EGYPT INDIA AND THE COLONIES,

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PREFACE.

THE following pages, to a considerable extent, treat of Eastern policy. The Author has long felt much interest in the affairs of the East, and ventures to express opinions on many subjects relating to them with that confidence which is alone justifiable, and which is alone deemed in the eyes of the world at large to be justified by a full knowledge of facts. Having on former occasions publicly stated views bearing on these topics, more or less of identity in the ideas advanced will, he trusts, be observed. In two or three instances repetition of the language used has been desirable, and all will agree that no one has more right to quote the ideas of an Author than the Author who himself originated

those ideas. Some of the anticipations which, on the occasions already alluded to, were brought before the public, have been in a remarkable manner verified by events, and some of them are still as true and as applicable as at any former period.

EGYPT, INDIA, AND THE COLONIES.

THE Isthmus of Suez no longer interposes an obstacle to free intercourse between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, and the most populous portions of the world will be brought into more immediate contact with the centres of moral and physical force in Europe than at any former period, either of ancient or modern history.

The canal now exerts its influence in bringing them thus into contact, and will every day more and more do so, whatever may turn out to be the facilities or the difficulties of maintaining it in a condition fit for navigation, with regard to which prophets of evil are still to be found, as inveterate as any who, in former times, declared that this vast undertaking could never issue in aught but failure and mortification. The predictions in which they at present indulge are discredited, it is true, by the highest engineering authority, and

will hardly be very seriously dwelt on by anyone acquainted with the circumstances of the case; but at all events the piercing of the isthmus is now an accomplished fact.

Egypt has thus become possessed of a modern interest, we may, without exaggeration, say for all men, equal to that handed down from remote ages, as belonging to its early records. The canals of Egypt have always been associated with mighty names, and Moses, Alexander, Cæsar, Napoleon, Nelson, and Lesseps have connected those annals with many of the most striking events and tendencies of their several epochs. The destinies of the world, however, seem likely to be affected by Egypt in future, more than they ever heretofore have been, dependent as those destinies must largely be, on the world-wide intercourse and the world-wide commerce which now draw all nations together, and have already stamped a new impress, and given a new character to the relations subsisting between the different families of mankind, as well as to the domestic features distinguishing each community. To attempt to anticipate all the relations to be developed between Egypt and its canal, and distant parts of the earth, would be futile; but indications

exist of the bearing of present circumstances on the prospects of India, of our Southern Colonies, and of the British Empire generally, the vast importance of which, as well as its pressing nature, in an eminent degree merit attention.

By Article 14 of the concession to the Canal Company, granted by the Viceroy of Egypt, and confirmed by the Sultan of Turkey, it is provided that, "the Suez Canal, and the ports appertaining thereto, shall always remain open as a neutral passage to every merchant ship crossing from one sea to another, without any distinction, exclusion, or preference of persons or nationalities, on payment of the dues and observances of the regulations established by the 'Universal Company,' lessees for the use of the said canal and its dependencies."

Our government has a right to expect that the sovereign of Egypt will see that this neutrality is duly observed; the immense increase of the facilities for communication between England and India through means of the Suez Canal, the construction of railways, and the establishment of the electric telegraph has augmented the value of Indian securities, *and has made feasible the application of capital to the development of the resources of India, to an extent hitherto undreamt of.* To

such a development of resources we must mainly look for the most available means by which to maintain the permanence of our dominion in the East, while performing the duty which has been imposed upon us as a nation, of promoting as a result of our advanced civilization, the well being of those Indian millions whose interests have come to be associated with our own.

The experience already acquired of the effects to be anticipated from the making of railways and canals in India, enables us to verify our work. Men of sense value the power of verifying their work, in whatever position of life they may be placed, more than any arguments derived from theory, or from the most unanswerable reasoning, of whatever kind it may be. A nation's experience is at least as valuable as that of an individual, and there is no longer room for doubt that ample returns are yielded by these works, both directly to those who furnish the pecuniary means required for carrying them out, and to the community at large, in the incidental advantages arising from them. The benefit derived by a nation from public works, often far exceeds that derived by individuals, even when their investments of money have been most successful.

The development of the resources of India by the application of British capital, to the extent which may fairly be reckoned on, would have remained as impossible as formerly, were it not for the augmentation of the facilities of intercourse with England, which has taken place, and is every day increasing. *The additional security afforded to our Indian Empire which springs from thence counts for a great deal*, in rendering practicable the investment of money on the large scale now contemplated, by those on whom devolves the official charge of the administration of affairs, so far as it bears on the construction of these works. Very intimate, therefore, is the connection between the prospects of the Suez Canal, and of the various modes of transit through Egypt, with the expectations entertained as to the development of India, and with the measures adopted to realise those expectations. The electric telegraph, at that time working in the country, saved India at the period of the Sepoy Mutiny, in 1857—58, by causing timely notice to be given of the designs entertained, and enabled also a British army to be diverted, by the late Earl of Elgin, from its destination in China, at a moment when its presence proved to be all important at

Calcutta; while even in its present imperfect state, the railway system in India immensely augments the efficiency of our military force. Both telegraphs and lines of steam communication are evidently calculated to be of as much use, when employed throughout an immense space, such as that between England and India, as when their efficiency was merely tested within the Indian territory alone. In warlike operations, a railway aids a General, principally by enabling him to assemble a comparatively large number of soldiers in a comparatively short time, on the point where he desires to employ them in the field. In proportion, therefore, to the distance from which a body of men is sent to perform any specified duty, will be the economy of military force effected by rapid communication; and accordingly the benefit accruing from rapid communication, must of necessity be more considerable, if the improvement in the means of transit exists throughout the whole route between England and India, than it can be between an Indian Presidency and any Indian locality where hostilities may be carried on, as *e.g.* on the frontier near Moultan.

Above £80,000,000 has been invested of late years under the guarantee of the Indian

Government, and further sums have to be laid out in completing the works already in progress. Government also have themselves executed irrigation works to a considerable extent. A further sum of about £75,000,000 is likely to be expended in completing the railway system as rapidly as Government may deem consistent with financial prudence, and it is supposed that £300,000,000 might very well be spent in constructing subsidiary lines. New irrigation works are to be undertaken on a scale commensurate with their importance, as causing an increase in the productive powers of the country; and as being fitted to afford the most efficient preventive remedy for the constantly recurring Indian famines; but there is a difficulty in finding any measure by which to form an opinion respecting the rapidity with which either irrigation or railway works may probably be executed; they pretty certainly are not likely to be executed so rapidly as heretofore since the course of events has demonstrated that private enterprise is not to be looked to for any aid in constructing them. Private enterprize alone could have effected what has been already brought about, as regards railways, in the period during which all has been done, (from

the commencement it may be said of Lord Dalhousie's Vice-royalty to the present day.) Private enterprise is not to be relied on to accomplish much in India, unless accompanied by a Government guarantee; and it has been decided to withhold, pretty generally, guarantees in future. This is felt by men who can value private enterprise, as Englishmen commonly do when familiar with its wonder-working powers in this country, to be a matter for regret; it will work its own cure, it is true, for Government cannot carry on their undertakings in India without the assistance of private enterprise, faster than they can borrow money in London with which to do so, which is likely to be to the extent of about £4,000,000 yearly. Probably, after a short interval, Government may again invite its co-operation, in some effective manner, when delay and its consequent evils have produced their results. Meanwhile, however, enough has been stated to prove the vastness of the opportunities which exist for applying capital in ways which promote the welfare of the population, while they fortify our Eastern Empire, and augment its resources.

To secure the neutrality of Afghanistan has been announced as the end of our recent policy,

as regards Central Asia. In order to secure it, negotiations have been entered into at St. Petersburg by our Foreign Office, and provided this be secured, English opinion has pretty well decided that the progress of Russia, in Central Asia, need occasion us no disquietude. The advantages certain to arise from the occupation by a civilized power of regions long pre-eminently remarkable for barbarism, and the perpetration of revolting crimes, cannot be questioned, as regards either ourselves or mankind at large. An understanding between Russia and Britain, that neither should seek to interfere with the interests of the other in Asia would be mutually advantageous, as fortifying the sense of security on either side; and as enabling national exertions to be all the more devoted to the advancement of civilization and the development of natural resources in the Asiatic possessions appertaining to each. This is a matter of the utmost moment, as cannot fail to be obvious when we consider the immense capital now in course of investment in India; and the very large measure in which British energy is devoted to doing justice to the natural capabilities of our great dependency. It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance to Russia of being able

to carry out similar improvement throughout her vast dominions in Asia, and particularly in Central Asia. There is a difficulty in estimating the magnitude of this importance, since the same data do not exist for forming a computation as in the case of India, and it may suffice to rest assured, that it is immense and indefinite. Nations have lately discovered that no application of money produces a more solid return, than an expenditure in improving the means of internal communication. This yields a revenue as real as is derived from land devoted to the production of food, by rent, or otherwise; and Russia has given proof of being fully alive to this truth by the zeal and efforts she has directed to the construction of railways in Europe.

One railway of about three hundred miles (which it is intended to construct), connecting the Sea of Aral with the Caspian Sea will probably produce a change in internal communications unprecedented anywhere else in the world, as an effect following from the making of so short a line; for it will open a route practicable for travellers, and commerce, and the transport of stores, not only through the locality traversed by itself, but likewise through the whole region

adjacent to these two vast pieces of water, and the navigable rivers falling into them.

The railways passing through the Isthmus of Suez have produced as considerable results in facilitating transit, but this is not a similar instance, since the transit is not for the most part internal; but comes from places at a distance, often from remote parts of Europe and Asia.

To secure the neutrality of Afghanistan is the point as to which British statesmen are principally solicitous, with reference to the politics of Central Asia. The exact mode in which this is to be secured, if it turns out to be practicable to do so, need not here be dwelt on, but good hopes may be entertained that the thing will be accomplished; the interests, both of Russia and of Britain so strongly indicating as they do the advantage to be derived from that course of proceeding.

The author has enjoyed opportunities for gaining valuable information bearing on Central Asia, and on topics connected with it from distinguished American diplomatists, who have had facilities for forming trustworthy opinions on subjects which seldom come within the scope of an Englishman's observation. To secure the neutrality of Afghanistan, and the neutralization generally of the

countries between the Mediterranean and India, ought to be the main objects of our diplomatic action as regards the East, and the official recognition of their being so must tend to advance the material well-being of those countries, and to ensure the permanence of peace.

The maintenance of the neutrality of Afghanistan almost necessarily infers that aggression on Persia should not be deemed a portion of Russian policy in the East. Persia can scarcely be considered, strictly speaking, to be in Central Asia, and the most ample latitude may be allowed for any amount of conquest and annexation in independent Tartary, while a different understanding might be maintained with respect to Persia. However, if Russia becomes preponderant in Persia, the independence of Afghanistan is threatened.

In a very extreme case, aggression against Persia might, doubtless, be repelled by the union of a British contingent with the armaments that could be provided by the Persians in their own defence. To aid in preserving the independence of Persia would accord with British policy in the East; and we are bound to aid in maintaining it by due regard both for safety and the avoidance of jealousy; the conquest of Persia by Russia, or

an alliance between them such as would place the Persian forces at the disposal of Russia must occasion uneasiness to our Government, and could hardly fail to involve expense in adopting what might be deemed requisite measures of precaution, but the neutrality of Afghanistan, or its freedom from influence on the part of a Power which may assume a position of rivalry, is what vitally affects the stability and strength of our Indian Empire.

It is to be remembered that Napoleon I. formed a design to invade India, resting very much on the succour to be derived from a Persian alliance; such a project is not likely to be renewed by France, the French, as well as other nations (our own included,) have learnt that nothing is so expensive as war, and that nothing pays so badly; as also that profit can never be derived from successful aggression where there has been a resistance directed by modern skill and science, and resting on such resources as its foundations as are in the hands of any great country. Defensive warfare, or warfare undertaken in vindication of supposed national rights must usually be differently estimated from any other warfare in many of its features, though in any conceivable case of

hostilities, one party, at least, must be guilty of either a blunder or a crime in not having applied for an arbitration, if there were imagined wrongs; and if there were none, the universal voice of civilized men at the present day condemns an appeal to arms.

In a book, published not long since (*the Suez Canal, the Eastern Question and Abyssinia*, London, 1867), the author stated his conviction, while the success of the Suez Canal was as yet undecided, that this success might be looked on as certain; and stating a belief strongly entertained, he further added, "Peaceful progress on the part of France in the East, need cause no umbrage to England. England's true policy is to maintain her means of defence intact on the Indian frontier, and at the head of the Persian Gulf (at the island off Bushire), and at the entrance of the Red Sea, at the island of Perim. She should at the same time join France, and if occasion offers, Russia also, in civilizing the East, and developing and ripening the several nationalities whose interests would be concerned.

"France, England, and Russia are too strong to have reasonable cause for jealousy, possessing as each does abundant means of defence, and im-

pregnable positions. Concerted action between the three would best accomplish the civilization of the East; but the object can be attained by co-operation between France and England alone.

"As far as possible, *the countries between the Mediterranean and India ought to be neutralized, i.e., ought to be placed on such a footing that exclusive rights should not be permitted to exist in favour of any nation as distinguished from others.*" He went on to say that "*free commuuications and reasonable arrangements as to trade should be guaranteed to all.*" The author had reason to be aware that the opinions entertained in the highest French political and diplomatic circles, before this was published, were entirely in favour of these ideas, and he had satisfactory grounds for believing, that not alone at that moment, but in futurity, so far as futurity could be reckoned on in any political calculation, these opinions were likely to remain unaltered, as their soundness was indicated by a due regard for the material interests of France. In a subsequent portion of the same work, he further stated, that the three great objects to be aimed at in a policy undertaken with a view to civilize the East:—"The improvement of the means of communication; the estab-

lishment of Civil and Religious Liberty, and the providing for the free sale of land to Europeans, can only be secured in any satisfactory manner by a previous understanding, and by co-operation between France and England, joined, if occasion presents itself, by Russia." These are the three great objects which should be sought to be attained, by measures adopted in the hope of civilizing these regions.

What is now advanced, in agreement with the ideas at present favoured both in India and in England, viz., that *our Government should secure the neutrality of Afghanistan, and that provided this be secured, English opinion has pretty well decided that the progress of Russia in Central Asia need occasion us no disquietude*, perfectly accords with this view. Central Asia is not situated between the Mediterranean and India, nor, strictly speaking, is Persia. Persia, however, is so much mixed up with questions, which may arise connected with countries that do lie between the Mediterranean and India, such as Afghanistan and Turkey in Asia, and may be so much affected by discussions as to transit, in reference more particularly to the Euphrates Valley Railway, of which so much has often been said, and to the

Suez Canal, that it ought certainly to be an aim with British statesmen to maintain the independence of Persia, so far as can be accomplished, by giving effective assistance to the means of defence, supplied by the national spirit of its inhabitants. At the same time, its independence is not to us an object of vital moment.

It is right to estimate the probability of a Russian invasion of India ever taking place, as well as the possibility of its success. That it is not impracticable is demonstrated, by India having been invaded from the North West by Alexander the Great, whose base of operations was as remote from the scene of his decisive conflict with Porus (which would appear to have been in the vicinity of the river Sutlej), as could be any base of operations chosen by Russian Generals. The Macedonian hosts probably at least equalled in numbers any force likely to be devoted to a Russian campaign; for the armies of the Persians and other Eastern nations in ancient times, usually consisted of such multitudes, as quite to throw into the shade all modern ideas; and Alexander had the strength of Persia at his command when he undertook this enterprise. In those days, it is true, invaders were not troubled with baggage trains, nor with

artillery, which might, no doubt, impede a modern army; but it is in the Commissariat department that any real difficulty could alone occur. *The Macedonian phalanx proved to be equally efficient on the banks of the Sutlej, as it had been shown to be in the battle of the Granicus; and the Armstrong guns, or the Russian artillery, which may be equivalent to them, must possess the same efficiency in the same locality, as they would do in Europe, when employed against the enemies of the Czar.*

It is manifest, that any instrument which confers a superiority on organization and science, as compared with mere rude force, will invariably exert a power in proportion to its perfection; the power of all instruments depends on the amount of command they give of what may be termed the material forces of Nature, and while rude force forms the basis of martial power, the degree in which it is turned to account depends on the skill and appliances by which it is rendered available. Since the efficacy, therefore, of the Armstrong gun immeasurably exceeds that of the Macedonian phalanx, it is safe to conclude that the ability of an invader to avail himself of such a tremendous engine (the powers of which must remain unimpaired at the termination of

any march, however harassing), renders the resources of a modern invader far greater than any that could have been possessed by Alexander.

But Armstrong guns can be met by Armstrong guns. The military science and appliances of Russia can be opposed on the Indian frontier by those of Britain. *The conflict, if ever it arises, will be decided by the preponderance of force brought to bear on the point of hostile contact.* The Indian railway system, if duly developed, will afford adequate means for bringing into position, in the neighbourhood of Peshawur, an army consisting of troops quite fit to oppose any soldiers in the world, and larger than any which Russia could send thither.

It is chiefly a question of railway communication: When Shere Ali, Ameer (Prince) of Afghanistan recently visited India, on his way to the conference, which took place between himself and the Queen's Viceroy, at Umballah, he for the first time travelled on a railroad. After examining it, the carriages, workshops, and locomotives, he made this most judicious observation, which proved him to be a man at once of reflection, education, and sound judgment: "No longer can we talk of Aristotle and Diogenes." No longer, indeed, unless we make ample allowance

for the circumstances of difference between their times and our own, which otherwise must derange all applications of their ideas, and all attempts to act on their doctrines.

We ought never to forget that, as has been stated, *the conflict, if ever it arises, will be decided by the preponderance of force brought to bear on the point of hostile contact.* This indicates,

1. That in order to be prepared for conflict, all practicable steps should be taken, to place our military system on a footing of efficiency, especially by facilitating the concentration of troops and stores through means of railways.

2. That the development of the resources of India should be extensively carried out, so as to increase the wealth of the country very largely indeed, and to augment the means at the disposal of Government for the purpose of resisting aggression, while at the same time conciliating the native population, whose sentiments are in this way capable of being deeply affected in a friendly manner towards our Government.

3. That a policy marked by justice, conciliation, and good sense should be pursued towards the native population.

4. That care should be taken to pursue a steady

and judicious policy with regard to foreign potentates.

As to the placing of our military system on a footing of efficiency, especially by facilitating the concentration of troops and stores through means of our railways, Colonel Pitt Kennedy, who had held the offices in India of Military Secretary to the Commander-in-Chief, and of Consulting Engineer to the Supreme Government in the Railway Department, in a pamphlet printed in 1858, (*Finances, Military Occupation, Government, and Industrial Development of India*, referring to a Report addressed by him to the Home Government of India, in 1852), made statements with regard to its military occupation which well deserve attention (page 8). "No one will deny that the efficiency of an army is in some inverse ratio to the time required to concentrate such a preponderating force of well-trained troops on any given point of its lines of defence, as shall secure victory over the largest hostile force that can be expected to attack it.

"When the movements are slow, as must be the case when the troops have to concentrate by marching, each limited district must be copiously armed for its own defence and protection; but

when the power of concentration is rapid, as in the case when troops can be brought together to any given point by railway from very distant stations, then a comparatively small force will suffice for each particular district.

"What the exact ratio of increased efficiency may be as compared with the increased power and rapidity of concentrating troops, and conveying artillery and commissariat supplies to the first place of assembly for a campaign, as well as in the subsequent supply of reinforcements and provisions, it is difficult to express in precise numbers. But it would probably not be straining the argument to assume that two-thirds of any given army for the protection of British India would be much more efficient, where a field force of 50,000 or 60,000 men, with ample artillery, stores, and provisions, could be congregated on any point of its vast lines of defence in twenty, forty, or sixty hours, than the whole of such an army would be, under the present system, requiring a mean period of three or four months to bring such a force together.

"It is not for a moment implied that, in the subsequent manœuvres of a campaign, the General can be aided by the existence of railways. Their

advantages, in a military point, are only assumed to apply to the first concentration of a force, and to its after reinforcement with troops, provisions, and stores. But all those acquainted with the Indian climate and practices will understand how much greater those advantages would be, as applied to India, than if our consideration had reference to Europe. In India, marching or campaigning in summer is out of the question, unless at a fearful expense of life and health to our troops, whilst, from the vast extent of territory we occupy there, the ordinary dispersion of our forces may be nearly in the ratio of one thousand miles, as compared with one hundred at home."

The same distinguished officer subsequently states, referring to an Appendix containing statistics digested with a discrimination and prudence equally worthy of remark, that—

"It would require forty-eight days to concentrate, *by marching*, a force of 53,000 men from an aggregate army of 325,840, (the number of the troops belonging to the Queen and East India Company, as given in a return made to the House of Commons on 15th April, 1852), costing annually £13,771,363; whereas an equal number could be concentrated by railway in seven days

from an aggregate army of only 100,000 men costing only £6,216,145, that is to say, the same number of 53,000 men could be brought to any one given point *by railway* in about one-seventh of the time, from an army under one-third of the strength, and costing under half of the amount as compared with the assembly of a similar force at the same point from the larger army without railway! To assemble, *by marching*, 53,000 men from an equally distributed army of 100,000 men would occupy nearly half a year instead of seven days by rail.

"*The advantages of railway transport for troops* in India over marching are, in fact, in the following compound ratios, viz. :—

"*As regards time in concentrating a field force, as* 24 *to* 1.

"*As regards the economy of military establishments, over* 2 *to* 1.

"*As regards the power of reducing the total numerical force of the army, over* 3 *to* 1.

"*As regards the power of reducing the number of Europeans,* 3 *to* 1.

"*As regards the protection of Europeans from fatal climate exposure, beyond calculation.*

"*As regards the averting of those contingencies*

that produce war and disturbance, beyond calculation."

Italics have been used for the last few paragraphs extracted from Colonel Kennedy's pamphlet to denote their extreme importance, and to draw special attention to them, as entering into a very curious and interesting subject, and this has been done also with regard to some others of these extracts. Colonel Kennedy, whose judgment, by reason of his scientific knowledge and experience of railways, must in a peculiar degree command respect, enters into some further particulars as to the means of intercourse and transport which call for notice; he goes on to say—"Every one conversant with the requirements of industry or of war, admits that a first principle essential to ensure the success of either is the advantage of convenient lines of intercourse, with efficient means of transport adapted to these lines.

"Few, however, having the power take the requisite steps, *at the fitting time*, to put their theory into practice.

"Sir C. Napier never allowed this principle to sleep. His masterly genius laboured with indefatigable perseverance and prescience to provide,

beforehand, all that could secure the results expected of him, and increase the efficiency, security, and well-being of those entrusted to his charge, under every contingency that might arise.

"His incessant attention was invariably given to his means of transport and intercourse. His most hardy exploits were necessarily crowned with victory. His troops were always at the decisive points, at the right times, when least expected, and fully provided.

"His intense appreciation of these essentials in war originated his masterly conception of high bred camel corps, capable of carrying bodies of fighting men eighty miles a day. It is not surprising that he quickly restored the prestige of British arms in India, previously tarnished in Afghanistan.

"The Emperor Nicholas would probably have admitted in theory the importance of transport for his troops and stores, but fortunately he did not act upon that theory in practice, and hence his successor was defeated at Sebastopol.

"How different would have been his position had he extended the St. Petersburg and Moscow Railway to the Black Sea before he ordered his

army across the Pruth. His forces about Petersburg would, in that case, have formed so many more divisions of the Sebastopol army, and the whole of the Imperial forces could have been available for the defence either of the north or south, as required, in fewer days than would have been wasted in marching 100 miles, avoiding that fatality which was known to attend those scanty reinforcements to which his utmost efforts were limited. Fortunate was it for the allies upon that occasion that no such railway existed.

"When the late war was declared with Russia, the British Minister would have admitted the importance of transport facilities; yet he sent forth an army without them. And all concerned would have admitted the importance of good communication between our troops at Sebastopol and their copious supplies only ten miles distant at Balaclava; yet those ten miles of impassable road (which ought to have been repaired in the first fortnight, had it cost the united efforts of one-half of the army and navy) produced the disasters and suffering of the first deplorable winter's operations; and most strange and unjust was the vituperation of the Duke of Newcastle,

to whom was due the only meritorious measure adopted—that of establishing, *though late*, an army transport corps. Had this department been effective when the expedition sailed, instead of being deferred until disasters called for its institution, and when it could only be brought together in a raw, inefficient state, and organized in front of the enemy at the time when its disciplined energy was most wanted—had these palpable requirements been foreseen and provided *in time*, and had a miserable ten miles of road been quickly repaired, tens of thousands of gallant victims would have been spared, and the progress of the siege and conclusion of the war would have been much more rapid."

The author had occasion to allude, in a pamphlet published not very long since (*Eastern and Indian Policy in connection with the Nationalities of Europe*, 2*nd Edition*, London, 1864), to some remarkable facts bearing on the subjects at present under consideration. In the Crimean war, the vast extent of the space in the interior of Russia, through which military supplies had to be drawn, told with destructive effect against the enemies of Napoleon III.; that vast extent of space having proved fatal to his uncle in the

Moscow campaign. This resulted from Sebastopol having been chosen as the scene of the French and British operations, the locality being far removed from those districts where Russian military strength was principally centred. *It is understood that a knowledge that this must be so, induced the Emperor of the French to consider that Sebastopol was the point of the Russian territory against which the main attack of the Allies could be most advantageously directed;* a noteworthy instance of what we may often observe, viz., that accurate information and the exercise of good sense enable a man of sagacity and experience and at the same time of strong and masculine intellect, to arrive at a foreknowledge, and to form conclusions, respecting the course of future events, with the same sort of certainty which may be felt in mathematical deductions, avoiding alike the bewilderments of fancy and of mental confusion. It is needless here to examine into the limitations with which such an assertion must be received (which chiefly arise from the possible eccentricities of conduct on the part of individuals, whose acts have to be taken into account in making any such computation); it will suffice to remark the fact to which allusion has been

made, and to remember that no similar condition of things can ever again be witnessed at Sebastopol, because of the railways which have been constructed since the Crimean war. We are bound, in common prudence, to do for Peshawur what has been done for Sebastopol, and happily there is no ground for anticipating that our Government will be wanting in zeal in completing the lines leading to Peshawur, as soon as possible. (*See* APPENDIX A.)

In 1850, Sir Charles Napier, there can be little doubt, saved India from scenes similar to those soon afterwards witnessed in the Sepoy Mutiny. The truth was, our native army had become preponderant, and there were no adequate means for keeping it in check, the railway system not having been developed. A spark might, at any moment, have produced a conflagration, and finally a spark did produce one, when the foolish alarm about greased cartridges issued in the frightful insurrection which ensued. Lord (then Sir John) Lawrence, the individual on the whole best qualified to judge, shortly after its termination publicly stated his belief that the story that greased cartridges were served out to the Sepoys in order to deprive them of their caste was the

cause, and it certainly was so. The reason for doubting this has chiefly been, that the idea was so absurd; but no one will continue to maintain this view, in opposition to the conviction of the highest Indian authorities, who is aware of the irritation and suspicion produced in the native mind, by the constant affectation at that time of a neutrality as to Religion which could not in reality be practised, since our Government prohibited the exercise of some of the rites of the Hindoos, such as burning widows alive, and interfered with their proceedings in many ways. Nor will anyone persist in being incredulous respecting the effect produced by the silly notions about greased cartridges who comprehends the dangerous posture of affairs which had roused Sir Charles Napier to adopt the energetic line of action which proved so successful in 1850, as well as to use the strong language with which he sometimes startled those who could not understand the dangers and necessities which at that period pressed on the Administration at Calcutta. The absurdity of the story as to the greased cartridges specially consisted in this, that the Sepoys fancied that it was intended to make them Christians by compromising their

caste, as the result of putting beef fat or pig's grease into their mouths, in biting off the ends of the cartridges on loading their guns. Had they known anything of the nature of Christianity, such a supposition never could have entered into their imaginations, and accordingly, now that a Christian policy has been established in India, to the extent of letting it be understood that our Government will act as they believe to be right, according to our own sense of morality, that is to say, of course, of Christian morality, and of permitting official persons to take part if they please in Missionary proceedings, there being evidently nothing to conceal, no more mutinies will arise from any similar origin.

The following opinion recorded by the pen of Colonel Kennedy throws much light on the position of things to which he alludes:—

"We were on the brink of a similar crisis in 1850, but Sir C. Napier was then our Commander-in-Chief; and that glorious model for British Generals and British Colonial Governors rapidly extinguished the extensive symptoms of mutiny as they appeared. There is no doubt that India was then only saved by his intellect and vigour from such horrible scenes as have recently been enacted.

"The remedy for the future must still be found in the precise measures delayed; but the disasters will have cost a sacrifice of capital which would have amply sufficed to furnish India with those essential railways that would have prevented their occurrence. Had forty or fifty millions sterling been advantageously invested in railways *at the fitting time*, no mutiny of Sepoys could have materially damaged the state of India, nor would any such enterprise have been attempted."

It must be borne in mind, that Colonel Kennedy was expressing his views at the period when the mutiny was actually raging. There is no need to detail the calculations made at that time, by which it appeared that a saving of £5,000,000 annually might have been effected as a consequence of possessing an adequate system of railways, through means of having an army far less in numbers than that which existed, though largely increased in efficiency. The saving thus induced would have more than repaid the original outlay before the mutiny took place, if the Indian Government had commenced the construction of railways in earnest twenty years previously. As it is, the vast improvement to

be observed in the finances of India has been principally effected by railways having been at length extensively established, and by the consequent reduction of the army; while the advances in agricultural and commercial prosperity, very much brought about by railway accommodation, have also produced their effects in greatly augmenting the public revenue, as well as in ameliorating the condition of the population.

The amount of return to be looked for by shareholders from Indian railways is capable of being fairly estimated by remembering that the security of the guaranteed return (usually 5 per cent. per annum) is quite satisfactory, being that of Government, and that this security is further fortified by the measures adopted for the substantial improvement of India, and more particularly by the value of the works belonging to each individual railway company. But the real question to be considered by shareholders in nearly every case is, how far their own operations, independent of any guarantee, can be rendered certain to return on their investments 10 per cent., after paying all charges and advances of interest made by Government in the first instance, and how soon they may be expected to do so. Ten per

cent. is the maximum dividend allowed to be received in almost all the Indian undertakings that are guaranteed by Government, and there is an impression among well-informed persons, that all the railways up to this time commenced will ultimately pay the maximum dividend, though the period at which they will do so may widely vary.

The incidental augmentation of the receipts of the Treasury, and the amelioration of the condition of the people hardly admit of being accurately computed, but the vast growth which has taken place in some branches of the public revenue is the consequence of the prosperity accompanying the opening up of districts at all previous periods isolated in poverty, and also of new markets having been created, chiefly by the demand for cotton, which at one time literally flooded portions of our Asiatic possessions with wealth beyond all previous experience or imagination. This suddenly acquired wealth produced the effects naturally to be anticipated; extravagance knew no bounds; the Hindoo, always fond of laying out money in jewels and finery, now shod his cart-wheels with silver; usually penurious, the mercantile classes now too

frequently became involved in wild speculation, to be succeeded by inevitable collapse. Still a solid improvement has been made, and a visible progress has been established, sufficient to mark the commencement of a new era, and to afford solid grounds for entertaining the most gratifying hopes. One excellent moral effect has made itself felt, along with this material development, in that it has caused so large a number of persons to be interested in the advancement of the country as to create a sound state of public opinion with regard to political and economical questions, partly by the introduction of numerous European residents. This is quite a novelty in the land formerly ruled over by the Moguls, and is not provided for in the Institutes of Timour. This novel fact in itself demonstrates that the triumphs of the Arts of Peace naturally go hand-in-hand with a legislation and administration founded on the science and moral sense of an enlightened and Christian nation.

The military defence of our territory was the thing that first claimed attention, to this extent at least, that there could be no doubt that if we were not able to hold secure military possession of the country, it was of comparatively small im-

portance what our ideas might be as affecting that portion of our dominions; the mischiefs following from such a disturbance as the Sepoy mutiny were incalculable, but merely as causing pecuniary loss and the dislocation of society, it is obvious that the possibility of any recurrence of similar risings was quite inconsistent with the well-being of our empire in the East. The correctness of Colonel Kennedy's views has now been demonstrated in all respects, except as regards the trial of them in actual warfare, for which, happily, no occasion has presented itself. It seemed best, in order to convey correct ideas of the connection between a well-arranged railway system and military occupation and defence, to state his views as they were originally promulgated. But the magnitude of the effects produced and to be produced, in developing industrial and commercial resources, and in providing suitable means of communication, quite equals any military result either already accomplished or still to be looked for.

Colonel Kennedy had addressed a communication to the Marquis of Dalhousie when Governor-General in 1849, stating his conviction that "in whatever view one regards the in-

terests of India—whether in respect to the application and consolidation of its military power, the efficiency of its Civil Government, the development of its industrial and mercantile resources; the advancement of its native population; or the health and security of its European residents—the first effectual impulse must consist in giving facilities to intercommunication through the instrumentality of railways." With regard to canals he considers that by means of irrigation conduits vast results might be accomplished, and at comparatively a very small outlay, and that while canals for only conducting water are very costly, those for the purposes of transit are very cheap.

For the most part, the true way to test works designed to promote public improvement, is to see whether they can support themselves by their own direct returns, which includes, of course, the yielding of a net sum at least equal to a sufficient annual interest upon the outlay. If they cannot, they clearly are almost always unsuited to the circumstances of the country. Railways, indeed, might properly be laid down for military purposes, even if they did not produce a sum equal to the fair annual interest, but there is no

reason to doubt that every railway in Hindostan will be productive to this extent in any event, and (as has been said) an impression exists among well-informed individuals, that eventually all those at present in course of construction will pay the maximum allowed to the shareholders, being about double the amount guaranteed by Government. But irrigation works yield to Government a return, in particular instances, out of all proportion greater than any looked for from railways. There is a wide difference of opinion as to the return to be anticipated from irrigation works; but this much is certain, that few such profitable operations can be named as tank irrigation; the irrigation carried on by means either of old tanks, or newly-constructed ones. It is supposed that the substitution in new works of irrigation of canals for tanks, is capable of turning the quantity of water available to far more account, and experience justifies the assertion that they are often highly remunerative. They have been relied on by our engineers to supply the place of tanks in many cases, which was not a course of proceeding in favour with the native originators of similar undertakings in former generations; but there seems to be reason to

think that the largest ratio of return, in proportion to capital, will commonly be in tank irrigation (whichever mode is calculated to lead to the largest general results), if only because tank irrigation is particularly confined to limited localities, and therefore is likely to be carried out specially in those places where the temptation is greatest. The construction of an irrigation canal, if of any length, must usually necessitate, on the other hand, that the wants and capabilities of different localities, the bad and the good together, are to be taken into account. But this by no means infers that as works to be carried out on a large scale, either by Government, or by private enterprize in conjunction with Government, irrigation canals may not present the most eligible, because the widest openings; and perhaps at a rate of profit to those taking them up, hardly to be attained on a large scale in any other description of investment.

Some of the irrigation works undertaken by Government have been unfortunate, in having caused a larger expenditure than would have sufficed had the operations carried on been, in the first instance, better understood. Experience had to be purchased. But the general result has

been attained, that all the irrigation works taken together yield a return decidedly greater than the yearly interest on the total outlay, at the rate paid by Government on their loans (which may be taken, on the average of the last thirty years, to be 5 per cent.); that this return is increasing, and that a considerable augmentation is to be placed to their credit in the revenue arising from taxes of various kinds, more particularly in the customs and excise.

The returns from irrigation works are often liable to be mixed up with the returns from navigable canals, which are very frequently constructed along with them, or form part of them; the object, in many instances, being to use the canals both for conveying water and for the purposes of navigation. The propriety of thus using them has been questioned, for there obviously may be a deficiency of water for navigation, if it is largely absorbed by distribution over land; and Colonel Kennedy believed that the whole revenue of India could not ramify irrigation to the extent required, either to fertilise her arid districts or to economise her enormous waters by the instrumentality of navigation canals, with all their costly lochs, &c. It does

not follow, however, that such works could not be carried out with borrowed money to any desired extent, for care can be taken in each instance (as in any other matter of business) to see that there is proper security to warrant the outlay. Though, according to the judgment of many, the investment of money on a large scale in navigation canals would be undesirable, others entertain just as strong a prepossession in their favour. Sir Arthur Cotton, who has achieved greater success in conducting operations connected with throwing water over land than any other individual, gives utterance to a conviction widely differing from the conclusions of those who mistrust navigation canals; and certainly it is often observable that men of the highest mark entertain each their own persuasion with regard to Indian topics with an intensity that makes little allowance for views opposed to their own. Experience alone can afford the means of arriving at a decision which shall not be questioned; but this much has already been demonstrated, that railways, and irrigation works, and navigable canals also, pay adequately, when judiciously planned and executed, and that so large is the aid derived by the military and civil administra-

tion of the country from the railway network even as already established, that it has been shown to be a safe and satisfactory basis for carrying out the future proceedings of Government in developing the resources of India; very much by reason of the degree in which it justifies confidence in the permanence of the present order of things, and thus affords security for the laying out of large amounts in the prosecution of these enterprizes.

So long ago as in the year 1854, Sir A. Cotton stated that the returns from forty irrigation works in the Madras Presidency, including all those of any consequence which had been executed there during fourteen years, had been on the average 70 per cent. (a few failures being included), up to the presentation of a Report which he quotes, and that at the time when he wrote, the returns must have been at least 100 per cent. on the outlay; the average being taken from the year of the execution of the works, and he represents that there was also an increase in the indirect taxes, induced by an increase of revenue from all articles paying duty. Nothing has since occurred to justify any doubt that this rate of return has been maintained, and it may be taken as a very common rate yielded by irrigation works.

Common sense declares plainly enough, that better openings for employing capital advantageously must be presented in a country almost in a state of nature, and occupied by an abundant and industrious population, than can be expected in one where the most inviting openings have been taken advantage of, such as Great Britain; or where there is a deficient supply of labour, such as a newly-planted colony in a territory formerly uninhabited.

Comparison is frequently most instructive, when there is a wide divergence of circumstances, provided proper allowance is made for the divergence, and that no features either of difference or resemblance are allowed to mislead. India is even still, comparatively poor, because being very much without any substitute for human labour, all that its inhabitants can do is barely to provide necessaries for themselves, and to meet the burthens of taxation. England is wealthy, and possesses an enormous surplus income, because with, perhaps, 25,000,000 of people, as much is done (independently of what may be called the productive machinery of manufactures), by the aid of internal lines of communication, docks, and ports, as could be accomplished by 200,000,000 of people, if

they had to manage everything by manual labour, assisted by bullocks, as in India. The services performed by machinery and physical agents strongly resemble those rendered by slaves among the nations of antiquity, but the economical, as well as the moral, results are far more valuable than those of slave labour. The population of Britain having, therefore, the benefit of the work performed to such a prodigious extent, beyond what could be effected by their unassisted efforts, there is a vast amount exchangeable for other things than mere necessaries, and above what is requisite for meeting the calls of taxation. On a larger scale, because the population is larger, India will become rich like England, whenever appliances similar to those existing in England make labour equally productive.

Sir Arthur Cotton, to whom the author is indebted for many of the ideas here advanced, though he has felt compelled in some instances to modify them, states the following as some English rates for conveyance :—

	Mile per Ton.	
Liverpool to Manchester,	3d.	Railway,
London to Birmingham,	$0\frac{4}{5}$d.	Canal,
Liverpool to Birmingham,	$1\frac{3}{4}$d.	Railway,

and asks what would be the diminution of traffic, if the cost were suddenly increased eight-fold? This much is certain, that it could not exist as it does now. In considering, however, the case of India, it ought to be remembered, that important as is the cheapness of carriage in England, it is yet more important in India, because the distances are greater, and the articles to be moved very largely consist of raw produce. Each new line, either of railway or of water communication, taps some hitherto inaccessible district; when new lines are opened, cotton is grown where it never was grown before, and in determining the probable results of forming a new line, it is not so important to consider what is the actual traffic, as to ascertain the prices of staple articles at its different points.

A startling fact is mentioned by Sir A. Cotton, which exhibits in the strongest possible light the loss to the country from the want of good communication. He says that almost the whole of the manure of India is consumed as fuel. This use of manure for fuel is not for want of fuel of other kinds; it is solely for want of cheap transit. Were the forest and coal districts laid open by cheap transit, all the manure would be devoted to restoring the land.

The British Empire is one great whole; it consists of a black half and a white half. Whether India shall be preserved from famine, and have cheap carriage and abundant crops, and whether Britain shall have an adequate supply of raw produce, and a reliable market for manufactures to an indefinitely increased extent, concerns every man, woman, and child, both in India and in Britain, for the interests and trade of India and Britain are intimately interwoven and united.

The income of the Godavery district is expected to be increased seven fold when the water is all distributed, and a surmise has been made, that the British imports into India would soon amount to £100,000,000, if a similar increase took place in all parts of the country. They had increased to £21,000,000 in 1861, from £7,000,000 in 1850.

There is no room for doubt that water-carriage is infinitely cheaper than any other kind of carriage, and Sir Arthur Cotton's facts and figures may not be questioned; but the point which in most instances practically determines the choice, in deciding as to the construction of works between navigation canals and railways is this, as to whether the circumstances are such as to justify Government in making a navigation canal, not-

withstanding the fact that it is not prepared to establish them generally, and notwithstanding also the general agreement of opinion now arrived at that, for military purposes, railways are preferable. In particular cases, natural advantages and the facilities obtainable for commerce, will cause navigation canals to be made, as in the instance of the Ganges canal. More commonly, however, there can be little doubt that the urgent need of railways for the general purposes of administration, the improvement of the country, and above all, for its military defence, together with the difficulty or impossibility of constructing them as rapidly as they are required, must induce Government to bestow on them a greater portion of its available means than can be applied to any other engineering object; indeed probably to do so almost exclusively for some time to come. The only course by which this can be avoided is, by encouraging private enterprise, and thus enlarging the amount of resources available for advancing the improvement of India. The encouragement of private enterprise at present would infer the extension of the guarantee system, which finds no favour in the eyes of those now charged with the management of Indian affairs, and is not

likely to do so till the pressure, induced by the indefinite delay of works which ought to be executed, leads to an outcry sufficient to bring about an alteration of views. The distress produced by the want of an adequate supply of cotton in Lancashire has already caused a considerable modification of opinion in those who hold the directing power both in the Council of India and at Calcutta.

It is a question of pressure and of available resources, and of the soundness of the principles acted on. No one has any desire but to do what is best, however unfortunate are the results sometimes experienced, as in the case of the Orissa famine, in which above 1,500,000 people died, which horrible calamity might have been prevented had the district in which it occurred been supplied with suitable appliances for distributing water over the land; which might, on the evident approach of actual scarcity, have been mitigated by providing suitable means for supplying the inhabitants with food, when their district was evidently condemned to suffer, in consequence of having been neglected; and *which, in point of fact, was circumscribed in its extent by the operations of a company (the East India Irrigation Company) formed for carrying out irrigation*

works, and which had laid out a large sum in the construction of these works, finally approved of by the Government Engineering Department. Wherever this Company were engaged in carrying out their works, the Orissa famine did not extend. Could the benefits of private enterprise be more plainly marked?

In the *Times* in September, 1868, a letter was printed bearing the signature "Private Enterprise," well understood to proceed from the pen of an individual more competent, perhaps, than any other man in the City of London, to detail facts with regard to the application of private enterprise to the carrying out of works in India. The following extract bears on this subject:—

"In November, 1861, Lord Canning, the then Governor-General of India, whose policy with reference to the construction of works for irrigation by English capital and joint-stock companies was truly liberal, sound, and statesmanlike, after much deliberation, and after consulting with those most competent to advise, entered into a contract with the East India Irrigation Company for the supply of works to the province of Orissa, the terms of which deed were at the time considered, and have since proved to be amply sufficient for

the protection of every public interest; and also satisfactory to the company and to English capitalists, for the required funds were thereunder readily subscribed in England. Lord Canning saw that this should be merely a commencement in the right direction, and that upon success attending the efforts of that, his pilot company, the vast private treasures of the mother-country, awaiting secure and profitable investment, would flow to India instead of to half-civilized countries unconnected with England in streams never ceasing, and that although even that source would not be sufficient to provide all the numerous and gigantic works absolutely required to cover and protect the enormous area now untouched, it would materially aid the Government, and confer very extensive and permanent local benefits; and at the same time present a safe investment for the surplus capital of the ruling race. He therefore publicly expressed a hope that the contract then executed by him would prove the forerunner of many others of a similar character.

"To make preliminary and working surveys and plans, and to determine a scheme of works for a territory so large as Orissa, was, of course, a work of time; but these were entered upon with

that spirit and energy which exclusively belong to private enterprise, and in 1863 actual executive labours were commenced.

"Now I desire to draw especial attention to the real public benefits which have been already conferred by the operations thus wisely sanctioned by Lord Canning, as at this moment it is highly important that they should be known and well understood in a national sense.

"For many years prior to 1861, Orissa had been the source of extreme anxiety and of great expense to the Government, arising from its peculiar state of subjection to floods and drought each in their turn, and almost annually destroying life and property largely, and rendering agriculture a mere speculation or game of hazard only. The city of Cuttack, the capital of the province, had long been considered in imminent peril of being swallowed by the Mahanuddy (that is Great River,) which, dividing itself into two unequal branches at that point, encloses the town on either side; and during the time of floods threatened to engulf the whole, the tongue of land upon which the city stands being several feet below the river, so that each year its certain destruction was anticipated with dread. The Government had

directed inquiry upon inquiry; reports and recommendations had been made to them without number, but nothing had been decided upon—the usual result in such cases. However, before the Irrigation Company had been at work eighteen months, embankments of a massive, well-constructed, and thoroughly effective character were by them erected around this before apparently doomed city, and Cuttack is now admitted to be in a state of perfect safety for the future. Beyond this one important public benefit the same joint-stock association has now—within three years—constructed enormous stone weirs (anicuts) regulating the flow of the Mahanuddy, large masonry head-works, and sections of irrigating canals, affording lines of navigation also, by which more than 130,000 acres of land are commanded for irrigation, upon which food for upwards of 160,000 adults can even at the present, or rather, past rate of production be realized; therefore the company may now, with proud satisfaction say, 'This otherwise fine province which has been annually subject to these dreaful visitations, under one of which its population is being paralyzed and more than decimated, has been made by us, so far as human precautions and human means

can make it safe, entirely safe and free for the future.'

"Now all this public good has been secured by a wise resolve of Lord Canning to accept an available means of good. The contract intended by him as such has in deed and in truth proved a veritable model deed, worthy to be established and extensively adopted. No difficulties have arisen under it, no possibility of oppression or extortion; the Government and the Company have both found its provisions sufficient admirably to effect all they have desired. The fixing of a price for the water to be supplied, the collection of that price from the cultivators, the regulation of the supply—all these have been amicably and satisfactorily arranged by its conditions; and from this time forward Orissa has a prospect of advancing solid prosperity before her, in contrast with the misery and degradation of the past, and the Government will also gain largely—as largely, in fact, directly and indirectly, as they would had they themselves executed the works instead of the company, and this without risk or without the expenditure of capital on their part, in addition to which the loyalty of the people is insured in a gratifying manner.

"Here, then, be it known, is plainly shown what is now required of Lord Cranborne (at that time Secretary for India) if he desires to gain the praise or thanks of his country. Let him only announce that he will encourage private enterprise; that to all who may seek to apply English capital to works of irrigation in India he will grant the same terms as have been granted to the East India Irrigation Company; and, in addition, let him turn a deaf ear to those who, tainted, possibly unknown to themselves, with the old civilian exclusive policy, protest against the employment of any other agency than that of the local Government; and, above all, let him personally investigate and understand the facts for himself, and he will inevitably regenerate India, and secure the hearty approval of all. He will, I am convinced, soon arrive at the conclusion that, even with the joint and energetic action of Government and private enterprise, there will remain, after many years, much still to be done to make the work perfect, and that therefore it is his paramount duty to do all in his power to welcome the wealth of England to assist in the repression of famine and the bestowal of prosperity where millions of our fellow-creatures are dependent upon his actions."

All this was perfectly true when written, but there is room for doubt as to whether the concession of terms similar to those arranged between Lord Canning and the East India Irrigation Company would now suffice to cause the investment of English money in enterprises of the same nature. It having become manifest that the works of the Company had been satisfactorily executed, at the very moment when a good—a large return—might naturally have been reckoned on by the shareholders (without the expectation of which they, of course, never would have laid out their capital in India), Government made a proposal to purchase their property. A proposal from Government cannot always safely be rejected, and it was not deemed advisable to reject the terms which Government saw its way to accede to, so the property was sold at a slight profit upon the outlay which had been incurred. *Lord Cranborne (now Lord Salisbury) did not, unfortunately, as he had been counselled to do in the letter already quoted, "turn a deaf ear to those who, tainted, possibly unknown to themselves, with the old civilian exclusive policy, protest against the employment of any other agency than that of the local Government."*

Government having purchased the works of the East India Irrigation Company, private enterprize is, so far, at an end in the locality where they were carried on.

The East India Company, perhaps, forgetful that their own origin was derived from private enterprize, termed all those persons interlopers who were engaged in trade in India, but were unconnected with themselves and with their monopoly, and the old jealousy of interlopers entertained by the Company and by their servants has been said still to survive in the Council of India, which in a great degree is composed of those who formerly were employed by that celebrated Corporation. Those engaged in private trade were the interlopers first complained of; the old India House contrived to produce the impression at home that the settlers were an extremely unquiet body of would-be slave owners; that politically they were highly injurious; and that their presence might very well be spared. Trade, however, was more benefited by the exertions of these useless interlopers than by any other one cause. The missionary, at last, became the worst of all interlopers, according to the views of the "traditional policy," as it was called,

—the men who introduced the printing press education, and the Bible, who secured instruction for the bulk of the people, and compelled the suppression of Suttee, were all missionaries, *interlopers of the very most unbearable description.* The India House was obliged, by the unmistakable utterances of public opinion in England, by degrees to allow of comparatively free action for them all; its own system broke down in the Sepoy Mutiny, and it never had to tolerate an irrigation company, or any except most restricted sales of land. When the Government was led, by proceedings adopted in England (chiefly in Lancashire), to acquiesce in the sale of land, the whole system complained of as being obstructive had to give way. Fragments of it and jealousies may survive, but the era of reform on a grand scale then commenced; the action of British sentiment became direct and potent; and, while it is gratifying to feel well assured that it will hereafter prove as it has already proved irresistible, just acknowledgments are due to the many eminent and patriotic men who are in the Council of India, for the efforts made to serve their country, and very emphatically for acting with the steadiness and energy demanded by the

magnitude of the interests committed to their charge; a steadiness and energy adequate to check when requisite the desire for experiment which is ever more likely to inspire a movement party than those on whom devolve the responsibilities of office. That the Council of India and Secretary for India, in their joint action, pursue a course calculated to promote the welfare of the British empire, so far as it rests with them to do so, the results already attained attest with an accumulated weight of unerring evidence. They are ready to learn from experience, and doubtless will soon see their way more clearly than they as yet can, as to how all incidental arrangements may be best carried out, in connexion with plans for distributing water to the cultivators of the soil. It is asserted that difficulties might sometimes be apprehended, in cases where such incidental arrangements had to be made by any party except the Government.

Notwithstanding the confidence justly to be reposed in the tried capacity of some of the members of the Council of India, the introduction into it of men virtually representing the commercial and manufacturing interests vitally affected by their relations with our Eastern territories is

much to be desired. Difficulties there are that have hitherto prevented this from being brought about; difficulties growing chiefly out of the disinclination of individuals of large fortune, if in business, to afford the time required for attendance in London, and it is the circumstance of being in business which would be the qualification in the case of individuals thought of for seats in the Council, in pursuance of the statesmanlike views promulgated, not long since, at Manchester, with universal approval by the Marquis of Salisbury. Still, of such vital and pressing urgency is it to secure judicious treatment for questions relating to private enterprise, that we must hope that the pressure of necessity will in time overcome these difficulties, and it certainly will do so, if in no other manner, at least by causing those with whom the selection rests to be all the less fastidious in their choice of members of Council. It must never be forgotten that, as has been said, wherever *the East India Irrigation Company were enabled to carry on their operations, the Famine, known as the Orissa Famine, did not extend, and that if effective encouragement had been given to Private Enterprise, it would not have occurred at all.* The

fact that when it did occur it was intensified by the unfortunate course adopted by Government, and by the absence of sufficient means of communication, does not militate against what is here asserted. An infusion into the Council of men unaffected by the "traditional policy" is urgently demanded. (*See* APPENDIX B.)

The line of conduct pursued by the Council with respect to the East India Irrigation Company has so seriously discouraged the ideas once entertained of executing works by means of private enterprise, that private enterprise must be deemed to be out of the question, unless a Government guarantee is given, very much of the nature of that afforded to railways.

Railways would never have been constructed except by private enterprise, and with the aid of a guarantee. It was requisite for the defence of the country that they should be constructed, and the thing has been done. If irrigation works are not constructed largely, the people will literally die by millions of famine, as they have done hitherto, and irrigation works do not seem likely to be constructed to any adequate extent, unless by private enterprise, and with the aid of a guarantee; persons interested in India may rea-

sonably and anxiously ask, *will the thing be done?*

It rests with the British Government and Legislature to decide. While the local Administration in India talk about executing such works, the people will die of famine from time to time, as they did in the instance already adduced of the Orissa famine.

Such works ought to be carried on by the investment of capital, not by the expenditure of surplus revenue. If surplus revenue is looked to, it will be otherwise applied, to meet the pressing necessities of the day, as has been the case hitherto. For various reasons, the institution of a Board of Public Works and Colonization is much to be desired. If to such a Board the laying out of a specified sum each year were committed (say £4,000,000), and the payment of the money into their hands were secured, public works would be carried out in the most effective manner. But there is only one way in which such a sum is likely to be raised by such a Board, and that is by giving guarantees to undertakings to be executed under their auspices.

The funds raised under guarantee for railways are placed in the treasury for specified purposes,

and through the periods of commotion and danger which have intervened since these works were undertaken, have always been available to be applied according to their proper destination. Money has been raised by the Companies year by year, and operations have never been suspended for want of pecuniary resources. The history of those public works which remained in the hands of Government (and notably of irrigation works), shows that this would not have been so had the execution of these enterprises entirely depended on Governmental agency.

The colonization of districts by Europeans or Asiatics is so intimately connected with the construction of public works, that both should be under the supervision of the same Board.

Such a Board could very well arrange that a register for shares, and stock, and debentures should exist in India (at each Presidency), as well as in England. This would cause a large increase in the amount of Indian capital invested in guaranteed securities, which has very generally, by men of the highest authority, been deemed a matter of great moment.

The appointment of a Minister of Commerce and Agriculture would be a measure very much of the

same nature as the institution of a Board of Public Works and Colonization. He might perhaps be a member of it, or be its president.

The opportunities for profitably investing capital in India are immense, and indefinite in extent, but at present, on account of considerations relating to the facility of obtaining money in London, it may be best to limit our expectations (or rather aspirations, for the thing will too probably not be done), to carrying on works to the extent of £4,000,000 in each year. The results already ascertained leave no doubt of the adequate profits to be derived by individual investors, and of the unusually large profits to be derived by the Indian community from judicious investments, by an augmentation both of revenue and resources, in addition to direct returns. To develop the resources of India ought to be the object kept in view by Government, far more than any idea of increasing trade with Central Asia, where it will be stopped by Russia, whose commerce is identified with her political power, and will be artificially supported to any extent. Russian preponderance throughout Central Asia will be complete, and this infers that Russian commerce will there exclude all rivalry. Chinese

commerce with India is certain to be checked in a similar manner, though not in the same degree, and may probably be chiefly managed in accordance with American influence.

In the earlier part of the year 1869, a Committee appointed by the Society of Arts, held numerous conferences in London, for the discussion of subjects connected with the Arts, Manufactures, and Commerce of our Indian Empire. The proceedings of this Committee fully supported the character long admitted to belong to the Society, of representing a larger amount of practical science than is elsewhere to be met with in this country, and of being the chief centre of information on those topics of general utility which are included within the scope of its Charter. The remarkable manner in which it has been able to originate some of the grandest enterprises of our age, especially when acting under the guidance of its President, the late lamented Prince Consort, is known to everyone, and the instance of the Great Exhibition of the Industry of all Nations, which was at first arranged in the rooms of this Society, not only under his auspices, but mainly by himself, will present itself to the recollection of all. Its illustrious President achieved the

highest grade of personal reputation as other men do, by being in a pre-eminent degree suited to his age and nation, and representing their peculiar forces, but he enjoyed one distinction which was very singular in attaining this highest grade of personal reputation without having been born a native of that country with which he was afterwards identified.

Never has the Society of Arts taken up a worthier topic than that which they referred to the Committee alluded to—the Arts, Manufactures, and Commerce of our Indian Empire. The immensity of that empire, and its importance to the prosperity of the nation at large, render the matters discussed things of the gravest concern to every inhabitant of the British Isles; and it is only to be regretted that this truth (it is literally a home truth) is not as vividly or as generally appreciated as could be desired. Such interchanges of sentiment, however, as those referred to, carried on as all discussions are which have been originated at the invitation of the Society, by men competent from their position to do them justice, cannot fail to enlighten the public mind, and to be productive of commensurate benefit. Lancashire is perhaps as much affected as India

itself by Indian legislation; that legislation often makes the whole difference between starvation and plenty, by reason of the commercial dependence of one upon the other, and particularly because of the cotton supply from India being that at present of the principal importance, as it must in many respects be deemed to be. The moral aspects of our duties with regard to India are as momentous and as vast as any material interests; but politics and moral considerations are very apt to be based on material interests, and it is for the most part a test of safety that they should be so based, when a care for material interests is not permitted to interfere with principles approved by conscientious conviction and the teachings of experience. It is a certain fact, that up to the present moment the civilisation of India has advanced, step by step, equally with the recognition of our duty to act towards that great Dependency, in accordance with the dictates of our own sense of what is morally right, *i.e.* according to Christian morality; in other words, to pursue a Christian policy. This does not necessitate the interfering with others, so as to be opposed to the widest toleration, further than is called for in obvious cases, such as in preventing the burning

of widows. Crime is not to be tolerated, even when veiled under the name of religious principle, or the assertion of religious convictions.

The Committee of the Society of Arts resolved on June 17th—

"That the Council of the Society move the Indian Government to offer a money premium for the best manual on 'Tea Cultivation,' affording the greatest information to the intending planter.

"That the Council of the Society move the Government of India to take steps for providing, by means of a Department of Agriculture, or otherwise, for the diffusion of information and for the encouragement of productions, after the manner of France and other countries. The subjects to which such recommendation would more particularly apply are—Information regarding waste lands and the opportunities for acquiring or renting them; the various methods of agriculture which are or might be adopted in India; agricultural results and statistics; the use of manures; the cultivation of tea, coffee, cotton, silk, wool, and the other staples."

Soon afterwards, the Secretary of State for [illegible] of Argyll, received an influential

deputation from the Council of the Society and the Indian Committee; a good deal of discussion took place on the topics brought forward, and a promise was given on the part of Government at once to refer the recommendation as to the creation in India of a Department of Agriculture, to Lord Mayo, as Viceroy. The principles put forward by the Committee of the Society were admitted to be indisputable, but the application of them appeared to be a matter demanding a good deal of consideration. In reference to this particular branch of the subject, the Duke of Argyll, with great good sense, replied—

"There was no doubt whatever of the immense benefit which had been derived in this country, even, from the establishment of voluntary agricultural societies. The Highland Society had had a very powerful effect upon the agriculture of the country, and the corresponding society in England had also done a great deal of good. He was afraid there were not the same materials in India for getting up a purely voluntary association of such a character, but the intelligence and education of the native princes were now so much improving that he was not at all sure that, with some assistance from the Government, some such

organisation could not be established, and perhaps that would be the best way of setting about it. He would, at any rate, communicate with Lord Mayo upon the subject immediately. From what had been said by the gentlemen who had addressed him, he did not conceive that the present application was made in any spirit of accusation of the Government of India, and certainly he was not about to take an apologetic tone; but it so happened that, having been examining certain statistics with a view to a financial statement, he found that in the decennial period since the mutiny, the purely agricultural products—exclusive of opium, which being a Government monopoly, and in other respects exceptional, he omitted—had increased nearly £23,000,000 in declared value. A very large proportion of this amount represented cotton, for in one year the amount was £10,000,000, and in another year it was still more. The export of grain had also largely increased, showing that the agricultural prosperity of India was rapidly progressing. Then there were several items which were comparatively new, as oil-seeds, wool, coffee, tea, jute, all of which had only appeared in any quantity since the mutiny, but they now figured for about two

and a half millions. This comparison was not taken in any extraordinary year, but represented the increase in the last year, for which they had complete returns, 1866-7, over the year before the mutiny, 1856-7. If an exceptional year were taken, when the stimulus of extraordinary prices operated, the result would be still more astonishing, for during one year of the American war, the increase of exports was £27,000,000, the total amount being £41,000,000, of which £31,000,000 represented cotton alone."

The Author feels justified in expressing a very decided opinion, that *the appointment of a Minister of Commerce and Agriculture, as President of a Board of Public Works and Colonization in India, would best meet the requirements of the case.* In this view he is fortified by the judgment of individuals well qualified to arrive at a trustworthy conclusion, from their acquaintance with the administrative details connected with Indian affairs, but is inclined to base the statement of this opinion entirely on the common sense of the matter, which is, that it is impracticable to prevail with a man of ability, well known, tried, and appreciated in England, to go to India, unless he is to occupy a prominent station. To have such a man in the

position of Minister of Commerce and Agriculture, and President of a Board of Public Works and Colonisation, is the first condition of success, and the creation of a separate department for the management of the business which would devolve upon it is requisite if the business is to be done well; indeed, it is requisite, if the business is to be done at all, so far as a great portion of it is concerned, since unless accounts, for the industrial operations now intended to be carried on, can be kept distinct, and manifestly distinct from the general Government expenditure, the operations will, many of them, from time to time, be starved for want of money, and the difficulties of obtaining money will be enhanced, from want of confidence. Private enterprise cannot be superseded in India, without sacrificing what has been the mainspring of British energy and success everywhere else in the world, but if it is to be superseded in India, at least let us possess in its stead a Govermental Administration which will do its business well; comparatively circumscribed, as may be its sphere, until private enterprise is again taken into alliance with Government to provide for necessities, perhaps as pressing as was the need for constructing railways, and thus placing

the military defence of the country on a secure foundation. Such necessities will probably present themselves, in consequence of continued delay in executing the enormous works of various kinds still called for, and in consequence also of Indian famines, arising in part from our allowing the irrigation works to fall into decay, which were provided by the foresight and piety of the princes of former days, whom we call barbarous; the Hindoos esteem them differently, and consider that the execution of such works is so meritorious, as to secure for those who originate them eternal happiness. Nothing so comes home to the native mind, as thus conferring benefit on mankind.

One of the things most dwelt on in the Conferences of the Indian Committee of the Society of Arts to which allusion has been made was the colonization by Europeans or Asiatics of hill districts, and of districts which without being actually amongst hills, are at an elevation of from 3,000 to 4,000 feet above the sea. The importance of such a colonization is universally admitted, but a difference exists among well-informed persons as to the extent to which it can be established. Colonization is the peopling and

settling of a country, and there is no doubt that the application of labour and capital to the localities whose capabilities were debated must be productive of many advantages to India. Any land increases in productiveness pretty nearly in proportion to the labour and capital expended on it. The districts spoken of would yield profitable crops, tea, coffee, cinchona, silk, and some other products of temperate climates, and a small portion only of their surface is at this moment under cultivation. Everyone agrees that so far as the colonization of these districts can be effected, good will have been accomplished. There is an immense extent of jungle which if cleared would in all respects present a most tempting field for settlement. *The success of the exertions first made, where few obstacles have to be overcome, will, it may be supposed, in a great degree, determine how far colonizing operations shall be extended.*

Colonizing operations in India in a very peculiar manner depend on establishing the means of communication with whatever locality may be thought of, as offering inducements for undertaking them. The opening up of a locality in the first instance, and the subsequent develop-

ment of its resources, for the most part are alike affected by the existence of facile means of transit. The Indian Government have at length become alive to this fact, and a railway is intended to be constructed to Darjeeling in Bengal, which shall open up a district fitted for the location of Europeans, and for the cultivation of the products of temperate climates; and another to the Neilgherry hills in the Madras Presidency, where such operations have already been carried out to a greater extent than in any other part of India.

In Central India more land is available for similar purposes than in all other localities put together, but it is extremely unhealthy, and until it is cleared of jungle the expectation must be vain that there could be any European colonization. In considering the probability of any such colonization being advantageously effected it ought to be borne in mind that a far larger number of native workmen than of Europeans can often find room in a district as yet only partially developed, so that there probably will, in such a case, be an abundant supply of comparatively cheap labour, to be utilized to the utmost by European capital and skill. Also, in looking at questions relating

to colonization in India it should ever be remembered, that it may sometimes be effected merely by transferring a native population from one place to another, where climatic reasons might render it quite impossible to think of fixing any considerable number of the English race, *e. g.* in the localities generally which are suited for the growth of sugar, cotton, rice, or indigo.

All these circumstances indicate the propriety of dealing with questions arising out of the desire to execute public works, and to promote colonization, through the medium of a Board appointed to deal with these two objects. Thus alone can justice be done to them, and to the interests involved in their being so treated as shall most conduce to the public welfare. The special necessity arising from financial considerations, for the supervision by a Department of the Administration of Public Works in India, has been already alluded to.

Mr. Hyde Clarke, at whose instance as a member of the Society of Arts the Committee referred to had been appointed, in the conference relating to hill settlements and Sanitaria, expressed his conviction that with districts in the hills containing English cities, towns, villages,

and homesteads, of which Simla, Darjeeling, and Hope Town are the mere working models, we should possess permanent schools for the moral regeneration of India, to which the natives would resort, and which would act as a salutary corrective to the vernacular press. A satisfactory step in advance has been made in the recent settling of English working parties of military men at the hill stations, but it is civil colonization which (in Mr. Hyde Clarke's judgment) is most energetic, and he has long considered that hill settlement, and the measures dependent on it, can only be efficiently promoted by the appointment of commissioners, on a footing similar to that of Land and Emigration Commissioners, and that it is chiefly through the subdivision of labour and systematic organization that this is to be accomplished.

Sir Vincent Eyre declared at this Conference that he had always regarded it as a great mistake that we had not turned our old soldiers to some such excellent account, instead of allowing them to come home to be half starved on small pensions. They would, he thought, be more happy and more useful as colonists; he had been much struck with regard to Russian progress in

Asia by the circumstance that every step had been accompanied by the founding of colonies, and he entertained no doubt that it was the true mode of procedure, to advance step by step, and take root as they went along in the wild countries which they overcame. This, we may observe, was the course pursued by Alexander the Great in his invasion of Central Asia (though that it was so does not seem to have impressed itself on the mind of Sir Vincent Eyre, or of any Indian officer), and constituted, in truth, his master idea and the main feature of his policy. Our position in India differs, it is true, from that of Alexander of Macedon, or Alexander of Russia in Central Asia, but benefit may be derived by us as by them from establishing colonies which are to be relied on, and if the Macedonian leader deserves praise for asking of his preceptor Aristotle (the great master as he has been termed by successive generations of our learned men) "what was the best method for colonizing," looking as he did upon colonization as the most effective means for carrying out his designs, we certainly shall be inexcusable if we neglect the lessons of experience, which have secured for us more knowledge from our own success in colo-

nizing other parts of the world than was ever dreamt of by Aristotle.

Hill colonization in India would make it practicable to effect a considerable economy in military arrangements, by keeping a smaller number of European soldiers than must always be needed, if they have not such a support to fall back on in case of necessity as would be always secured by the existence of settlements of Europeans, as also on the aid always to be derived by a European army from a European population, with regard to the value of which we learnt some striking lessons during the mutiny. There would, further, be a very serious economy in locating invalided soldiers at hill settlements, when they so desired, instead of sending them home, thus saving an enormous expenditure, and providing handsomely for each soldier thus located, instead of, too possibly, only enabling him to return home to die in a workhouse.

Speaking of Southern India, Sir Charles Trevelyan said:

"Here there was a solid foundation for commercial and industrial prosperity, coffee cultivation being the great staple. The produce was of excellent quality, and might be grown with

profit to any extent, the demand of Europe for this article being constantly on the increase, and the region suited for coffee cultivation in Coorg, Mysore, Wynad, and the Neilgherry and Travancore hills being practically unlimited. European colonization in the Neilgherries approached nearer to the Australian and American type than anywhere else in India. Europeans could live there out of doors all the year round. The climate was invigorating. The residents had abundant means of employment and subsistence, and the Madras Government had been liberal in their arrangements for giving security of tenure at moderate quit-rents, in a manner acceptable to the planters. A considerable amount of colonization had taken place, and it was still going on in a satisfactory manner, through coffee planters, through a large number of retired officers, and also through the schools, the latter being a very interesting feature."

Again,

"Everything appeared to be going on admirably. A separate commissionership had been established, to give the advantage of local administration; and even if our Indian empire were to be rent asunder to-morrow, he believed an

important self-sustaining fragment would be left there; but surviving, as he believed it would, for generations to come, and continuing to grow and develop, he looked to the Neilgherries as a source of solid strength, as a sort of bulwark of European power and Christian civilization in the south of India."

A population of about 70,000 has become subject to Christian influences in this part of India, through the instrumentality of Protestant missionaries. This fact renders the justice and soundness of Sir Charles Trevelyan's observations all the more apparent.

And again, speaking of military colonization,

"He thought it a mistake to take any body of men whatever, and to turn them into ready-made colonists. The work of colonization was one which all men were not capable of. It required some special personal qualifications, and the manner in which our English soldiers were cared for and looked after was not favourable to the formation of the self-reliant habits which are so necessary for colonists. Of course, a considerable proportion of European soldiers were qualified to become useful and successful colonists, and they did become so. They percolated, as it were, into

real colonization; but to encourage them to settle in a body, and to assist them with little outfits, was a mistake. It had been tried, and failed over and over again. During his experience at the Treasury, two remarkable instances had come under his observation—one in Canada, and the other in New Zealand. Both were dead failures, and he attributed it to the fallacy of supposing not merely that military, but that any body of men, as a class, were fit to be colonists."

This emphatically demonstrates the justice of Mr. Hyde Clarke's view that civil colonization is the most energetic, and demonstrates likewise the absolute necessity of having a complicated subject of such vast importance and multifarious bearings as the colonization of the Hill districts, placed under the control of an administrative department specially charged with it; but it by no means proves that colonies of Europeans, and of those possessing European descent themselves, or mainly acted on by European influence, would not be quite as useful, in a military point of view, as the military colonies of Russia or of Austria in modern times, or as those of Macedonia in remote antiquity. The military element would not be the least influential in the composition of

these Indian colonies, and the principle of mixture is a principle of strength. In truth, the Macedonian colonies in Central Asia were as much mixed as any British colonies in India could well be, and were accordingly strong, and maintained the Grecian sway, notwithstanding the disadvantage under which they laboured of Alexander's empire being divided into four distinct portions. They finally lost their character (their mark, their stamp, according to the literal signification of that expressive Greek term), as distinguished from that of the populations in the midst of whom they had been planted, but they lost it by absorbing into the polity founded on the teachings of Aristotle, that of the surrounding nations—barbarians, as a Greek would always have termed them. Anglo-Saxon colonization is the great fact of the present day, and to compare it or its energies with anything developed by the military colonies of Russia or Austria, useful as these are in their way, would be not only illogical—it would be ridiculous. Still, what is stated by experienced men of the benefits to be looked for from permanently locating discharged soldiers in India is not to be neglected. To locate them in favourable situations could not fail to be advan-

tageous, so far as its effect was capable of exerting an influence, and would be a thing of considerable moment in strengthening our military defences.[1]

Up to the present moment, strong as we may be, we have taken little root in India. The huge cedars to be met with in the Himalayas spread vast lateral branches, but take little hold of the soil, and when a storm comes they topple over. Our position is somewhat similar; and to fortify it, whenever opportunity presents itself, is the part of prudence.

Mr. Hyde Clarke had previously published a book (*Colonization, Defences and Railways in our Indian Empire*), recommending measures for giving effect to his ideas respecting the settlement of Europeans among the Hills, and the development of the adjacent regions. He says (pp. 124, 125):

"The land sales fund would constitute the

[1] The Author desires to express his obligations to the Rev. Dr. Pusey for much interesting and highly important information brought together respecting the Macedonian and other Eastern monarchies, in his *Lectures on Daniel the Prophet*. It is recorded that Alexander was more particular as to planting his colonies between the Pass and the Indus than anywhere else. This was in the precise locality where we are now particular to place our defences on a strong footing, between the Khyber Pass and the Indus.

basis of the immigration; and when immigration was carried out on an adequate scale, an emigrant could be taken to Calcutta, Madras, or Bombay, as cheaply as to Sydney or Wellington, and could be carried up country by emigrant trains as cheaply as from New York or Montreal to Michigan or Lake Huron. From £14 to £20 per head would place an assisted immigrant in Darjeeling, Simla, or Assam.

"The more immigrants the more land would be sold, and consequently the larger the amount of the land sales fund, while a proportional outlay, as in the colonies, on roads, bridges, and other necessary works for making the public lands available for settlement and sale, would likewise enhance the proceeds of the fund. An immigration of 50,000 men, women, and children per year would be within the limits of the ultimate progress; and such numbers would constitute an effective and powerful colonization."

Bearing in mind that as has been said, *the success of the exertions first made, where few obstacles have to be overcome, will, it may be supposed, in a great degree determine how far colonizing operations shall be extended*, it is safe to adopt these statements of Mr. Hyde Clarke as guides to

indicate the objects to be aimed at. In concert with the late Mr. Ewart, Mr. Hyde Clarke brought the subject of Hill Colonization before a committee of the House of Commons, who reported in its favour, and a pledge was given that one-fifth of the troops should in future be kept at the hill stations. This pledge has, as yet, been only partially acted on; but will, doubtless, be adopted to its fullest extent as a rule to be observed with respect to military cantonments, so soon as the requisite arrangements can be made.

It is asserted on unquestionable authority, that two soldiers, at the least, die at the stations in the Plains, for one who dies on the hills.

The three great developments have now been described of the material resources of India mainly to be relied on as affording a basis on which our power in the East may be best maintained; and which present besides a sure foundation on which our Indian polity may be managed, so as to satisfy our national conscience, and secure the most conderable amount of benefit to that portion of mankind who are directly interested, that is to say, the inhabitants of Hindostan, and those of the British Islands generally. An amount of military force adequate for the defence of India against

any attack from the north-west, from which quarter alone danger is to be apprehended, can receive adequate support from the increased resources to be looked for, our measures of defence always resting on the sea-board as their basis. Supplies from England can always be thrown in from the sea-board; through the Indian Ports most frequently, but in the case of actual hostilities existing, by the action of a fleet whenever it may be called for, as it has been called for in our expeditions to Persia, Egypt, and Abyssinia. The resources of India, when duly brought into play, will suffice for the defence of India, and we can calculate with a precision that is strictly and literally mathematical, that the amount of force which can be brought to bear on any point by our railways, will so far exceed any amount which can possibly be brought to bear on the same point against us, as to render the idea futile, that we shall ever be unable to maintain our position in the north-west. Moral and political considerations, it is true, have to be taken into account, which do not admit of mathematical, or of any precise calculation; more particularly as to the loyality of our Indian populations; as to the number of troops requisite to be kept disposable

for the garrison service of India, independent of any resistance to invasion; and also as to the expense which might have to be incurred by taking the steps approved of on the part of those charged with the direction of affairs.

Loyalty, in a sense such as is attached to the word in Europe, can hardly be said to exist in Hindostan. That chivalrous and energetic principle is absent, which will induce a nation to do and dare all for the love of God and country. But the native population proved itself, for the most part, to be our well wishers at the period of the mutiny, though they did not rise as a mass in our favour; it is hardly possible to imagine their being hostile to us; and, in point of fact, the British Government is day by day acquiring a firmer hold on the native mind. In this condition of things we must look for strength to the amount of our available force of various kinds; and, if this be kept up to its proper standard, there is no reason for apprehension with respect to any moral or political contingency. Even the questions about finance are safely to be dealt with by keeping our finances on such a footing as commends itself to our British notions of paying our way as we go along; and by augmenting the

wealth of India in encouraging the various modes of operation, and of investment which have been mentioned.

Were it not that we have only to provide for possible defensive warfare, we could not arrive at a trustworthy conclusion as to what it is in our power to accomplish. Knowing as we do our ground, and the precise end at which we aim, it is practicable to calculate with an unusual degree of exactness.

Much as has been said of the improvement effected in India by the establishment of adequate means of communication, and by employing capital in industrial investment, it is impossible to convey any definite idea of the enormous growth in value of private property, and this must ever be the surest foundation of the resources of a state. The 700,000 acres of irrigated land in Tanjore, for instance, are now sold for at least £2 per acre more than before the great works were executed there in 1836. The saleable value has been more than doubled. Rates of augmentation, on so large a scale, when they cannot throughout a vast country be made the subject of statistical admeasurement, only justify us in asserting that the results brought about possess an importance as

considerable as regards the resources and the well being of a nation, as even a very satisfactory increase in the annual revenue paid into the public treasury.

It is difficult, often impossible, for an individual to arrive at a decision as to Indian topics, which, until tried by experience, can command any general assent of well-informed men. The suffrage of a majority, of course, may often be gained, but to command anything like a general assent would appear to be peculiarly difficult. This is the more remarkable as it arises, not from party violence, as vehement diversities of opinion with reference to public affairs for the most part do in England, but from differences of judgment conscientiously entertained, and entertained with a depth of feeling and vigour of sentiment natural to men whose lives and energies are absorbed by the interest attaching to official avocations to which their lives have been devoted. It is such public servants that have given India to Britain, and it is such who must keep it, and while those charged with official responsibilities, or the legislative conduct of the public business, are bound to take care to see their way clearly before they commit themselves to any line of proceeding, they

and the British nation ought ever to recollect how vast a debt of obligation is due to these Indian officers, even when ideas advanced with the zeal of earnest conviction cannot be adopted. Franklin speaks of a French lady who wrote to her sister that it was very strange that she never met with anyone who was invariably right except herself, and while it would be unfair too strongly to press an analogy between the two cases, this much at all events is obvious, that as concerns untried questions, when men of the most well-known ability and knowledge differ, caution has to be practised, until the test of experience can be exercised; and that in the meantime, in public as in private life, the part of a man of prudence is to verify his work as he proceeds; to prove that his principles of action are true, if they are true, by looking at the results; and if they are not true, then to amend them. The object kept in view throughout the preceding pages has been, not especially to advocate any theory or theories connected with India, but rather to give an account, so far as was called for, of the circumstances on which the defence of our Eastern territories mainly depends, as well as of the solid growth in wealth, strength, and material resources,

which has been brought about under the auspices of British rule in Asia; and in doing so to trace some salient facts as to our religious, moral, and political position and prospects in India, connected as these facts are with our policy as regards the Empire at large. Our religious, moral, and political position and prospects in India constitute the chief points of contact between that great subject, the defence of India, and those other great subjects with which it is connected. Like all topics of immense magnitude, involving extended moral considerations, the growth in wealth, strength, and material resources which has been brought about under the auspices of British rule in Asia, may be said to embrace in all its various relations and ramifications, connexions more or less intimate with all human science. Moral considerations necessarily involve multifarious relations to an indefinite extent, whereas material considerations are bounded by material limits, except so far as they are connected with moral truth. Nothing material, perhaps, has such extended and varied relations as the facts relating to the possession of the precious metals, involving as these facts do questions of finance, which are of a moral and political nature. But though

questions having a financial bearing with respect to India have been treated of at some length, it would be an error to direct attention to them as being of the most moment.*

To maintain our position of defence is of greater moment, than to improve our Indian finance, for unless we have a good position of defence, no one is likely to care much about our finance. To maintain also that standard of political ability and military efficiency which acquired India is likewise of greater moment. Gold ultimately will only remain with the strong.

But all depends on our keeping the command of our communications by sea, and on our seaboard in Asia remaining available as the basis of any operations that may be undertaken by us, as it has been hitherto.

And in this matter we are exposed to a competition and a rivalry which press us far more immediately and more seriously, than anything that needs to be guarded against in India, or in Central Asia. If New Zealand, Australia, and the Cape Colony cease to be portions of the British

* It has been asserted (not perhaps quite gravely), that the effects produced on the mind ordinarily by the presence of a purse well filled with gold in the purse exhibit in the form most easy to be understood, the connexion of mind and matter. There is some truth in the remark.

Empire, their seaports will afford the means of fitting-out expeditions against our Indian possessions, and our Indian commerce, and the application against ourselves of the doctrines and practice which we established during the late American war would be as inconvenient to us, as it would be agreeable to large numbers in the United States, because of the ideas entertained by them as to the retributive justice which they would affirm was thus vindicated. All the world knows that nothing is more probable than that New Zealand, and indeed all our colonies, will before long cease to acknowledge the sway of the British sceptre, by reason of the line of conduct now pursued towards them, the effects of which most people in this country deplore, however difficult they may consider it to be, either to remedy those effects, or to devise a better system for regulating the relations to be maintained between the different portions of our dominions. However, the loss of the Colonies is not the worst thing to be feared. *The great danger is that many of them may become American.*

In *Fraser's Magazine* for January, 1870, there is a remarkable article, dealing with the Colonial question (or rather the Imperial question as it

was more correctly designated by the late Lord Palmerston), from the pen of a remarkable man (Mr. J. A. Froude), one who can view current events connected with ourselves, in the light of history.

"These are not the days for small states: the natural barriers are broken down which once divided kingdom from kingdom; and with the interests of nations so much intertwined as they are now becoming, everyone feels the benefit of belonging to a first-rate power. The German States gravitate towards Prussia, the Italians into Piedmont. While we are talking of dismembering our empire, the Americans have made enormous sacrifices to preserve the unity of theirs. If we throw off the Colonies, it is at least possible that they may apply for admittance into the American Union; and it is equally possible that the Americans may not refuse them. Canada they already calculate on as a certainty. Why may not the Cape and Australia and New Zealand follow? An American citizen is a more considerable person in the world than a member of the independent Republic of Capetown or Natal; and should the colonists take this view of their interests, and should America encourage them,

what kind of future would then lie before England? Our very existence as a nation would soon depend upon the clemency of the power which would have finally taken the lead from us among the English-speaking races. *If Australia and the Cape were American we could not hold India, except at the Americans' pleasure. Our commerce would be equally at their mercy*, and the best prospect for us would be to be one day swept up into the train of the same grand confederacy.

"It is easy to say that we need not quarrel with America, that her interests are ours, that we mean to cultivate friendly relations with her, with such other commonplaces. *From the day that it is confessed that we are no longer equal to a conflict with her, if cause of rupture should unhappily arise, our sun has set: we shall sink as Holland has sunk into a community of harmless traders, and leave to others the place which once we held, and have lost the energy to keep.*

"Our people are generally too much occupied with their own concerns to think of matters which do not personally press upon them; *and our relations with the Colonies have drifted into a condition which it is agreed on all sides must now be modified in one direction or another. Statesmen who ought*

to have looked forward have allowed the question to take its own course, till they have brought separation to the edge of consummation."

This able writer (many of whose ideas are here incorporated with other ideas that appear to merit attention) points out that well-directed colonization is capable of securing strong positions throughout the world, and that *means are to be found for bringing about a union with the Colonies, in other words, a federation of the Empire.*

To find the best means for imparting additional vigour to the different portions of our scattered dominion, enabling them to support each other and to strengthen the whole, is looked on by most men as being the Imperial question. To accomplish this is what is commonly meant by bringing about a federation of the Empire. *The federation itself must consist, however, in arrangements or compacts regulating the relations of each part of the whole.* And the chief difficulty has been hitherto held to consist in the providing of an adequate and suitable representation in London of the information bearing on Colonial topics possessed by various individuals, and of public sentiment as prevailing in the several Colonies. A federation may subsist as much between states

included in the same empire, as between states that own no common head.

The public mind has, in truth, long tended in this direction, and no proposal could be more popular in England than one holding out a well assured prospect of bringing about such a federation. Ideas often possess an inherent force, and the exigencies of public affairs have, frequently in the course of history, been provided for by such a force; the weakness, debasement, and hopelessness of Italy were met by the idea of a united Italy, the inherent force of which idea (the force of the aspirations of an entire people, it may be said, anxious for the attainment of this object), went far towards securing its own accomplishment; Monsieur de Lesseps always relied on the force of his idea of piercing the Isthmus of Suez, and achieved success in his unprecedented enterprize mainly by that force; and the force of the united will of British citizens all round the world is adequate, if wisely directed, to establish a well arranged federation of the empire.

An organization is occasionally called into existence by political ability, fitted to meet the urgency of cases as they arise, without those cases having been originally specially foreseen,

of which the most remarkable instance on record is afforded by the history of that Company of the merchants of England trading to the East Indies, which acquired the greatest extent of conquest gained in modern times; an empire probably surpassing in wealth and strength any empire acquired by conquest at any period of the world's annals. The budget of the Finance Minister at Calcutta is double the amount of the revenue of the Great Mogul, during the most flourishing epochs of the Tartar dynasty; and we may safely lay it down that neither Timour, nor Ghengis Khan, nor yet Alexander the Great, ever possessed the *absolute* power of money and of military force combined, which now centres in the hands of the Queen's representatives in Asia. The *comparative* power at the disposal of the Great Rulers of Mankind in former ages is, in some respects, to be differently estimated, as will be evident to any one who bears in mind, that the human race at the present day have at their disposal more ample riches than were enjoyed by their ancestors, and an increased command of the resources of nature, as well as vastly more effective appliances of civil skill and military science; the fact is chiefly to be noted, because a forgetfulness of the difference between

the absolute and the comparative increase of resources in modern times has led to some singular and serious errors in political calculation.

The great need of the British empire at the present day is an adequate and suitable system of federation, which would meet the urgency of cases as they arise. Without this it is plain enough that the empire will fall to pieces, and many writers, usually among those who are unaffected by the responsibilities of public station, do not hesitate to express a hope that its disruption may be brought about; for the most part veiling, or seeking to veil their hope under various phrases which may commend themselves to those who cannot comprehend that weakness, however veiled, will certainly be appreciated by the mass of mankind; and that a consciousness of weakness, and of acting on weak counsels while pretending to maintain a footing second to that of no other power in the world, is inconsistent with that self-respect which is the most valuable possession of a nation, and the loss of which must at once lead to irresolute action, to disparagement, and to misfortune.

Mr. Froude says in the article to which allusion

"*Other nations once less powerful or not more powerful than ourselves are growing in strength and numbers; and we too must grow if we intend to remain on a level with them. Here at home we have no room to grow except by the expansion of towns which are already overgrown, and we know not certainly that we can expand. If we succeed it can be only under conditions unfavourable and probably destructive to the physical constitution of our people; and our greatness will be held by a tenure which, in the nature of things, must become more and more precarious.*

"Is there no alternative? Once absolutely our own, and still easily within our reach are our eastern and western colonies, containing all and more than we require. We want land on which to plant English families where they may thrive and multiply without ceasing to be Englishmen. The land lies ready to our hand. The colonies contain virgin soil sufficient to employ and feed five times as many people as are crowded into Great Britain and Ireland. Nothing is needed but arms to cultivate it, while here, among ourselves, are millions of able-bodied men unwillingly idle, clamouring for work, with their families starving on our hands. *What more simple than to*

bring the men and the land together? Everything which we could most desire, exactly meeting what is most required is thrust into our hands, and this particular moment is chosen to tell the colonies that we do not want them, and they may go. The land, we are told impatiently, is no longer ours. A few years ago it was ours, but to save the Colonial Office trouble we made it over to the local governments, and now we have no more rights over it than we have over the prairies of Texas. If it were so, the more shame to the politicians who let drop so precious an inheritance. But the colonies, it seems, set more value than we do on the prosperity of the empire. They care little for the profit or pleasure of individual capitalists. They see their way more clearly, perhaps, because their judgment is not embarrassed by considerations of the Chancellor of the Exchequer's budget. *Conscious that their relations with us cannot continue on their present footing, their ambition is to draw closer to us, to be absorbed in a united empire. From them we have nothing to fear, for in consenting they have everything to gain. The legislative union with Scotland was found possible, and there were rather greater difficulties in the way of that than those which obstruct a union with the colonies.*

The problem then was to reconcile two nations which were hereditary enemies. The problem now is to reunite the scattered fragments of the same nation, and bridge over the distance which divides them from us. . . . . England would not hold the place which now belongs to her had there not been statesmen belonging to her capable of harder achievements than re-attaching the colonies. It is not true that we are deterred by the difficulties. If there was the will to do it, if there was any real sense that the interests of the country required it, the difficulties would be found as unsubstantial as the proverbial lions which obstruct the path of the incapable. We are asked contemptuously how is it to be done? We ask in return, do you wish it to be done? for if you do, your other question will answer itself. Neither the terms of the federation, the nature of the Imperial Council, the functions of the local legislatures, the present debts of the colonies, or the apportionment of taxation would be found problems hard of solution, if the apostles of *laissez faire* could believe for once that it was not the last word of political science."

Mr. Froude further very fairly and most forcibly urges, that if the unity of the empire is preserved,

"*at great stations round the globe there would grow up, under conditions the most favourable which the human imagination can desire, fresh nations of Englishmen. So strongly placed, and with numbers growing in geometrical proportion, they would be at once feeding places of our population, and self-supporting imperial garrisons themselves unconquerable. With our roots thus struck so deeply into the earth, it is hard to see what dangers, internal or external, we should have cause to fear, or what impediments could then check the indefinite and magnificent expansion of the English empire.*"

All depends on the fact being established that an Englishman emigrating to Canada, or New Zealand, shall be still on English soil, as much as if he were in Essex or Middlesex, and that he shall remain an Englishman while the Empire lasts; he practically is not on English soil, if the portion of the Queen's dominions where he resides is to be remitted to its own resources for defence, as New Zealand has been, instead of being defended by the British Army, like Essex or Middlesex; and if, furthermore, he has no means of making his voice heard in the direction of the affairs of the empire. Nor can he feel certain of remaining an Englishman while the Empire lasts, when the Se-

cretary of State for the Colonies informs colonists, in answer to their complaints, that they may cease to be attached to this country as soon as they please; nor when it is deemed a proof of enlightenment and patriotism on the part of those who profess to be particularly enlightened and patriotic to speak hopefully of the time when the Empire shall only consist of Great Britian, Ireland, and India. It will not be deemed enlightened or patriotic to speak hopefully of a period when either Ireland or India shall not be included in the Empire, so long as both are considered to be profitable, or to be necessary appurtenances to Great Britain. The most erroneous and short-sighted idea has come to be widely entertained, that the colonies are not profitable, and already it promises to work out its own accomplishment and to prevent their being so. Before the separation was effected of the former North American colonies from the British Crown, Franklin hoped and was fully persuaded that the British Empire was capable of indefinite expansion, and that its power would become quite irresistible by the extension of the British race in free communities, attached to the Crown, and placing at the disposal of the Crown the force which belonged to

each, without any expenditure of power on the part of the Metropolitan State being requisite to control them. It is such an expenditure of power that for the most part fritters away the strength of empires, and detracts from the Democratic force, which in one sense must be at the root of all social action, since the people ultimately do all; directed or controlled as they may be by those in whose hands authority is centred. Democratic energy is commonly as much the support of a Despot as of a Demagogue. Franklin considered, and truly, that foreign statesmen were fully alive to the importance of this expansive force which was then inherent in the British empire, and sought to impress his ideas on the Earl of Chatham, who, he says, agreed with him, and so far as material force is concerned, we see what the result must have been, had the American colonies remained till now attached to us. It is of no use to say that this was impossible. Opinions are divided as to that, but there can be no question whatever as to the amount of material force which would have belonged to the empire had Franklin and Chatham succeeded in preserving its unity by a just and wise Administration of Public Affairs;

had the aspirations of Franklin and of Chatham been fulfilled in the first instance, by success in their efforts to induce Parliament to apply to the North American Plantations, that fundamental maxim of the Constitution that Englishmen shall not be taxed without representation, and subsequently, perhaps (on the necessity becoming apparent, as it has done, that an adequate system of Imperial Federation should be established), by other Franklins and other Chathams in later times facing difficulties and mastering events, instead of being mastered by them, which has, for the most part been the result of the proceedings of our more modern statesmen with reference to our colonies. It had been affirmed to be part of the Common Law of England, that Englishmen did not cease to have the rights of Englishmen, *to be Englishmen in fact*, by settling in plantations beyond the sea, and this undoubtedly was and is part of the Common Law. A mistake on that subject, however, caused the loss to this country of our most ancient and at the time most valuable possessions in consequence of the monstrous attempt to tax Englishmen otherwise than by their own representatives. *The same mistake, though by a different mode of operation, the ima-*

gination that Englishmen cease to be Englishmen by becoming colonists, seems to be but too likely to cause the loss of our present transmarine possessions which are peopled by the British race.

A meek and helpless resignation to suffer periodical amputation has been substituted for the ideas of Franklin and of Chatham, and "the art of reducing a great empire to a small one," the study of which was ironically imputed by Franklin to those ministers of George III. who goaded the Americans into an armed assertion of their rights, appears now to be taken up, in sober seriousness, by many who would fain make the world believe that they possess an unusually large amount of political wisdom; perhaps that, as a class, they monopolize it.

Mr. Froude admirably marks the precise points where all these false and feeble doctrines break down; he plainly shows that, if the British empire is to exist at all, we must provide means for self-defence, and set aside preconceived opinions, when they interfere with what is literally the *common* sense of nations, which they do when they manifestly tend to the dissolution of the empire, since as yet every nation that has ever existed has been impressed with the paramount necessity of providing for self-defence.

Some imagine that England is to be an enormous workshop for the world, and the universal emporium of free trade. But no one even professes to see his way through the dangers brought about by the trades unions. All are aware that our manufacturers cannot hold their ground against foreign competition, if these unions are to dictate the wages paid in England, and if they fix them at so high a rate as to render business unremunerative. Mr. Froude very justly observes:

"The unions and the master employers are in a state of war, either open or at least suspended; and war is the most wasteful and ruinous of all means by which human differences can be adjusted. Every strike is a battle—a battle which determines nothing—in which there is no glory to be gained, and no victory to be won, which does but widen the breach more irreparably, while the destruction of property and the resulting ruin and devastation are immediate and incalculable....Nothing but absolute failure will check the growth of manufactures among us; but is it absolutely necessary that the whole weight of the commonwealth should be thrown upon it? Is there no second or steadier basis to

be found anywhere? I for one cannot contemplate the enclosure of the English nation within these islands with an increasing manufacturing population, and not feel a misgiving that we shall fail in securing even those material objects to which our other prospects are to be sacrificed. We shall not be contented to sink into a second place. A growth of population we must have to keep pace with the nations round us; and unless we can breed up part of our people in occupations more healthy for body and mind than can be found in the coal-pit and workshop, unless we preserve in sufficient numbers the purity and vigour of our race, if we trust entirely to the expansion of towns, we are sacrificing to immediate and mean temptations the stability of the empire which we have inherited."

The quotations have been printed in italics, which appeared to be of the most moment with reference to the object mainly intended to be served by their introduction. It is hard to estimate too highly the importance of the strength which would be conferred in providing for the defence of India, by the possession in the southern hemisphere of positions strong in themselves, and strongly held by British citizens. It is especially

requisite to assure ourselves not only that we can make available as a security for Her Majesty's dominions, either in India or elsewhere, the expansive powers of Anglo-Saxon colonization, but that we shall be able to do so permanently; otherwise our exertions may be thrown away, and our outlay of capital in India may be rendered comparatively unsafe. Some may say that they do not want colonies, but no one will advise that British money shall be laid out on Indian railways, unless he feels pretty certain that the British flag can be kept there in its present position of supremacy. Colonial questions are plain practical matters of business, and are important, often even vital to the well-being of this nation. Some of the individuals most inclined among practical men to question the benefits conferred by our dependencies on this country have been included in the number of those connected with the cotton interests in Lancashire. With them, for the last few years, the great end has been to promote the growth of cotton in India, and the general development of that portion of our dominions. It is quite impossible to do justice to the good effected by many influential persons connected with these interests.

in pursuing this end; and some would assert that the marvellous improvements in the Indian administration have been, in the main, effected because of the representations continually made by them to those charged in London with the management of the affairs of India. The Cotton Supply Association of Manchester may be looked on as virtually representing all the cotton interests, and accordingly a vast amount of wealth; mindful of the importance of the production of cotton in India, they have long urged the several Secretaries of State for India to adopt measures for giving effect to the wishes entertained by themselves, and approved of by all public men, and they afforded most valuable aid in support of the suggestion already alluded to, made by the Society of Arts for the encouragement by Government of agriculture in India.

At the last anniversary meeting of the Cotton Supply Association, on November 2nd, 1869, the President—Mr. Cheetham—stated that there was a class of men who were fond of attacking Manchester, because they said Manchester wanted India governed for the sake of Manchester, and that this was a total misrepresentation of the views which actuated the Cotton Supply Asso-

ciation; that they never advocated any step whatever for the improvement of the Indian government, or made any suggestions exclusively confined to the cultivation of cotton; and he intimated also that a great many of their suggestions had been taken up without acknowledgment. With regard to railways, they had said that if they had a certain railway in India it would stimulate the growth of cotton; but would it not stimulate the growth of every other article? If the ryots grew food or flax, would the railway not increase them? If they had asked the Government to make a railway, and to say that no one should grow anything but cotton near it, then he could have understood this attack which had been made upon Manchester. All the suggestions which had been made by the Association were for the purpose of improving the position of the ryots; and while men had been abusing them as selfish agitators, they had been rendering services to the British Government, as well as promoting the freedom and improvement of the Indian people.

In India, hostile pressure may best be counteracted by developing Indian resources and commerce. But any peace, if it is to be of much

value, must be a strong-handed peace; unless a peaceful course is guarded and supported by adequate armaments, it very soon will cease to exert much influence, for the development of India is only possible, as the result of widely spread confidence in our Government and in the permanence of our sway. Without this confidence, money cannot be found for the construction of the public works, on which Indian development depends, and all notions of giving up India, or of the possibility of resting on moral force alone as the means of resisting hostile aggression, or civil war, are totally opposed to the practical ideas entertained and now largely acted on by those charged with the administration of Indian affairs, in conformity with the representations made to them, more especially by the Cotton Supply Association. Some there are, no doubt, who would express opinions to the effect that it would be well gradually to retire from India, in other words to give it up, and to rely on moral force alone, there and elsewhere, as supplying the means of resisting hostile pressure, but the immediate effect of such opinions being seriously advanced by influential parties must be to stop the supplies of money for carrying on the public works, even

without views of this stamp meeting with any general acceptance. A Prime Minister once declared that no one except a madman could ever dream of a free trade in corn, which Cobden however did dream of, and was principally instrumental in establishing; many now say that none but a madman can dream of a return to Protection, which Trades Unions however not only do dream of, but carry out in their own way; strong expressions prove nothing, and there is no use in speaking strongly as to the impossibility of any large portion of our population ever entertaining ideas such as those alluded to respecting India, but it certainly seems as highly improbable as anything can well be, by reason of the immense and growing pecuniary stake possessed in that portion of our territories by so many individuals in this country.

Britain is not prepared to give up India, there is therefore nothing to be done but to make the most of our position there, and to secure it, and it certainly appears to be more consistent with a correct appreciation of moral and religious duty, to feel that the possession of India is a trust committed into our hands for high purposes; a trust greater than any other ever committed to a Christian *nation.*

Much irritation has been produced by the recent declarations in many quarters, that the colonies must soon cease to belong to the Empire, and may cease to belong to it whenever they so desire. These declarations have less frequently been made by official men than by others, because of the responsibilities of office if for no other reason, but unhappily grave exception has been taken to the sentiments expressed by Lord Granville, Secretary for the Colonies, by individuals who must command the utmost respect, on account of their actecedents, their character, and the position at present occupied by many of them. A general assent would be probably found to exist among well informed persons, that Sir George Grey, once Governor of South Australia, at another period of South Africa, and for six years of New Zealand, is second in ability to no man now in the Colonial Service. On the 22nd of last December, at a meeting convened to discuss the question relating to the colonies, Sir George Grey said, speaking with reference to an interview which had recently taken place between a number of gentlemen interested in the colonies and Lord Granville :—

"He could see that the whole matter had been

left in a most unsatisfactory state. On the one hand, the Colonial Minister stated that he hoped the British colonies would not all leave this great empire; and on the other hand, it was known to all of them that steps had been taken with reference to New Zealand tending to drive that colony away from this country. The Colonial Minister, having taken those steps, said, if New Zealand wished to go, Great Britain would not attempt to retain that colony by violence. He asked if a Colonial Minister for the time being was to be the sole judge for the whole empire of a line of policy with respect to the proceedings of any one of the British colonies? Would not other colonies be affected by the withdrawal of New Zealand? Supposing that colony were to leave the Empire and confederate herself with the United States, would not the interests of Australia be affected? And was not Australia to be considered? Where was the limit to be drawn to which the language of Lord Granville applied? Was New Zealand to be allowed to go alone, or was New South Wales, Queensland, the Cape of Good Hope, the West India colonies, Guernsey and Jersey—a voice or Ireland—or Ireland to be allowed to leave the Empire if any portion

of them liked? Were they to be told that the party in power for the moment, entertaining some selfish motives of its own, should be allowed to say—'We will retain those colonies we see fit to keep by force, and will shut out those which are of no advantage to our party?' Were any of the British colonies to be at the mercy of or subject to the caprice of any party, who may be all financialists or capitalists? A friend of his said the other day there was no government more calculated to prejudice or to retard the progress of the British colonies than a government composed of financialists or representing merely capital. Was a party of that kind to say, 'We please to let each or all these parts of the Empire go because we think they are useless, and other parts we will retain by violence, or by other means?'"

It certainly seems difficult to reconcile Lord Granville's refusal to allow any portion of the British army to be employed in the defence of New Zealand, with ideas of imperial unity. In this case unfortunately facts carry conviction more strongly than words, and speak trumpet-tongued, not only by reason of the magnitude of the stake involved, but also because of the horrors enacted by the savages opposed to our fellow-

countrymen settled in New Zealand. Sir George Grey thus records his opinion in a letter dated 13th November, 1869:—

"It could never be said that it had become indispensable for an English Government to recognize within the limits of its own dominions the authority of a Maori king, when the tribes who had raised an insurrection to set up this king were scattered, and their power broken. Especially as they had no original right to set up a king, an office unknown to their ancestors, country, and institutions, and which act on their part has throughout been resisted by the great majority of their own countrymen. Barbarians, whether our friends or foes, will never believe that we have from such causes as these made concessions which they will regard as pusillanimous and disgraceful. The present Governor of New Zealand gives an exactly opposite reason for advising Lord Granville to recognize the authority of the Maori king; he says it should be done because 'it is clear that the conquest of the Maori king by force of arms is impracticable.'

"I am not of opinion that the colonists of New Zealand will ever recognize the authority of the Maori king to such an extent as Lord Granville deems indispensable.

"The Colonial Government, to avoid revolt, when revolt was only imminent, and the Colony was strong in imperial troops and in its own forces, offered to a portion of a barbarous race, all that could in reason be given to them. That offer was decidedly refused. War took place. The European race and a portion of the native race have eventually been subjected to a series of the most dire calamities and most cruel acts, including outrages of every kind that the mind of man can conceive, even cannibalism itself. They are now called upon, without giving any commensurate reward to those tribes who have shown themselves tried and noble friends, to recognize the authority of the Maori king, which has been supported by those barbarians who have inflicted such ills upon them, and who have been guilty of such atrocious crimes.

"I feel sure the colonists of New Zealand will think that Rome in the days of her utmost decline, when her standards were withdrawn from point to point, never humbled herself further than this before a barbarian foe. They will feel that such an order as this appears to issue from a minister who regards the strength and majesty of the empire as fading away, but they will also feel

that if it is sent forth from age and decay, it comes to a youthful nation, fresh and vigorous, just springing into life, on which times yet to come will look back for the example it gave and left for the strong peoples who were to spring from it: and I believe the New Zealand men will give an example worthy of the race from which they have come—the example of sacrificing all they have, and dying, if necessary, to a man before they will obey a command which would require them to recognize the authority of a so-called native king, whose servants, allies, and friends have cruelly murdered their men, women, children, and faithful relatives, with circumstances of atrocity which make the blood run cold to think of. And in resisting to the last extremity the recognition of the authority of such a king, the New Zealand people will believe that they will carry with them the almost universal sympathy of their fellow subjects in Great Britain, which sympathy and regard I feel sure they will still further entitle themselves to by the justice, mercy, and generosity with which they will deal with the native race, now, equally with themselves, abandoned by the British Government to a most frightful struggle."

Sir George Grey has been here quoted as being fairly and in an authoritative manner entitled to speak the sentiments of the large numbers who share his ideas, but the author does not desire to imply an adhesion to them in all respects. What Sir George Grey states marks the certain fact, that there is an opposition in assumed interests, and yet more with regard to the instincts actuating both parties, between the financial and capitalist class and those bound up in the prosperity of our dependencies. Whatever doubts as to the value of dependencies have at any time been urged on public attention have for the most part arisen in this class; and any hesitation as to retaining possession of them, or providing for their defence, may commonly be traced to the same origin. British dependencies have generally been productive of wealth; they have producing powers just as much as operatives. Obviously, therefore, the capitalist class is to this extent placed in an antagonism as regards our dependencies, that they naturally base their calculations and wishes on making the most of the exchangeable value of their capital, in the very same way that a millowner makes the best bargain he can with the cotton-spinner who suplies him with manual

labour, or as a grocer or butcher turns the money laid out in his business to the best account in dealing with his customers. Colonists, being producers, are almost always protectionists, and protect themselves by their commercial tariffs, just as workmen in England at present protect themselves by means of Trades Unions, and it remains to be seen whether the capitalist class will succeed in their opposition to Trades Unions, as well as to other forms of protection; the similarity of the principles actuating workmen at home and our colonists is here noticed as explaining the opinion alluded to by Sir George Grey to the effect that there is no Government more calculated to prejudice or to retard the progress of the colonies than a Government composed of financialists or representing merely capital. No more earnest friends, however, of many of our dependencies are to be found than some individuals in this very capitalist class, and no men who take more patriotic or more enlightened views. This is especially manifested in Lancashire, with regard to India, and it may reasonably be considered that if many of those who have been most active in advancing the improvement of India occasionally broach notions incon-

sistent with maintaining the Indian armaments at the standard of efficiency requisite for the defence of India, their ideas with respect to this second point are not of the same immediate and practical nature as with respect to the first, and would not even be asserted to be so by themselves. Still, it is unfortunate that there should be this discrepancy between the ideas entertained, as it interferes both with confidence and with progress, and it really is desirable that, once for all, everyone who has to arrive at a decision relative to such subjects should determine in his own mind, whether he desires to make the best of the British empire as it stands, or to sacrifice practical objects (such as the development of India, and the increase of the growth of Indian cotton), in the pursuit of theoretical aims, which, he will himself admit, may turn out to be of a Utopian character. Few Manchester men would refuse to adopt what steps might seem feasible for increasing the growth of cotton in India, by encouraging the investment of English money in that portion of our dominions, but many might say that if New Zealand withdrew from the empire it would be no great harm, and that if New Zealand became American they could not

In the event, however, of New Zealand becoming American, the security of Indian investments will be seriously impaired, and there appears to be a greater probability that New Zealand may become American, and that it may very soon do so, than people generally imagine.

The difficulty with the Government of the United States in acquiring transmarine territory has hitherto been, that any such territory could only be administered as if it were a ship of war; there is no provision in the laws of America applicable to the direction of its administration, which would not equally apply to the administration of a ship of war. This difficulty, it would appear, has at length been surmounted, for it is just announced that the American Government have acquired a large district in the Island of St. Domingo. (*See* APPENDIX C).

And by advices lately received, it seems that some seventy members of the Polynesia Company and others in the Fiji Islands have addressed the President of the United States, asking to be taken under the protection of the American flag. It is stated that this step has apparently been determined on in consequence of Great Britain's recently announced policy with regard to colonies.

The Fiji Islands have long been anxious to be taken under British protection.

The temptation to New Zealand to become American, if the Fiji Islands do so, must prove irresistible, in the event of New Zealand ceasing to be British. And it is obvious that no difficulty on the part of the Americans is to be anticipated; as their desire to acquire transmarine possessions is now a patent fact. Even if New Zealand, however, did not become American, the circumstance of the Fiji Islands coming under the protection of the Stars and Stripes is a most serious one, and must cause embarrassment to British commerce to an extent that is quite incalculable, in the Pacific Ocean and Indian Seas, in the event of hostilities unhappily taking place between this country and the United States.

This would be in itself an evil more than sufficient to tax all the powers of our Statesmen. Obviously the only hope of dealing with it in any satisfactory manner would be by relying on the moral and physical forces of Anglo-Saxon colonization in our own hands in the Pacific; but though the author desires to speak with all respect of many of the present leaders of action and opinion in Britain, it is manifest that men

who speak of giving up New Zealand, are not exactly those most capable of guarding against the eventualities which may arise from American "*Notions.*"

There are men who think they have discovered that Britain's course in history is in future chiefly to be glorious as being the Mother of Free Nations. What! (some one exclaims in horror), would you take the inhabitants of the Fiji Islands at their word, and create a new colony? To this the reply may be given, that the great immediate danger is of New Zealand becoming American, but that most decidedly, if the object is to present to the Americans a front of power equal to their own in the Western Pacific, the Fiji Islands ought to be formed into a colony. Few possessions could be so profitable. The Americans know the value of wide-spread territory, though we may not, and it is impossible to estimate the gigantic aggregation of population and of wealth which is now being called into existence on the Pacific seaboard of North America. Every European emigrant who lands in the United States is looked on as being worth about four hundred dollars to his adopted country, and the Chinese immigration now carried on into California to an

immense extent (more than ten thousand persons in each month), may be expected to be equally profitable. American statesmen perceive that in the direction and organization of this Chinese emigration a field exists for the exercise of political ability, equal to that which created in the instance already alluded to (that of the East India Company), a skilful and unparalleled machinery—a machinery which was instrumental in establishing our rule in Asia. Speaking at a time when the Company's authority had not been superseded by the present arrangements, one of the greatest of French publicists (De Tocqueville), in writing to a friend, said that nothing under the sun was so wonderful as the conquest, and still more the government of India, by the English, and that nothing so fixed the eyes of mankind on the little island of which the Greeks never heard even the name.

Well-informed Americans are of opinion, that either the affairs of the Pacific and of China, or else the cause of civil and religious liberty in the Levant, in connexion with their alliance with Russia, which exists in feeling at all events, if not in any other way, will present the first occasion for the interference on a great scale of the

United States, in the concerns of the Old World, and that probably it will be the former; it almost must be so, in consequence of the march of events.

There is room for hope that our Imperial system, instead of being now destroyed, may be consolidated, and rendered more vigorous. For the accomplishment of this, all that is required is that we should apply our minds seriously to the task. We now know whither we are drifting, and we ought undoubtedly to be more competent than Athens of old, or than Spain, to prevent the disintegration of our Colonial dominions. Lord Granville does not, apparently, look with favour on the proposal that the Colonies should send delegates to an assembly, whose meetings should be held from time to time in London, though many men of the highest distinction and most extended experience are sanguine in their expectations of the benefits which would thence result. But at all events, the Governments of the self-governing Colonies might be invited to send representatives, to be received as quasi-ambassadors. These gentlemen ought to be received with distinction, as each representing in reality a free state, and an intimation to this effect could not

fail to be useful, even in cases where Colonies did not choose to avail themselves of the proposal made to them. The representatives could consult together, and it is pretty certain that an assembly such as Lord Granville seems to fear might not work satisfactorily, would constitute itself, if this course were adopted. A vast amelioration could thus be effected, and all ideas of separation would be forgotten. Federation of the British Empire would have been established, and there would be no further talk about severance.

It would likewise be most useful to constitute a Colonial Court of Privy Council, consisting of Privy Councillors acquainted with colonial topics, who should be advisory in their position as regards the Secretary of State for the Colonies, as the Council of India is with respect to the Secretary of State for India. This would do away with the inequalities of judgment, and with the inequalities also in the courses pursued, arising from the constant changes of those holding the office of Secretary of State for the Colonies; which constant changes have brought about many of the evils complained of. There is every probability, that the institution of a Colonial Court of Privy Council would alone suffice for bringing the difficulties which beset our Imperial system

into a course of satisfactory solution. (*See* APPENDIX D).

It is not too sanguine to hope that by such machinery a national commercial league (a Zollverein it would be generally named by those familiar with the German term) might be arranged between the different portions of the empire, or between many of them. No doubt is entertained that this could easily have been brought about at the time when responsible government was conceded to the colonies.

At a period antecedent to the abolition of the Corn Laws, the late Earl of Derby declared that the British empire was a vast system of mutual assurance. There is an evident possibility that we might have free trade among all the self-governing states composing the empire, and this is the only free trade on any extended scale that there seems to be much prospect of seeing established, except such as we allow others to carry on with ourselves. Trade when taxed is not free, and it is a mere mockery to call our trade with France free, subject as it is to heavy taxation, however possible it may now be, as compared with former times, to introduce our manufactures into that country.

Mr. Gladstone has arrived at the conclusion that imperial guarantees in aid of colonial undertakings may sometimes be justifiably granted when imperial objects are to be gained. A liberal acting on this principle would carry out the idea of the British empire forming a vast system of mutual assurance. A liberal acting on this principle would also greatly facilitate the arrangements, of whatever nature they might be, which were entered into for the purpose of re-attaching the scattered portions of our empire, and creating, in a large and real sense, imperial unity. It further could not fail to be influential in inducing the various colonies to exert themselves seriously, with a view to establish a national commercial league throughout the empire (which ought to be, in the main, the foundation of any system of mutual assurance), resting on the principle of commerce being unrestricted between all its parts, so far as this might prove practicable. A disposition to carry out arrangements for consolidating imperial unity might be expected to solve difficulties very rapidly (and few would arise from colonists), so soon as a machinery had been provided capable of dealing with the questions which have to be considered;

such a machinery would exist in a colonial Court of Privy Council and Assembly of Representatives. The moment that a disposition to carry out arrangements for consolidating imperial unity is believed to be the guiding principle of action in London, a corresponding disposition will be all powerful in the colonies, and there would be every inclination to arrange such provisions as should secure the all-important objects to be attained both by the mother country and her dependencies; objects all centering in the maintenance of imperial unity, and in the advancement of the prosperity and power of the empire to an extent difficult to define in prospect; but at all events, promising in its present effects as well to satisfy colonial wants and wishes as to solve the difficulties experienced in this country from want of employment, by means of colonisation, and to give relief from the pressure caused by the restrictions everywhere imposed on our commerce.

But at present colonists believe that no such disposition is entertained; and when large numbers of men, distinguished by strong, sound sense, believe a thing, they are apt to be right.

It is worth remarking that feeling has of late years been much conciliated, by establishing an

understanding that persons connected with our dependencies are to be equally eligible with other British citizens for the bestowal of honours by the Crown, as a recognition of public service. The present understanding may be considered to have been fully established by Lord Lytton when at the Colonial Office, by the creation of baronetcies in favour of Sir Charles Nicholson and Sir Samuel Cunard. The granting of responsible government to such of the colonies as were fit for it (allowing them to form their constitutions on extremely Democratic models, if they chose), has, together with the fair and friendly conduct in many respects pursued towards them, resulted in a spirit of loyalty to the throne amounting to a passion. It is only to be regretted that steps were not taken at the same time to establish a federation of the empire, and also to establish free trade between all its parts, but it may be hoped that both these things can still be done.

Mr. Herman Merivale, whose views as to colonies, because of his experience, are entitled to attention, has recently published an opinion with reference to the bestowal of such honours (*Fortnightly Review*, Feb. 1, 1870, p. 172), which

"Let philosophers deem of it as they may, the bestowal of public honours affords one of the noblest incentives to public virtue which the community has it in its power to furnish. And the feeling of possessing such honours in common would be specially conducive to that sense of national unity which we wish to foster."

As regards the advantages to be derived from our extended possessions in various parts of the world, it has been stated that all depends on the fact being established that an Englishman emigrating to Canada or New Zealand shall be still on English soil, as much as if he was in Essex or Middlesex, otherwise our best concerted plans of colonizing must fail to produce their due and legitimate effect in augmenting imperial strength, and must likewise be affected very seriously as to the grounds on which they could be recommended for support. If confidence can fairly be entertained with respect to the duration of imperial connection, there need be no apprehension that embarrassment will arise in arranging with the Governments of such of our dependencies as wish to have British labourers, for their proper reception. It seems truly astonishing that so much difficulty as is spoken of by many should

be thought to exist, in doing so simple and so cheap a thing as to transfer unemployed men from this country to undeveloped land in the foreign possessions of the Crown. Colonization is admitted by all to be the very most profitable matter of business in which a nation can engage, and it is earnestly to be desired that Government should adopt measures for making useful, so far as possible, the capabilities of these territories for receiving our workpeople who may find their way to them, either with or without assistance. This would help to solve many of the social problems with which we have to deal at home, and would effectually relieve distress.

Many very eligible plans for the conduct of colonization, adapted to the wants of the present time, have been pressed upon public attention; and the success which has attended the enterprises of Englishmen in former days, (indeed up to the present moment) is well known; its magnificent results are more envied by some of our foreign rivals in the arts of peace than any other thing connected with, what is often denominated, "the unexampled fortune of England."

The Imperial system ought to be arranged on fixed general principles in all its parts, varied, no

doubt, in particular instances; but still founded on a consciousness of unity, strength, just designs, and self-respect; as well as of a desire to promote the general welfare; to advance, in fact, the commonwealth, using that well known word in a more extended sense, as embracing a greater number of communities, than has ever previously been attached to it in the course of history. British dependencies cannot be given up, as Sir George Grey seems, from his observations already quoted, to fear they may, at the discretion of the party in power for the moment.

If New Zealand becomes American, we could only retain India at the pleasure of the United States, that is to say, in the face of combinations which might be called into existence against us in Asia; that we should only retain India at the pleasure of the United States on such combinations being effected as are supposed, is demonstrable from two facts which no one will gainsay: 1st. That the command of the sea-board of southern Asia is absolutely indispensable, if we are to be engaged in serious operations on land. 2nd. That no one is prepared to maintain in the Indian seas a naval armament capable of meeting the whole naval force which could be sent there

by the United States in the case supposed; and at the same time of performing the other services that might become requisite.

It is necessary to recur to the case of New Zealand. Lord Granville's despatch, which made such a commotion, has been considered to give shape to the ideas entertained by some, at least, of the members of the party now in power. Mr. Bright once said, that it would be better for us, and better for the colonies, that we should be separated, and he must be considered to speak the sentiments of many who agree with him in opinion, though they may not, like Mr. Bright, occupy an official position. There is no use in pressing the investigation as to the precise tendencies of different individuals; nor yet in charging the present Cabinet, or any member of it, with an actual design of parting with the colonies. The tendencies and notions which at present find favour in some quarters are what have to be guarded against. In reference to the particular instance of New Zealand it ought to be borne in mind, that the circumstance of the native inhabitants, being inferior in numbers to the settlers of European descent, has really nothing to do with the discussions about Lord Granville's letter, since

the point mainly objected to in the conduct pursued towards New Zealand is the withdrawing of British troops, which dissociates Britain from the struggle carried on in New Zealand. The withdrawing of the troops, it is contended, and the dissociation of Britain from the struggle are inconsistent with all common sense ideas of Imperial unity.

There would appear to be good ground for hope, however, from the adoption of the two measures which have been already alluded to; and which have both been approved of by persons competent to form a judgment on the subject, viz., the inviting of the Governments of the self-governing colonies to send representatives to be received as quasi-ambassadors; and the constitution of a Colonial Court of Privy Council. There is no reason to suppose that the present Cabinet is likely to feel a repugnance to either of these suggestions.

Nothwithstanding that our self-governing colonies, being legislated for in accordance with the convictions of working men, congratulate themselves on being free from free trade, their tariffs are so much less hostile than the tariff of the United States to the commerce of Great Britain

and Ireland, that it is almost incomprehensible how the idea has arisen that emigrants who settle in the United States are as good customers for our manufactures, as those who settle in our own possessions. Free trade can be best extended by bringing about a federation of the British Empire on terms which will conciliate the colonists, that is to say, a large portion of those British citizens whose interests are the interests of producers. An expectation may be safely entertained, that they will perceive that the establishment of free trade between all portions of the empire must conduce to their welfare, so soon as it becomes evident that Free Trade is no longer to be one-sided; and that there is to be reciprocity between the various British communities included within the same commercial league.

Some reliance may also be placed in the conciliatory efficacy of the disposition (in which Mr. Gladstone concurs,) to grant Imperial guarantees for public works when they are of manifest importance to the empire. The great example of a federated British Empire adopting the principle involved in a real free trade might induce foreigners to judge of it more favourably than they now do. At present the prevalent impres-

sion is, that though free trade may suit an advanced and rich country like Great Britain, or the capitalist class in Great Britain, it will not suit any nation except ourselves. Our own working men seem to be likely to seek to secure, that wages shall be raised to *the level indicated by the rate of remuneration to be attained when all the productive powers of the empire are made available for that purpose;* and it is certain that working men throughout the empire possess a positive and absolute right to secure that wages shall be raised to *the level indicated by the rate of remuneration to be attained when all the productive powers of the empire are made available for that purpose*, to the extent justified by the laws of supply and demand. This infers the facilitating of access by emigrants, (so far as it can be facilitated by Government without making any undue demands on the Treasury,) to our possessions abroad; and would ensure that wages shall not, for any class of workmen in the United Kingdom, be materially and permanently lower than in a prosperous colony; and accordingly the resolution that all the productive powers of the empire should be thus made available would authorize us to look forward to a large rise of wages.

But in truth the rise to be anticipated ought to be enhanced beyond what we can at present compute with any approach to accuracy, by establishing a satisfactory Imperial system, and providing adequate means for colonizing, in consequence of the diminution of numbers at home, and of the prosperity to be confidently reckoned on in the event of Free Trade being secured throughout all the lands owning the authority of the Crown, and, in any case, wages will not have been raised to *the level indicated by the rate of remuneration to be attained when all the productive powers of the empire are made available for that purpose*, until the rate of wages has been increased as much as must follow from the withdrawal of as many workmen by emigration, as can better their condition in our foreign dependencies. Meanwhile there is no appearance of their being inclined to give up their Trades Unions.

If working men see that it is for their benefit to support Free Trade throughout the empire at large, on a federation of the empire being brought about, which alone can lead to that result, they will doubtless support Free Trade within that limit; and in case federation

is not brought about, they may, perhaps, "ask the reason why." If they do not see that it is for their benefit to support Free Trade, if, in fact, rational expectations that this federation will be brought about, and a real Free Trade established, are not held out, no very wonderful gift of prophecy is needed to enable anyone to feel pretty certain that in England, Scotland and Ireland, *they will see* that their colonial brethren are Protectionists, and that they themselves possess political power.

To make available all the productive powers of the empire for the purpose of raising wages to the highest level justified by the laws of supply and demand, is an obvious, and probably is the only mode of doing away with the present scarcity of employment complained of in England, and of promoting at the same time to an indefinite extent commercial prosperity, and augmenting the value of many descriptions of property.

The rights of industry and the rights of property are not opposed, though it may sometimes (it is not so always, when special circumstances have to be taken into account,) be for the interest of the employer to pay the lowest rate of remuneration which will be accepted, and of the

workman to receive the highest rate of remuneration which he can obtain.

Workmen in England declare that their condition has not improved of late, and when they hear the praises of that Free Trade (as it is called), which puts many millions sterling each year into the French and American treasuries, derived from customs-duties levied on British goods, while it puts nothing into the British treasury derived from any customs-duties whatever, may perhaps apply an anecdote told by Dean Swift, who related that when an article of diet was on some occasion lauded as being particularly worthy of admiration, it was asserted that all might be very true, but that the article in question was uncommonly like brown bread. They may also apply another history recorded by the same celebrated master of wit and wisdom, of a certain Mr. Drew, who petitioned Parliament with regard to legislation then pending, to the effect, that while he did not in the least deny the general advantages to be derived from the proposed measure, he prayed them "for ever to except the entire family of the Drews from its blessed operation."

A petition to the Queen has been extensively

signed by working men, setting forth that a large number of men, women and children, "have long been, and are now, in a state of destitution through inability to procure work; and that their condition in this respect is very miserable and hopeless."

It further says,—

"That they are informed, and believe, that in other parts of your Majesty's dominions there is a great demand for labour, and also a great abundance of food, so that all who are here perishing for want of the necessaries of life might there live, by their own exertions, in plenty and comfort; but they are unable to reach those distant countries without assistance.

"We therefore humbly pray your Majesty to see that such measures are taken without delay, as may enable those who are willing to work to go to those parts of your Majesty's dominions where their labour is required, and where they may prosper, and increase the prosperity of the whole empire.

"We also beg to represent to Your Majesty that we have heard with alarm and indignation that Your Majesty has been advised to consent to give up the colonies containing millions of

acres of unoccupied land, which might be employed profitably, both to the colonies and ourselves, as a field for emigration.

"We respectfully submit that your Majesty's Colonial possessions were won for Your Majesty, and settled by the valour, and enterprise and treasure of the English people, and that, having thus become a part of the national freehold and inheritance of Your Majesty's subjects, they ought not to be surrendered, but transmitted to Your Majesty's successor, whole and entire, as they were received by Your Majesty."

Some other things are urged in this petition marking the vivid interest felt in the colonies by our operative classes. They entertain a lively sympathy with colonists, practically appreciating the fact, of course, that they are producers like themselves. A fellow feeling largely pervades working men throughout all lands, and the sentiment commonly so powerful amongst them, that protection ought to be extended by every country to its own sons, proves that they, more probably than any other order in society, are actuated by the parental instincts of nations.

Many years since Mr. Cobden stated, that "if it could be made manifest to the trading and in-

dustrious portions of this nation, who have no honours or interested ambitions of any kind in the matter, that whilst our dependencies are supported at an expense to them of more than five millions annually, they serve but as gorgeous and ponderous appendages to swell our ostensible grandeur, but in reality to complicate and magnify our Government expenditure, without improving our balance of trade—surely, under such circumstances, it would become at least a question for anxious inquiry, with a people so overwhelmed with debt, whether these colonies should not be suffered to support and defend themselves as separate and independent existences." In this quotation are expressed the ideas now entertained by some of our capitalist class. The individuals in question are, without doubt, mostly included in the trading and industrious portions of this nation spoken of by Mr. Cobden; but it has at all events been made manifest by recent events, that such ideas do not actuate our working men. The annual expenditure on colonial objects drawn from the British Treasury has of late years been very greatly diminished, so that the outlay of five millions sterling no longer exists.

The strangest imagination of the partizans of the doctrine that our Colonies are of no great use to the British Islands (as has been said before) is the fancy that they would have been as good customers as they are, if they had been dissociated from the Empire like the United States. Australasia, with a population of about 1,500,000, takes of our manufactures more than half the amount taken by the United States, with more than twenty times as many inhabitants; in Australasia the consumption per head is worth about £8 for every man, woman, and child; in the United States its value is about 18s. 8d. Notwithstanding the tariffs unfavourable to our commerce which have been enacted in British Dependencies, it still principally is carried on with them, and they are the chief marts for our manufactures.

The interests of Ireland are unquestionably the interests of a producing country as distinguished from those of the capitalist and financial class spoken of by Sir George Grey, as much as are the interests of any of the Colonies. Sir George Grey would seem to think that the cases of Ireland and New Zealand are not wholly dissimilar. In a pamphlet recently published he advances some

remarkable ideas, and the following mode of proceeding is sketched out:—

"Give to Ireland a State Legislature and a State Executive in Dublin; secure thereby the residence of its ablest men in the country. Open a fair field as ministers, legislators, orators, to its best and wisest men. Afford from the same source, as would necessarily and certainly be done, occupation to Irish architects, carpenters, painters and secure a resident aristocracy of worth, talent, and wisdom, and you will at the same time secure the wealth, trade, and commerce of Dublin and Ireland. Dumb Ireland will then speak again. Half inanimate Ireland will again awaken to national life, and breathe the breath of hope and freedom. Whilst by again accustoming the Irish people to the management of their own affairs, and to administrative duties of the highest order, a willing people will be educated in that political knowledge which will enable them to put an end to the ills which afflict them, the causes and cure of which none can understand so well as themselves. All this can be done for Ireland without taking from England any power she wants, or which can be of use to her. And what they do for Ireland will be equally done for the trade and

commerce of England. It is impossible to benefit one country without benefiting at the same time the other."*

If the Colonies were to leave the Empire, and India were to be wrested from it, Britain would become a third-rate power. It is not easy to conceive the wide-spread ruin and loss which must follow from the violent disruption of India. If Ireland were also to be violently abstracted, the Empire would cease to exist. Foreigners, especially Americans, find it hard to comprehend how the system of the British Government, which in England is asserted to be so beneficent, and to confer large benefits on mankind, wherever its influence is felt, can have resulted in the absolute starvation of hundreds of thousands of persons in the Queen's dominions both to the East and West of England. Above a million and a half of the population perished during the Orissa famine in India, and as many during the Irish famine in Ireland. In each instance, justly or unjustly, the British Government received a full

* This quotation is taken from an Irish newspaper, (The Tralee Chronicle.) It would appear that no long time elapsed before the importance of Sir George Grey's opinions was understood in Ireland. Their importance as regards the Empire at large will be questioned by few, and undoubtedly it was to be expected that their application to affairs in Ireland would there be looked on with especial interest.

share of blame from the inhabitants of the two countries.

The truth is, that free trade, such as it is, however it may suit England, or rather the financialist and capitalist class in England, certainly has not satisfied those working men generally, whose alliance was sought in order to obtain it, nor has it conferred any very special and striking advantages on those parts of the Empire whose interests are entirely or mainly producing interests; there appears to be a strong probability, that the use of the Imperial credit may prove to be the most potent means of infusing new life into the industrial resources of Ireland, and that the use, accordingly, of the Imperial credit for Irish purposes, when the case falls within the rule laid down by Mr. Gladstone that it must be such as to render it evident that an Imperial purpose shall be served, may be the mode in which Ireland can derive most advantage from an improved general system of Imperial policy.

Mr. Gladstone, not long since, induced Parliament to sanction a guarantee for a line of railway in North America. Similar guarantees for various purposes must surely be calculated to be of at least as great utility in Ireland, when the general

sense of wrong and injustice amongst the inhabitants of Ireland, and the Irish out of Ireland, have brought about a condition of things in which it is an acknowledged necessity that their feelings must be conciliated, if the gravest embarrassments in America and in Ireland are to be averted. Imperial guarantees may be disliked by Chancellors of the Exchequer, but if properly arranged, it is inconceivable that any loss could arise from the granting of them, and if any loss did arise, it must be of an infinitesimal character as compared with the expenses resulting from the desperate animosities at present cherished by millions of the Irish, and the alienation of many of the remainder. If these animosities should lead to war with any first-rate power, the loss in money would be, of course, *incalculable*, using the word in its literal sense. It may be well to bear in mind that the Russian war cost above £100,000,000.

Sir George Grey has not been here quoted with respect to Ireland for any other reason than to lay before the reader, in a point of view admitting of no mistake, the fact that the economical circumstances of Ireland are the same as those of the Colonies, to this extent that the interests of the Irish, like those of the Colonists, are those of

producers, and are not of the financial and capitalist class; the interests of the Irish and of the Colonists are so far identical, and consideration ought to be had for the sentiments and aspirations connected with their country, as much as for those connected with New Zealand. Liberality in the granting of the guarantee of the British treasury for works of public importance is likely to be the mode by which Ireland can best and most largely be made to partake of the benefits of that gigantic system of mutual assurance, which was spoken of by the late Lord Derby, as existing in the system of the British Empire, and which, it may be hoped, will now be put on a firm and lasting basis, by a federation of the Empire, and the establishment of a real, not a one-sided free-trade between its parts. Each portion ought to derive from the accomplishment of this, its due proportion of benefit, and of benefit the most adapted to its requirements.

It has been desired to exhibit the relations subsisting between the provision made for the defence of India, and the general strength, position, and resources of the Empire. Armaments are for the most part proportioned to the magnitude of the interests which they have to protect,

and those in the Indian seas will be large and powerful in proportion to the commerce and wealth to be there guarded. No one would seriously propose to give up India, and to sacrifice the immense stake possessed there by our more immediate countrymen, as well as to retreat from the position in which we find ourselves, and from the discharge of duty, thus causing Britain to retrograde among the nations. The importance of bringing about a federation of the British empire may be as great, perhaps may even be as pressing, as can be the dealing with any Indian question, but no one topic connected with these considerations seem to equal *in magnitude* the necessity of providing for the defence of India, by the development of Indian capabilities. Happily, the adoption of well advised measures with reference to any of these things will aid the adoption of well advised measures intended to meet the necessities to be provided for as regards the others.

In estimating the desirableness of taking steps warmly urged by eminent individuals with respect to India, each ardent in recommending his own faith to others, the illustration suggests itself, once used by Sir Walter Scott to show the fervent credulity which besets a man

who gives himself up to working out a cherished conviction. Scott speaks of an alchemist who would blow himself up with his own retort, and certainly, as an analogous instance, this marks no more complete infatuation than that which frequently absorbs the wisest, and best, and bravest. But we ought to remember that these are the persons to whom, when they succeed, the world accords immortal honour, and that whether they succeed or fail, their ideas, when brought into contact with the ideas of others, and subjected to the ordeal of public discussion, are rendered powerless at all events for evil, and if adopted after due debate, bear their part in the advancement of their country and of mankind.

Charles XII. of Sweden declared that there was no word in Swedish answering to the idea which we convey by the term impossible; Napoleon I. maintained that the word "*impossible*" was not French, and a Chairman of the East India Company, in its palmy days, once said to the author, "Nothing is impossible to the Government of India." The political, scientific, and military ability of modern times is nowhere to be found in more commanding force than in

the British Administration in that part of our dominions, and it is extremely improbable that a false step could be taken, after full and mature discussion, in any matter where those representing the Crown were free agents from the first, and masters of the situation with which they had to deal. It has been desired in these pages to place before the reader various facts bearing on the subjects under consideration, but more with the intention of supplying materials for a correct understanding of the matters treated of, than in order to advocate any special theory. One persuasion the author does unhesitatingly entertain, and it is shared by the Government of India, and, he believes, by all practical men—that *the defence of India is in the main to be provided for by the development of Indian resources, and by maintaining an efficient state of preparation.*

The details of diplomatic action and of military strategy are highly important, and highly interesting, and they may be safely left to the Viceroy of India, acting in concert with the India Office in London. For example, a serious question exists, as to whether the principal line of defence towards the North-west should be the River Indus, or the mountain passes, as they are

termed, which are chiefly two: the Khyber and the Bolan Passes. Peshawur is situated between the two lines of defence, and the present policy of the Indian authorities is to maintain it as a great military station, and to occupy the passes beyond it. There is no reason to feel the least doubt, that whatever course they decide on they will make good; the chief point, more important than any decision still to be arrived at having been already secured — that they shall always possess abundant strength in the rear of any military operations, together with the means of reinforcing that strength. It would be going too far to assert that the Indian Government is not liable to commit even grave mistakes, but when the national sense, and the common consent of British Statesmen have declared decisively in favour of the defence of India being provided for by developing the resources of India, rather than by diplomatic tactics or military strategy carried on in Central Asia, it is perfectly justifiable to anticipate that the Indian Administration is to be relied on to carry out this policy, firmly, strongly, and successfully.

The possibility of serious invasion from the North-west must depend on the action of Russia.

If Russia were joined by France and America, the struggle might be tremendous, but we should hold our own. Possibilities ought to be looked at in order to estimate probabilities, and on the whole it seems unlikely that Russia will, in any time we can think of, attempt to invade Hindostan, but that is no reason why we should not be prepared. There is more ground for expecting that the Court of St. Petersburg may endeavour, when occasion presents itself, to attain other aims, to which we have hitherto opposed ourselves with all the force at our command.

Russia's policy in Europe has chiefly consisted, since the reign of Peter the Great, in aggrandizing the power of the Czar on her western confines, and the principal object has been to establish, under the form of a protectorate, his domination in the Levant. Antagonism in creed and race, and all the minor antagonisms springing from them, including fervent sentiments of nationality, have ever been ready instruments in the hands of Russia for attaining the coveted ends. It has been asserted that documentary instructions were left by Peter, defining and directing the line of policy to be followed, till aims indicated by him should have been accomplished,

but however this may have been, throughout all transmutations, and notwithstanding all checks, the Cabinet of St. Petersburg has pursued its purposes as tenaciously as if there had been such instructions, which purposes have been in accordance with the directions said to be contained in the Will of Peter, and has more especially pushed its great objects in the Levant. The principal object in the Levant was, as has been stated, to establish domination under the form of a Protectorate, and it was chiefly narrowed to the idea,—the passionate aspiration of the whole bulk of the Russian people,—to place again, under Russian auspices, the Cross in its ancient position on the Church of St. Sophia in Constantinople, and to abrogate Turkish rule. The Russian Government being to such an extent as it is, Oriental in its character, of course is well aware that a Protectorate may imply the most absolute domination and direction of force.

The title of King of kings, so often assumed in Asia, has for the most part merely indicated that the bearer of it held sovereign sway over many inferior potentates, who were frequently tributary princes, whose countries were not incorporated with other members of the empire to which they

owed allegiance. The boast has always been a confession of weakness. Asiatic monarchs have not usually had the power to consolidate the disjointed materials of greatness, but federation of this nature under a supreme head has very generally effected a considerable economy of strength, for less repression is needed, when every community can manage its own concerns, without demanding any expenditure of coercive force. There is in such a case all the more force disposable for external purposes; so it was in ancient Persia, and in the East in certain matters things vary very little, by reason of the lapse of time. One great secret of the vigour and permanence of Rome consisted in this, that the Senate directed the resources of a vast confederation, without making any such shipwreck of the interests of the Republic as had proved fatal to the best-laid plans of Cyrus and Alexander, who had preceded them in the enjoyment of overwhelming power in Asia. Cyrus and Alexander were unable to create in their dominions that principle of cohesion, that sense and idea of unity, which in the ages of remote antiquity was the safeguard, the mainstay, and the distinguishing feature of Rome, and which in conjunction with the strength

of the Roman people, concentrated as it was in and near to the metropolis, mainly conduced to the building up and to the permanence of Roman dominion.

To preserve a large amount of force applicable for external purposes, by so governing that it may not be called for in order to be used for coercion, will be admitted by all to be a wise course to pursue where it is applicable, and everyone is aware that little profit is ordinarily to be derived from ruling over a discontented community.

It has been commonly felt that Russian domination at Constantinople would infer a yet grander and more ambitious aim—supremacy in Europe. There is no necessity to discuss here whether this must be so; the objects sought to be attained by Russia in the first instance are what it is desirable to keep in view, in order to estimate aright the line of action probably to be followed by her as relates to India.

To avoid collision with the religious enthusiasm of their people as opposed to the Turks, is an obligation practically laid on the occupiers of the throne of Peter, Catherine, and Nicholas, and the astute and able advisers who have always

wielded their armaments are well aware that this religious enthusiasm largely augments their means of action. By constantly exciting the hopes of the Christian populations of Turkey, the Czars have weakened and paralysed the Government of the Sultan; Russia can pursue with respect to India a line of proceeding exactly similar to that pursued by her in Europe; in the principalities on the confines of India, and within India itself, bands of men ready for military enterprize are ever to be found, and to any extent. Appeals could not, it is true, be successfully made to them in the name of Christianity, as they may to subject populations in Turkey, but they are easily to be alarmed on the subject of the Hindoo faith, or the Mahometan faith, as so many of our trusted soldiers were at the period of the Mutiny, and the word "loot" (signifying plunder), or the name of the Great Mogul, are not likely to be ever without the attractions that have hitherto belonged to them.

A project was laid before the Russian Government in 1792 (by Prince Nasau Siegen), to take up the cause of the Great Mogul, making his restoration to his throne at Delhi the pretext for an advance; Princes of his family, the family of

the Great Mogul (whose name acts like a magic spell throughout Hindostan), deriving their origin from the lineage of the mighty Conqueror Timour, may still be produced and brought forward, and are supposed to be at this moment in the Russian territory, and Russia can probably find pretenders to a throne without more difficulty than we have ourselves, on various occasions, experienced in India. Besides placing the Mahometan element of Indian society in a position of such antagonism against us, as must tend to cause hostile projects to be popular, this would make sure of doing away for the time with all Mahometan opposition on religious grounds to the progress of Russia towards our frontier, and could not fail to secure the enthusiastic support of the Mahometan tribes of Central Asia, backed as any movement on their part in such circumstances would be, by very effective aid derived from a Russian army and from Russian gold.

M. De Tocqueville in 1855 wrote to a friend:—

"Russia is a great danger to Europe. I think so more strongly, because I have had peculiar opportunities of studying the real sources of her power, and because I believe these sources to be permanent, and entirely beyond the reach of

foreign attack. But I am deeply convinced that it is not by taking from her a town or even a province, nor by diplomatic precautions, still less by placing sentinels along her frontier, that the Western Powers will permanently stop her progress.

"A temporary bulwark may be raised against her, but a mere accident may destroy it, or a change of alliances or of domestic policy may render it useless.

"I am convinced that Russia can be stopped only by raising before her powers created by the hatred which she inspires, whose vital and constant interest it shall be to keep themselves united and to keep her in. In other words, by the resurrection of Poland, and by the re-animation of Turkey.

"I do not believe that either of these means can now be adopted. The detestable jealousies and ambitions of the European nations resemble, as you say in your letter, nothing better than the quarrels of the Greeks in the face of Philip. Not one will sacrifice her passions or her objects.

"About a month ago I read some remarkable articles, which you perhaps have seen, in the German papers, on the progress which Russia is

making in the extreme East. The writer seems to be a man of sense, and well informed.

"It appears that during the last five years Russia, profiting by the Chinese disturbances, has seized not only the mouth of the Amoor, but a large territory in Mongolia, and has also gained a considerable portion of the tribes which inhabit it. You know that these tribes once overran all Asia, and have twice conquered China. The means have always been the same,—some accident which, for an instant, has united these tribes to submit to the will of one man. Now, says the writer very plausibly, the Czar may bring this about, and do what has been done by Ghengis Khan, and indeed by others.

"All Upper Asia is at the mercy of a man who, though the seat of his power be in Europe, can unite and close on one point the Mongols."

The hosts of Upper and of Central Asia are not likely to be less effective in their action on Southern or Eastern Asia, when directed by the skill and science of modern times, than were the Mongol Tartars under Ghengis Khan. True, they may be opposed by modern skill and science, wielded by European officers as efficient as those on the staff of any Russian army, but there is no reason

for supposing that the circumstances of Upper and Central Asia have materially changed, with regard to the ability to pour forth invading hordes. The effects produced by modern skill and science would, it may fairly be anticipated, be about equal on both sides.

Russia, during the disturbances which have of late years convulsed China (as De Tocqueville very truly says), seized the mouth of the Amoor river and fortified it, and our surprise was accordingly considerable on discovering that the position had been made impregnable by military art, without anything having previously been known on the subject. Engineers, possessing the resources of modern science, fortified the mouth of another river also, which empties itself into the ocean, not very far from the Chinese capital; and no preparation having been made for this, our first expedition against Pekin was brought to a disastrous termination. In these two instances we have already come into contact in the extreme East with military experience and appliances such as are to be found in Europe.

Soon after the conclusion of the late Russian war, Sir Henry Lawrence, certainly one of the ablest men ever trained in the Indian military

service, thus recorded his opinion, in some essays published by him, expressing, of course, the result of his matured thought:

"*We repeat that our arrangements are for the storm as well as the sunshine; for the possibility of a Russian army at Herat simultaneously with an American fleet at Bombay.*"

And again,

"There can be no lasting peace. The time has not come. The war of principles has yet to be fought. Russia *must* have her revenge, and America *must* try her strength, her gigantic frigates, and her ten-inch guns."

And again,

"That America *will* strive for Oriental sovereignty is certain...Let England work out her destiny, let her govern India for the people, and as far as possible by the people, and neither England nor India need fear Russia or America, or both combined."

Sir Henry Lawrence has further given expression to his general view of Russian progress. What he says is all the more remarkable, because his predictions have since been verified by events:

"Insensibly, and almost by every de[illegible] the

Russian Empire has been extended for thirteen thousand miles across the whole continent of Europe and Asia, and for twenty degrees over America. Curbed to the south and west Russia has not waited an hour to push forward her soldiers, her savans, her engineers, and her labourers to the Caspian, to the Aral, and even to the mighty Amoor. Her old policy will now more vigorously than ever be pursued, and though the dream of a century will never be realized, her position in Persia will speedily be strengthened, and posts will be established in Central Asia and even in China."

There is a general concurrence of opinion, and this concurrence of opinion is at length understood to have received the sanction of the Indian Government, that an invasion of Afghanistan by Russia or Persia must be made a *casus belli.* To maintain its neutrality has been announced to be an object of British policy. No doubt is entertained by anyone competent to judge, that the hostile presence of a Russian army at Herat, or of a Persian army well understood to rest on Russian support, and to be impelled in their advance up to that point by Russian instigation, would let loose all the elements of discontent

throughout Hindostan, and intensify and lend importance to the rumours already current in the bazaars, that Russia has hostile designs. These rumours are, as it is, quite sufficiently embarrassing, but it is utterly impossible to calculate on the amount of ferment, and of discontent, and of consequent expense which might be entailed on the Indian Government by a real demonstration of hostility on the part of Russia, such as would be inferred by the occupation of Herat. To estimate the probabilities of Russia marching an army, either small or large into India, is not a thing of much pressure or practical moment. What is of pressing and practical moment is the fact, that by urging the hosts which can be raised in the length and breadth of Upper and Central Asia against our Indian frontier, joined perhaps with Persian troops, she can render India certainly not very profitable to keep in a financial point of view; at the same time that India undoubtedly in such a case would not be given up; partly because of the enormous amount of British capital there invested, but still more because the national spirit of our people would most assuredly in such a contingency put such a proceeding even beyond the reach of discussion. It is worth

while to remember that peace theories were not much in fashion during the Russian War, even in those localities where they ordinarily flourished, and least of all were they popular among our working men. The manner in which Mr. Bright's popularity faded away in Manchester ought never to be lost sight of. It affords an instructive lesson as to what is to be expected, by those who act in opposition to English national sentiment.

The only wise or worthy course on our part is to be prepared in time. Herat possibly might be occupied by Russia, but hardly for a permanence, since its occupation virtually means war with Britain, and since there is every reason to think, that in a series of sustained efforts Britain must be able to bring to bear a preponderating weight of force, through the instrumentality of the Indian railways, the Indian reserves of fighting men, both enrolled and non-enrolled, and the general naval and financial resources of the realm which could be brought to bear in other parts of the world besides Asia.

Still we ought to take care always to be able to say, in the words of Sir Henry Lawrence already referred to, that "*our arrangements are for the storm as well as the sunshine; for the possibility*

of a Russian army at Herat simultaneously with an American fleet at Bombay."

To develop, (as has been said), the resources of India should be the object kept in view by Government, far more than any idea of increasing trade with Central Asia, where it is certain to be stopped by Russia, whose commerce is artificially supported by subsidies, and in other ways, and always to an extent when requisite, that defies competition. Russian preponderance throughout Central Asia must, from the nature of things be complete, very much because we have not thought proper to oppose to it a timely and effective check, and this preponderance infers that all rivalry to Russian commerce will be excluded.

The policy of a country ought to be guided by its material interests, (in due subordination, of course, to moral considerations); its diplomacy should be moulded by these interests, and should represent them. They are guides which will never lead diplomatists far astray, and if they restrain the play of fancy or the outbursts of zeal, and cause a Diplomatic Agent to know precisely what he wants, all this is not a matter for regret. To know precisely what is the object desired to be attained has, indeed, been declared on high

authority, to be one of the things in the diplomatic art most to be attended to, and even in the conduct of private life as well as in the diplomacy of nations, or in public affairs of whatever nature they may be, it obviously is one secret of success; if for no other reason, at least because a fixed purpose ensures clearness of views, and the avoiding of waste of means and exertion. It is a happy circumstance that so definite an aim as the development of the resources of India can so easily be adopted and announced by the authorities at Calcutta, as an object to be steadily pursued. If it be true that *to develop the resources of India ought to be the object kept in view by Government, far more than any idea of increasing trade with Central Asia*, the policy of the Administration at Calcutta is thus to a large extent defined, and the character of its diplomatic action in a great degree indicated. Its diplomatic action is of course included in that of the British Empire at large. The true course to be pursued with reference to the regions lying between the Mediterranean and India is *to enter into an understanding with France, (and if occasion arises also with Russia), with a view to neutralize and civilize the East.* To do so should be the object of our

diplomatic action. This policy would include the establishment of the neutrality of Afghanistan, which is more especially a matter for negotiation with Russia, and can be dealt with independently of any general question respecting the regions between the Mediterranean and India.

In June, 1867, a Deputation from the Cotton Supply Association, arranged at the Author's instance, presented a Memorial to Lord Stanley (now Earl of Derby), at that period Secretary for Foreign Affairs. The following extracts are taken from the Cotton Supply Reporter of 1 July, 1868, containing a copy of the Memorial, and giving an account of the reception of the Deputation, and of Lord Stanley's reply.

"The Memorial of the Cotton Supply Association sheweth,—

"That the Cotton Supply Association regards with satisfaction the construction of the Suez Canal, and believes that it will greatly promote the development of the cotton trade of India by affording a cheap and speedy transit for cotton through the Isthmus of Suez; whilst the sweet water branches of the canal may be made available for the purposes of irrigation, and thus contribute to the improvement and extension of cotton cultivation in Egypt.

"Your memorialists, considering it to be an object of the greatest importance to secure the neutrality of the canal, under all circumstances, are anxious that every possible guarantee should be afforded for the observance of Article 14 in the concession to the canal company granted by the Viceroy of Egypt, and since ratified by the Sultan of Turkey, which provides that 'the Suez canal and the ports appertaining thereto shall always remain open as a neutral passage to every merchant ship crossing from one sea to another, without any distinction, exclusion, or preference, of persons or nationalities, on payment of the dues and observance of the regulations established by the "Universal Company," lessee for the use of the said canal and its dependencies.'

"Your memorialists apprehend that the 'neutral passage' provided by the 14th Article in 'the Charter of Concession,' cannot be adequately guaranteed to England unless it be confirmed by an international convention, as the agreement to maintain it now rests only upon an arrangement between the Turkish authorities and the canal company. Such an international convention might not only be the means of removing any jealousy that may be produced as some anticipate

from the success of the enterprise, but would, if wisely arranged, ensure the maintenance of the neutrality of the passage for merchant vessels under any circumstances that may occur; whilst those who direct our foreign policy would be aided in their efforts to guard British interests as they may be affected by this new means of communication, and in providing for the development and expansion of those interests. Your memorialists, therefore, respectfully request that your lordship will take such steps as may appear expedient for entering into a convention with the French Government for the purpose of confirming the provisions contained in Article 14 of the concession to the Suez Canal Company."

Mr. Cheetham, the President of the Association, stated that when this canal was complete, permitting vessels to pass from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean, without touching cargo, there could be no doubt that a very large portion of the Indian crop of cotton would pass by this route, with a result of economy in transit and great saving in time.

Lord Stanley in reply said "he had long been a member of the Cotton Supply Association, and was perfectly aware of the benefits it had

conferred upon the cotton trade of this country. He fully sympathised with them in the subject they had now brought under his consideration. He had no doubt whatever of the ultimate completion of the Suez Canal, and it was evident no nation would so largely benefit from the traffic which he expected to pass over the canal as our own country would. He had no hesitation in committing himself to the principle of neutrality, and this he considered would be best maintained by an understanding between the governments of different nations, and especially between our own and the French, as referred to in the memorial, the language of which he adopted upon this point. We could not be sanguine enough to hope to abolish war, but we might endeavour to circumscribe its limits of operation, and he thought this might be done by placing some of the main lines of communication throughout the world under the protection of conventions between civilized nations. He would bear in mind the topics brought before him in the memorial with a view to their attainment, and bestow upon them the attention their great importance deserved, and he ventured to hope the deputation would be satisfied to leave to him the

time for action with reference to them for the most effect."

So ended the Palmerstonian system of opposition to the Suez Canal, and all that was inferred by that system in bringing about the course long pursued by Britain of supporting the Turkish power. To oppose the construction of the Suez Canal was part of the general plan of maintaining the Ottoman rule, for it was sufficiently obvious that the existence of a canal through Egypt must lead to the practical independence of that country, so far as regards the possession of very extensive powers of self-regulation. The effects probably to be exerted on our Indian interests were not, according to Lord Palmerston's ideas, to be confined by the extent of any political results in the Levant, since the action, likewise, of military and naval armaments to the south of the Isthmus of Suez could not fail to be materially affected by the opening of the canal, and the conditions of success to be taken into account by any party concerned in deciding on such action, must, of necessity, be essentially altered.

That the opposition to the Suez Canal was not the only part of the Palmerstonian Eastern policy

which thus came to an end, was soon manifested to all the world in a speech delivered by Lord Stanley to his constituents at King's Lynn; from which it appeared that he had no such sanguine expectation of the resuscitation of the Ottoman Power as had long been professed to be entertained by Lord Palmerston and others; to maintain its integrity, and while hoping for its resuscitation, to provide for ameliorating the lot of its Christian subjects, had been, since Lord Palmerston's epoch at all events, ostensibly aimed at by British policy.

In November, 1868, Lord Stanley thus expressed himself:—

"One word more I must say on foreign affairs, and it relates to the East. I am afraid no one who looks to that part of the world can doubt that trouble is gathering there. It may come quickly, or be deferred for years; but come it probably will. That is a state of things to which we ought not to shut our eyes. Fifteen years ago we refused to see in time what was obviously impending, and as everybody knows, we 'drifted' into the Crimean war. Now I do not think the present danger of the Turkish empire arises from the same source. It is internal rather than external peril by which that empire is threatened.

No foreign alliance, no European guarantee, can defend a government against financial collapse and rebellion in its provinces. In those matters every country must be left to work out its own destiny. But it does not less follow that the weakness of a great State is a misfortune to all the world,—a misfortune even to those who do not and cannot sympathise with its rule. An indifferent government is, after all, better than none. If I ventured to hope that any words of mine could reach those Christian populations of the East with which I sincerely sympathise, I should say to them, 'Your aspirations may be natural, but remember this: that anarchy is not progress; and it is not wise to pull down that for which you have not provided any substitute.' More particularly I would say to Greece,—to that little State, about which our grandfathers were so enthusiastic, and which we, perhaps, are inclined, rather unduly, to depreciate,—'You might be the model State of the East, and exercise over Christian races there an almost incalculable influence, if, instead of indulging in vain dreams of aggrandisement, you would make your internal government more worthy of a civilised country, and of those destinies which are yours

in future. But if you adopt the policy of fostering disturbances abroad, you are throwing away the substance for the shadow; you are losing what you might command, and it is doubtful whether you will gain what you want.' This is advice which, tendered in a friendly spirit, may not be wholly useless; and we have interest enough in the East to make it worth tendering."

Great was the consternation in the Levant on this speech being read. Greece, it is true, did not profit by Lord Stanley's counsel; and, so far as the proceedings of the Greeks with reference to Candia could prove anything, they seemed to prove a desire to bring about immediate hostilities against the Turks. Russia, however, interposed a potential veto, and will probably interpose one whenever requisite, upon the commencement of war between the Christian and Mussulman populations of the East, until her network of railways has been pretty well advanced towards completion, which will be in three years, as nearly as may be, from this moment. There is little room for error in this calculation; the time wanted for the construction of each railroad can easily be estimated, and the financial resources have been secured. All that is here asserted as to the con-

struction of the Russian railways is perfectly understood in well-informed circles, and is, indeed, openly affirmed by Russians possessing the fullest acquaintance with these things. In truth, the exercise of a little common sense may suffice to dispel any doubt; for the advantages of having in operation these Russian lines of communication which are in course of construction are so very great in a financial point of view, and as leading to economical army arrangements, that the profit thence resulting must immeasurably exceed any to be derived by the Government from other applications of their means. The eminent individuals in France who sympathise with the Christians of the East, feel that until the Russian railroads are completed, it is best to direct attention to the Suez Canal, as presenting the great instrumentality to be relied on for civilising the East; and those in England who also sympathise with the Eastern Christians arrive at the same conclusion, unaffected by the consideration that the Suez Canal is a French enterprise, which of course would be irrelevant in the formation of their opinion.

Meanwhile, the strength of the Christians in Turkey is growing daily, and the Turkish race is

dwindling; the financial condition of the Sultan's Government is less and less held in any estimation in the money markets of the West, such as to justify sanguine hopes of being able to obtain adequate assistance in case of emergency. As it is, one loan needed a Western guarantee to secure its present position; and the plighted faith of the Sultan's Government has failed to induce capitalists to supply adequate sums for the Euphrates railway. It is needless to urge anything against the authorities at the Ottoman Porte, on the ground of extravagance, or of any particular dealing on their part: we may sufficiently judge of their position by these two tests.

We ought to bear in mind that the three great objects to be aimed at in a policy undertaken with a view to civilize the East are, the improvement of the means of communication, the establishment of civil and religious liberty, and the providing for the free sale of land to Europeans; these can only, it is true, be secured in any satisfactory manner by a previous understanding, and by co-operation between France and Britain, joined, if occasion presents itself by Russia, but action must be taken by the Turkish authorities in behalf of these objects, if they are to be effected

in its territories while they remain directly subject to its sway. Some of its territories, such as Romania, are no longer directly subject to its sway; self-government having been established in them, as the form of administrative protection judged requisite for the guardianship of the rights of the Christian inhabitants.

In 1867, the "*Livre bleu*," on the part of the Emperor of the French, impressively declared, that everything urged the Ottoman Government not to cherish deceitful illusions, and that the smallest danger incident to the complications it alluded to was to retard the recovery of its finances, and the trial by experiment of all those steps in advance which could alone assure to it prospects of vitality worthy of being seriously dwelt on.

All this remains as true now as when it was written, but Lord Stanley's remarks at King's Lynn, already quoted, do not seemingly indicate much confidence in the future of the Ottoman Power, and since the old Palmerston policy of defending it as a cardinal point of our policy would at present find but few supporters in England, the mainstay, the sheet-anchor on which the authorities at Constantinople have often relied, can be relied on by them no more. They must

stand or fall by their acts. Their best friends can give them no better advice than they have already given, and there is reason to think that the Sultan and many of his Ministers are as well aware of what would most conduce to the prosperity of the Ottoman dominions, as the wisest of their advisers. The difficulties which beset them very much arise from the impediments to be encountered in carrying out their views in the provinces.

Each hour, the power and force of the Christian populations increase with the regularity of an operation of nature; in a manner precisely resembling the rising of the tide. When the Russian network of railroads is completed, the power and force of these populations will no longer be restrained; the tide will burst the banks which till that moment will have held it in; and then the aspirations of some Christian Nationalities are likely to be fulfilled.

These aspirations are very various; in some, as in Crete, at all events, they consist of hopes to be associated with Greece; in other instances, merely to be freed from oppression; in others again to be established as self-governing communities, either independent or semi-independent.

Subsequently to the date of Lord Stanley's assurances already alluded to, with respect to his views as to neutralising the Suez Canal, our expedition to Abyssinia has been brought to a victorious termination, and our army has been withdrawn from that country. We have given an example of moderation, and have shewn that we do not seek the acquisition of territory between the Mediterranean and India. We obviously ought not to permit other European nations to acquire territory which we have ourselves given up, and by the line of conduct we have pursued in Abyssinia, as well as twice in the instance of the Island of Karak, off Bushire, in the Persian Gulf, it may be considered that we are committed in the most emphatic manner to the principle of neutralizing the regions between the Mediterranean and India. The occupation of isolated and insignificant posts, however, by other nations, if they think it worth while to occupy them, need not necessarily be objected to, even though they should be situated between the Mediterranean and India.

The French Emperor announced it as being his policy to ripen the Nationalities of Turkey. This includes the advancement of Christian civili-

zation in the East, in those localities where, if there is to be any civilization whatever, it must be of a Christian type, as in Epirus or Thessaly. This has, to a considerable extent, already been brought about in most of the nationalities concerned, by the establishment of an administrative protection on the part of the Great Powers of Europe, which has restrained the intolerance and oppression that have too frequently characterized the Mahometan system. It is in vain to say that there is no intolerance after those who were not Mahometans have come to terms. To compel those who differ from a conqueror or from a government to come to terms does not look like civil and religious liberty, and the maxim that unbelievers are to be slain by the sword, unless they come to terms, which is to be found in writings of authority amongst Mahometans, does look very like persecution. Besides which, it is well known, that persecutions of converts from Mahometanism are only restrained, (so far as they are restrained), in conformity with the provisions of the Hatti-Humayoom (Royal edict), obtained by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, as our ambassador from the Sultan, and that up to the moment of it being granted, persons were liable, under

certain circumstances, to the penalty of death, in consequence of changing their religious profession.

Egypt and Syria are not Christian; Egypt has long been in the course of being ripened very effectually, by various civilising agencies, and is essentially Mahometan. Syria contains a people more mixed in religious faith than any other, probably, on earth, and can hardly with propriety be said to possess any national religion, or in itself to constitute any nationality. But the moment that obstacles cease to be interposed, there is every reason to believe that a most ancient nationality would establish itself there, in all the vigour and maturity of modern civilization —that large numbers of the children of Israel would return to the land of their fathers. Considerable numbers, as it is, do flock to Jerusalem from religious motives, and it is not commonly known that there is a greater Israelitish population at this moment in Palestine, than that which followed as their leader, Ezra the scribe, as he is denominated in Scripture history, when returning with him from captivity in Babylon, soon after the overthrow of the Babylonian monarchy by Cyrus. Whenever a fair opening is presented in

Southern Syria for the investment of capital, startling results may probably be witnessed, both because of the economical circumstances connected with the country, and also because the disinclination to lay out money in buying land, hitherto to be found very generally among Hebrew capitalists, has been much modified; there is apparently a likelihood that some of them would desire to use a portion of the immense wealth they have of late acquired, in securing a stake in that land which is endeared to them by associations of most peculiar, undying, and vivid interest. Of course, members of this branch of the family of Abraham, enjoying positions (as some of them do) of influence and honour in Europe, would not be likely to go to reside in Palestine, any more than a wealthy Greek would be likely to leave Manchester or London to live in Athens. National feeling amongst Israelites is certainly as strong as amongst any people that can be named, though it does not interfere with the entertaining of loyal sentiments towards the ruling powers wherever they may be placed. The press, throughout Germany, is said to be almost exclusively in their hands, so that they take a prominent part in the formation and direction of public opinion, at

the same time that they perform those duties which devolve on all citizens in common. But they are no more inclined than their fathers have been throughout the whole course of modern history, to fall down before a graven image.

On an enlargement and better settlement of the kingdom of Greece, there is every reason to expect that the Greek capitalists of Western Europe would lay out money extensively in its advancement. They are seldom natives of the territory comprised in the present kingdom of Greece; and of course if Scio or Candia were included within its confines, a Sciote or a Candiote would be able all the more strongly to join, in his mind, the associations of childhood and family traditions with patriotic sentiment; as it is, such men can be entered on the roll of citizens of Greece, and even in the present state of things they contribute munificently to the support of the Hellenic cause, whenever an occasion presents itself for so doing; as during the recent war in Crete. Unless the kingdom of Greece is enlarged it cannot be said to have had a fair opportunity for constituting a strong Government, and accordingly for inviting the outlay of capital in local investment. The acquisition of the Ionian Islands has enlarged its resources, and

the cession of Crete, which at one time seemed so likely to be brought about, would have been a further important step in the same direction.*

It will be found that to neutralise and civilise the East, and, as a consequence, to ripen the Nationalities of Turkey, constitutes the Eastern policy, which has of late been in the main acted on by France and England, however unequally it may have been carried out, or however it may occasionally have been lost sight of.

De Tocqueville did not believe that Russian progress could be successfully resisted in Europe, by the Christian nationalities included in Turkey. It is evident, nevertheless, that the very moment these nationalities cease to be oppressed, and, as a consequence, to rely on Russia for support, their national sentiments will become the strongest barrier against Russia, while the greater portion of her strength available on the spot will be withdrawn, since it arises from the upheaving force of the Christian populations. Their national sentiments have hitherto been developed precisely in the degree in which each nationality is ripened, and acquires the right to govern itself.

* Until brigandage is suppressed, and atrocious crime duly punished, capital is not likely to be largely invested in Greece, either by her own

That this would be so was discerned beforehand by Mr. Gladstone, and was a striking instance of prophetic prescience resulting from the action of a judgment practised in affairs, on full and accurate information. This knowledge formed the basis of a remarkable speech delivered by him in Parliament, on the Union of the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia.

Whatever exertions any European nations might feel disposed to make to restrain Russian progress would then have full effect, in causing the independence of these nationalities to be respected, like the independence of Belgium or Switzerland. At present they have not full effect, the weight of the Christian populations being thrown into the scale in favour of Russia.

However things may turn out with regard to the balance of power in Europe, the courses have been pointed out in these pages through means of which safety can be ensured for our Indian frontier; by adopting the steps requisite for the development of Indian resources, and by pursuing the line of diplomatic action here indicated.

Shortly after the battle of Sadowa the Emperor of the French, with that candour that distinguishes him for saying to the whole world

things that are indeed quite unquestionable, but which he alone has the moral courage to say, most justly brought before the world the fact, that within this century the United States and Russia would each count 100,000,000 of population, and he deems an alliance of French, Germans, and Italians, a fit counterpoise. Perhaps it may be; that will probably depend on the amount of cohesion brought about between the various members of such an alliance; but so far as we are concerned, where is to be the counterpoise, if India and our colonies are lost? More especially where is to be the counterpoise if Russia and America should act together?

No means known to man can enable two small and over-taxed islands alone to resist such combinations of force as have never yet been recorded in history. That the combinations of force to be looked for may be expected to be such as ought to be thus characterized is necessarily to be anticipated, from considering the augmented physical as well as moral resources of modern times, the enlarged command over the powers of Nature, and the increased numbers of the civilised portion of mankind. We must maintain the unity of the empire; this alone will maintain our position; and very especially should we bear in mind (re-

curring to the saying of Sir Henry Lawrence, which deserves to be adopted as a ruling maxim by our statesmen,) that "*our arrangements are for the storm as well as for the sunshine, for the possibility of a Russian army at Herat simultaneously with an American fleet at Bombay.*"

More than with any other movement in the Old World, American citizens sympathise with that in favour of civil and religious liberty in the East. They do so from combined motives. Religious sympathies have always had a strong hold on the citizens of the Great Republic, and the countrymen of Washington are not indifferent to freedom, or to the want of it, in struggling nationalities, while they are drawn also by the strong cords of feeling allied with Russia. True, they may interfere in China, or with reference to the affairs of China and the Pacific, before committing themselves to any other intervention in the Old World. They possess such large material stakes in China and the Pacific that this is probable, as they cannot even be a passive or inactive with respect to them; a pressure is upon the Americans to act in China, and they have already done so diplomatically; with good effect, largely, and most successfully. Things in the

Levant will not, in all likelihood, arrive at a crisis during the next three years, when, as has been said, the Russian railways will be well advanced towards completion. Whenever Russia again seriously espouses the cause of the Eastern Christians, we may safely calculate that American moral or physical aid, or both moral and physical aid, will not be wanting.

Were Britain to insist on still upholding the Mahometan power in the Levant, Britain would be committed to a warfare against greater odds than in the late Russian war, and would have less assistance from allies. But Lord Stanley's speech at King's Lynn shows that no danger of this kind is to be apprehended; support of Mahometan power in the Levant forms no part of the present British policy.

Italian sympathy with civil and religious liberty in the East, and as included in it with Christian civilization, is ardent and impetuous, like all Italian passions, and is not the less worthy because it is ardent and impetuous, either of a generous nation or of a great cause. Next to the idea of creating a United Italy, no idea seems to be imbued with such attraction for the Italian mind as that of establishing Christian

civilization in the East; the first and main step towards doing which must be the vindication of civil and religious liberty.

Traditions connected with the East exercise a vast, though in some measure unacknowledged, influence on Italian sentiment; they are handed down from the times of the Crusades, and of the Italian Republics of the Middle Ages, as also from the periods, in part coincident with the latter, when large numbers of Albanians, who had served under Scanderberg, "the soldier of Jesus Christ," fled into Italy on his fall. The prospect, too, that their native Italy will again become a highway, as in the Middle Ages, for the trade of the remotest East, in consequence of the opening of the Suez Canal, and of the advance of Eastern civilization, is much dwelt on by Italians, and is deemed by them to be full of brilliant promise. Patriotism and sanguine expectations of pecuniary benefit have formed a remarkable, though a perfectly natural and justifiable alliance, and the effect produced on public sentiment may be pronounced to be in the highest degree vivid, influential, and lasting. During the recent insurrection in Candia it was asserted, and not doubted, that if Garibaldi had gone thither,

80,000 volunteers at the least would have followed him. As it was, he sent for rifles to Dolfi, the Florentine baker, and declared that he would go to Crete if he had to go in a basket. He thus, doubtless, might have evaded the Turkish blockade; but whenever an Italian movement declares itself in favour of the Eastern Christians, it is likely to be felt in irresistible force, and not to stand in need of secrecy, as it will represent the sympathy, power, and aspirations of the Italian nation, acting in localities where they can be brought to bear with every facility for rendering them available to the utmost. Men of influence among those friendly to the Cretan cause very naturally were alive to the fact, however, that it would have been worse than useless for Garibaldi to have proceeded to Crete with 80,000 volunteers, unless means were provided for feeding them. An expedition consisting of such numbers infers Governmental organization, or something equivalent to it. But expeditions of Italian volunteers under Garibaldi, even on a small scale, are not to be contemned; the "thousand of Marsala" accomplished their cherished design under him, in Sicily.

Up to the date of the establishment of the pre-

sent order of things in Italy on what may be deemed a permanent footing, Garibaldi had opposed any descent on the eastern shores of the Adriatic, with a view to raising the standard of the cross in the midst of the Christians in Turkey, and thus finding means for attacking Austria on her Transylvanian frontier, which would have then been a great object with Italians to attain. Garibaldi was deeply impressed with the conviction that English moral co-operation in favour of Italian ideas was too valuable to be sacrificed by thus opening up the Eastern question. During the Cretan insurrection, however, he is understood to have advocated a descent on the Turkish mainland; his views had apparently been modified like Lord Stanley's, by the course of events, and the gradual change of public opinion in England. Neither the Italian nor any other nation can ever henceforth sacrifice English moral co-operation, by espousing the cause of the Eastern Christians.

Whenever any national Italian movement takes place in their favour, it is certain that the Government, being a popular Government, will direct and organize it practically at all events; possibly receiving the initiative from literary men, and

from those possessed of popular influence. In every nation, at the present day, pretty nearly in proportion to the degree of intellectual culture, is the intimacy of the relations subsisting between its chief literary men and the public press; and a growth of this intimacy has usually accompanied the spread of education and of intelligence. It probably has done so in Italy to an extent greater than in any other country, because of the sudden energy imparted to the national spirit of the population. National spirit is the inner life of a nation, and never is its influence more felt than when, as in the instance of Italy, it bursts its bonds, and inspires an ancient people with the vigour and elasticity of youth. Its effects on the Italian mind, more particularly in directing its action with regard to public affairs, are not at an end; they are not, indeed, as yet so fully developed as to enable us to form a judgment even in reference to all its immediate tendencies.

In a great national movement, a spasmodic fury almost invariably takes possession of the nation's soul, and *for the moment* alters its very nature. The effect is in most instances *only momentary*, but it is decisive. The violence of a movement like the French Revolution of 1793, (the most

astonishing convulsion connected with popular enthusiasm in modern times,) is the result of the moral forces in operation; and more especially of the passions and sympathies incident to human nature, but what is here desired is to look at effects rather than at causes. One thing always to be observed in any such movement is, that a single idea lays hold of the public mind, and as a consequence, reason ceases to bear sway. England, America, France, Russia, Greece, and Italy, have at different periods illustrated this; from the nature of the case the nation in which a spasmodic fury develops itself, is incapacitated from estimating philosophically the subject matter of excitement; and even bystanders often cannot do so. The most acute English observers were unable, during the French Revolution, to comprehend till all was over, that France was shaken by a moral earthquake. Even if Edmund Burke formed a solitary exception, by doing so he proved the prevalent want of discernment as to the true character of the events which were occurring within a few miles of our shores. But it is doubtful whether Burke did understand their true character, for his celebrated pamphlet on the French Revolution did not appear until the Re-

volution had been in reality effected, until a transfer of political power had taken place. Then he undoubtedly expounded its tendencies and probable consequences with a marvellous appreciation of the chaos then existing in France. Still, though there may sometimes be difficulty in perceiving the real nature of a national movement when in progress, it is commonly not beyond the reach of ordinary sagacity to recognise the indications of its approach.

Action on the part of Russia and America would almost certainly bring about action on the part of Italy by the force of *sympathy;* (the *passions* of Italians are always ready to be excited in favour of the Eastern Christians,) and they only require to be moved by sympathy or some other external influence; but it is far from improbable, that if the next movement against the Turks does not arise in the territories ruled over by themselves, it will commence in Italy, and at once make itself felt in the lands long subjected to the crescent.

During the recent struggle in Crete, the Italian Government issued instructions to the commander of a sloop-of-war sent by it to cruise on the coasts of that island to defend Italian interests, the defence of which was to be his principal object, and advised

him, as much as possible, to give the support of the Italian flag "to interests no less holy, the interests of humanity which had only too much to suffer in that struggle."

On this the remark was made at Florence in an influential organ of opinion—*L'Italie*, which merely gave utterance to sentiments prevalent amongst public men, and throughout the nation:—

"It is impossible not to applaud such language. Italy thus shews to the world that she is worthy of all the sympathies which have helped her to retake in Europe the rank she had lost. Her opponents who forget sometimes to be just, have accused fortune of being too generous to her; perhaps before long they will see that fortune has not been so blind as they suppose. It is by thus associating the interests of humanity with her own interests, that Italy will again serve civilisation, whose progress is connected with her own prosperity."

Some may fancy that the affairs of the Levant and Italian politics are only remotely connected with the defence of our Indian frontier from aggression, or with the preservation of the unity of the British Empire by the establishment of a satisfactory system of imperial policy. This,

however, would be a shallow belief; anyone who knows anything whatever of the mutual dependence of all parts of our dominions, the one on the other, will penetrate deeper than the surface, when he seeks to arrive at conclusions which are to actuate him either as a private person, or in his public conduct as a citizen. Regiments on the Indian establishment were present at the siege of Sebastopol, which looked like a connection between Indian interests and what is known in Europe as the Eastern Question. In truth there is no use in endeavouring to gloss over the fact that our zeal for the Grand Turk in former days was quickened by a tacit reference to our Indian interests, though what was in the main put forward was a regard for the interests of European civilization,—a regard sincerely entertained, and one in which France and Italy could join us; our statesmen trusted also that it afforded a basis on which Austria and Prussia would likewise co-operate with us.

Foreigners assert that if it is for the interest of England that a cause should succeed, in the eyes of an Englishman it is just. The action of patriotism and of conscience is thus mingled, and is increased in intensity. Strangers are astonished at

the degree in which this is to be observed, and impute (for the most part without reason) a want of conscience as a national characteristic, instead of apprehending the fact that conscience in an eminent degree *enlightens* English patriotism. De Tocqueville, who perhaps understood the English character better than any other foreigner that can be named (unless it may be the Emperor of the French), took a truer view of the matter, and deemed the principal reason of this "phenomenon" (as he termed it) to be, that the English public only see one thing at a time, and entertain the laudable desire to connect the actions of their country with objects greater and higher than mere interest, even though it be the interest of a nation.

Whatever there may be to regret in the present condition of things in England, a sacrifice of patriotism to intrigues and parties is not one of them. The Emperor Napoleon, in a work published many years since, affirmed that in the English Government *intrigues and parties are powerless*. The passage ought to gratify us, as demonstrating that, while the judgment of foreigners is that of a contemporary posterity, it will not, when expressed by a man who is really

acquainted with England, always be unfavourable, or impute unworthy motives.

"Since the fall of the Roman nobility under Augustus, the history of the world has not presented so intellectual, so patriotic, so active, and so politic a body as the English nobility;—taking the lead in everything,—in the navy, the army, in agriculture and trade; an aristocratic, liberal, conservative, and progressive body, censuring the king, but venerating royalty.

"Since the fall of the Roman wardens under Constantine, no body of manufacturers or tradesmen have shown themselves more sagacious, more firm, more elevated, or more national than the English corporations.

"Since the fall of the Roman *jurandi* under Constantine, there has never been a body of manufacturers and merchants who have shown wiser instincts,—been more foreseeing, firm, and dignified than the English corporations;—associations of men of mingled pride and deference, performing their duties as scrupulously as they obey the laws, valuing the law as highly as their privileges, bending without servility to the aristocracy, and directing the people with gentle-

"These three great portions of English society, the church, the nobility, the commons and corporations, are bodies specially formed to govern, uniting the past and present, and living in wonderful harmony. Rivals only in activity, intellect, and patriotism, royalty is their link rather than their guide, and presides over the common work, rather than accomplishes it herself.

"It is easy to understand that a constitutional and parliamentary form of Government is the one calculated for such a nation. There is no fiction in the English Government; intrigues and parties are powerless."

There is no fiction in the English Government; intrigues and parties are powerless. This sums up all. But there is reality, and there is reality, too, in that public opinion on which the English Government rests, and which is formed and elaborated by those institutions and orders of society so well described in the passage here quoted from the writings of the Emperor of the French.

And in nothing is the joint action of patriotism and of conscience likely to produce more satisfactory and larger effects, than in determining the line of conduct pursued with regard to plain practical matters which concern ourselves: such

as the maintenance and carrying out of a policy in India in accordance with our own sense of right and of Christian morality; the development of the material resources of our great dependency; the establishment of a well-arranged Imperial system; and the rendering available, for the advancement of the welfare of all British citizens, the resources of the Empire at large.

There is little room for the *refinements* either of politics or of diplomacy in effecting these things. They are *plain practical matters*, and both politics and diplomacy must be based on plain practical matters, and must be carried out in a plain practical way, if they are to commend themselves to the direct sound sense, and manly sentiments, which actuate those classes that now form our constituencies, and are the source of political power.

It is one of the characteristics of the English press, which moulds and directs opinion, that while it has become more direct in its mode of dealing with all public topics, it has immensely increased in power; very much, because of the intimate relations now existing between it and University men, which has rendered it more Universal or Catholic (using the word in its original

and literal signification) in its grasp. And in nothing is its power exerted with more telling effect, than in doing justice to and carrying out the joint action of patriotism and of conscience. *The joint action of patriotism and of conscience is at once the secret and the measure of Britain's moral force.*

We hear of Russia being curbed on the west and south-west by European strength and alliances, and that she therefore makes Asia the chief sphere of her operations. There is room enough for them in Asia, without their impinging upon India; and the maintaining of the neutrality of Afghanistan has been announced to be an object of our policy. If its provinces can be united under one strong government, the Afghans can be enabled to hold their own in alliance and friendly concert with the rulers of Hindostan; and we shall have no further cause for uneasiness. Russian aspirations to place the White Cross of Constantine in triumph at Constantinople will not be given up; and possibly a less vivid dislike of these aspirations than has hitherto prevailed will in future be manifested in England, now that we consider that they can be indulged in without danger to ourselves. The Author is bound to add, that

the progress of enlightened sentiment in this country, mingled with a regard for the dictates of religious duty, and fairly represented as it now is by the public press and the opinions of literary men, independently of any ideas bearing on interests exclusively our own, have, during the last few years, brought about the alteration of feeling on this subject, which is observable in the United Kingdom.

If the vigour, and energy, and virtue fail, which have made Britain what she is, all the gold in our planet will not save our interests in the East, or anywhere else; not even within the four seas, as we denominate that watery wall, which some have maintained to be Britain's only valuable possession, since it alone confers value on anything else. This may be true, and its truth is quite compatible with ruling the waves over the world at large. Security and strength at home by no means infer weakness abroad; they are not necessarily or even naturally accompanied by too great concentration and centralisation. While our country retains its self-reliance and self-respect, we need only to guard against any Russian encroachments which may be apprehended, so as to prevent their interfering with our policy, and causing expense by

provoking uneasiness among the inhabitants of Hindostan; the possibility that a Russian invasion will ever be seriously essayed is at all events a distant one; and if the attempt were made, it could be met, so long as the British Empire remains undismembered, and its resources are unimpaired.

There have now been brought before the reader those facts connected with Egypt, India, and the colonies which appear to be at once in many respects the most urgent at the present crisis in the fortunes of our country, and to have the most widely-extended bearing on its prospects. The system of the British Empire is magnificent, its machinery is in many points of excellence unparalleled, and the whole fabric, in the main built up by the virtue and wisdom of our Fathers, is the most marvellous product of that principle of growth (in itself one of the truest tests of vitality), which has led to the development of most of those things in England that are great and good. But it is tottering; some would say that our colonial dominion has already come to an end,—that our connection with the colonies is merely nominal; those individuals who would not much regret to see the colonies "go," are

seemingly unable to make up their minds as to whether to accuse the persons on whom they would gladly fasten the name of alarmists, of speaking too soon, or too late, but it is clear enough, from the very nature of things, that if nothing effectual is done in providing remedies for the present difficulties, the colonies generally will "go." The tendencies of great movements in human affairs have very seldom been so plainly perceived while the movements were in progress, as in this present instance; the separation of the British Empire into its component parts, the disintegration of the mightiest aggregation of communities now on earth, is one of the greatest, and certainly one of the most senseless and uncalled-for movements which has ever astonished mankind. This much, at all events, is certain, that the bonds of connexion are loosened, and that the effects which, it ought to have been known, must of necessity follow from the line of conduct pursued during the last twenty years, were not provided for with the foresight which would have been desirable; but, at all events, these effects must now be dealt with; the expectation, too long entertained in some quarters, that they will adjust themselves,

can no longer be cherished, and as to the state of things in India, more especially, no one is likely to propose that we should leave it to arrange itself. Progress in India is essential to safety.

The inherent force belonging to the institutions of any People tends to overwhelm weaker Nations with which they come into contact. The Huns, Franks, Goths, and Turks demonstrated that their institutions were instinct with more strength and vigour than those of the corrupt and effete Romans; this strength and vigour very often consisted in the habit of hurling hordes of barbarians, whole populations, against the inefficient legions, who still affected to protect the throne of the Cæsars, but were inadequately supported by their countrymen, who at last refused to pay the expenses incident to the maintenance of armaments adequate for the effective discharge of Imperial duties. Something like this has, without doubt, been witnessed in our own modes of dealing with questions, so far as regards the Colonies, and our Standards, like the Roman Eagles, are likely to retire from point to point, unless, in consequence of the arrangement of a satisfactory Imperial policy, our Colonies make available their youthful energies to perpetuate

Imperial connexion; unless our colonists choose that their aspirations for the future, like their memories of the past, are to be those of British citizens.

The law already alluded to is universal, that the inherent force belonging to the institutions of any People, tends to overwhelm weaker Nations with which they come into contact. The British race has, for the most part, overwhelmed all weaker families of mankind, wherever contact has taken place; frequently quite in opposition to the wishes of those who had the direction of affairs abroad, as well as to the views entertained in England. The effect universally follows from the operation of this law, when unrestrained, for it is a law of Nature.

The United States of America come into contact with us all round the globe. Is the inherent force of their institutions likely to overwhelm us?

Men too often forget that the primary signification of the word Democracy is the strength of the people; the secondary senses in which it is used are numerous, and need not here be dwelt on. In the great American Republic democratic force and vigour are unattenuated and unhampered, and their diplomacy equals our own.

We need not scruple to acknowledge all that is worthy of praise in that mighty nation, which derives its origin from us, and is largely actuated by the same motives as ourselves. This much ought undoubtedly to be borne in mind, that the Americans are always likely to make their weight felt in favour of Christian civilization, and there is no reason not to anticipate that the disposition to do so may form a basis for united action between the various divisions of the British race in the Old world and in the New.

The American capacity for action towards external communities is greater than might be imagined by anyone who supposes that every step must be sanctioned by the Federal Authorities. A party in the Union can authorize their friends to take their own steps. This is supposed to have been done in the case of the annexation of Texas. It is not intended to intimate that there was any breach of any principle usually enforced by the comity of nations, for there were many special circumstances to be considered. That no similar proceeding was ever adopted with regard to any British possession signally exemplifies the good faith which characterizes the American Government, and the mass of the American people.

There is no danger that we shall be overwhelmed by the inherent force belonging to American institutions, if only we resolve not to be overwhelmed, and it would be erroneous to impute any general spirit of hostility against us to the American people. Moreover, it could not be worth while for them to enter on the chances of conquering us, if they were to confront popular energy, made available and efficient in each community throughout our Empire by British intellect and science. It would not pay to do so, and "the almighty dollar" possesses as decisive a weight in the councils of the Great Republic, as has ever been ascribed to financial considerations in Europe, and to the Financiers, who by the influence they exercise represent these considerations. But American citizens can no more prevent their country from fulfilling its destinies, whatever they may be, than we found it possible to prevent the acquisition of the greater portion of our Asiatic territory, which was forced on us by circumstances as they arose, for the most part, to the bitter annoyance of those in England, who, during the period when the acquisition referred to from time to time took place, held sovereign sway.*

* It interfered with the Dividends of the East India Company.

However, if we do not choose to take timely warning by the obvious tendencies of things, if we do not devise means for preventing portions of the Empire from ceasing to acknowledge the British sceptre, and as a consequence from becoming soon afterwards American, we have only ourselves to blame, and there is no use in quarrelling with New Zealand, or any other colony which is informed that it may "go." It seems to be thought by many that the principal thing to be desired in reference to the Colonies is, that they should part from us good friends. If we provide no satisfactory place for them in our Imperial system, by establishing adequate means for the representation of their sentiments in London, and for enabling them to exert an influence on the management of Imperial concerns, if we shew no solicitude in consulting their wishes, or their feelings, or their interests; they are given to understand most unmistakeably that they are not wanted, and that their association with us is not valued. Truly or untruly the story is told of a nobleman, that when an uninvited guest was once prolonging his visit rather too near to dinner-time, he said to him, "Good bye, I'm sorry you can't stay." Nothing could well be more certain

than that a guest could not stay without being invited, and being made to understand that there was a place for him; and it seems to be at least equally difficult for a colony to remain in the Empire, after being informed that it may "go."

No faith is to be put in the British public acquiescing in humiliation beyond a certain point. The prestige of Empire may be surrendered; we may long remain most amicable with the Americans, and hold India (in the language of Mr. Froude), at the Americans' pleasure, while we do not seek to counteract by any counterpoise the establishment in irresistible might of the Stars and Stripes in the southern seas. But when, as a result of complications in European politics, a Russian Army is seen at Herat, simultaneously with an American fleet at Bombay, the British public may better appreciate facts and their bearings.

Except Britain, no European Power can have interests of any great comparative magnitude in the Asiatic seas. There are French Dependencies and Governmental establishments in many parts of Asia, and as connected with French power and trade in the Mediterranean these may be useful and may flourish, so long as peace is maintained. French steam-vessels (*the Message-*

ries Imperiales), doubtless, carry a large traffic, though in comparison with that in the hands of our countrymen it is insignificant. But with Americans the case is different. American intercourse with China, including the conveyance of emigrants from China to California, is immense, and likely to increase indefinitely. At present the Americans lament their deficiency in merchant vessels, and the Authorities at Washington have as yet no establishments in Asia, but in both these things it is sufficiently plain that there will be such alterations as naturally accompany expanding commerce. American men-of-war can easily come into the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, or the Persian Gulf out of the Pacific, and for all practical purposes, in estimating the balance of Naval power, they must be regarded in the same degree as if they were always stationed in those waters. If New Zealand, Australia, and the Cape of Good Hope become American, it is obvious enough that Mr. Froude's prediction of what must happen in that event would be verified,—*that we should hold India at the Americans' pleasure.*

The more our southern colonies prosper, the more they will demand Naval protection, and

the larger the Navy that is employed in protecting them, the more decided will be our preponderance in the adjacent seas. Its magnitude must be proportioned to the importance of the interests on which it is based.

Since the command of the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf must be preserved in order to ensure safety in the event of India being menaced, the growth of our commerce in the Asiatic seas generally (according to what has been stated) affords the means of maintaining our maritime preponderance as connected with India.

A sound Imperial system, which shall ensure permanence of connexion with our Dependencies to the south of India, and the development of the resources of India itself, are the two things alone capable of perpetuating the security we have hitherto enjoyed. A sound Imperial system is of at least as much moment as any provision for sending Colonists to our southern settlements.

As a class, working men seem to appreciate this most perfectly, as is apparent from the numerously signed petition from them to the Queen, already referred to. More than any other class, they are characterized by directness

of purpose, and clearness of perception. Even when they are led into error, it is rather to mistake than to confusion or obscurity of mental vision that error may ordinarily be traced. Prejudices are often strong, and may mislead, but many of the ideas held by operatives, and most criticized, as for instance some of those on which are based the rules prevalent in Trades Unions, may have counterparts found for them in certain learned Professions in which Trades Unions find but little favour; between which counterparts and the ideas referred to, on which the Trades Unions' rules are founded, it would be vain to deny that a most provoking resemblance is to be traced.

Political action, when representative of the sentiments of working men is direct, energetic, well defined, and fearless, their character is naturally stamped on it. Such political action may be mistaken, may be subversive, may be unstable. All this need not here be considered; but it will commonly in England be found to be honest, according to convictions conscientiously entertained. This, however, appears very certain, that political action, representative of the sentiments of working men, affords the most hopeful

prospect that measures will be adopted in the present crisis adequate to meet the difficulties which press on us with an urgency which can no longer be either ignored or disguised.

The difficulties primarily pressing on us at home are, a want of employment (as the late Lord Mayor of London has stated), such as has never been known since the commencement of the present century, and that the empire is in imminent danger of falling to pieces.

With reference to India, the pressure is of a different nature. The production of cotton in India has been what our operative cotton-spinners mainly depend on for their daily bread, such as it is, and has been the sheet-anchor of our cotton interests from the instant when a failure took place in the supplies from America, on which reliance had previously been placed. The influence of the advancement of India on the prosperity of almost all branches of widely extended manufactures is immense, as likewise on the operations of capital in England; but to the operative cotton-spinner more especially it infers an increase in his means of living, or perhaps, in some instances, the preservation of his means of living at all, if the dearth of supply from other

quarters should leave him wholly dependent on India. No pressure can be much more urgent than that experienced with regard to India, or more intense, more widely-spread, or more important. With respect to India itself, the pressure rather concerns eventualities, which *must* arise at some time, and *may* arise at any moment—to provide securities for defence against hostilities, and against the recurrence of famine. This Indian pressure is intimately connected with the two difficulties, already named, as affecting us at home; viz., the want of employment, and the imminent danger of the empire falling to pieces. In proportion as this Indian pressure is diminished by the development of India, the demand for our manufactures will increase, and the satisfactory dealing with it, with regard to provisions for naval defence, infers, as has been shewn, the maintenance of a policy which shall do justice to the claim of our fellow citizens in all our dependencies, to be looked on as being as much British as if they resided within the four seas.

It has been sought to bring before the reader the things to be chiefly attended to in forming an estimate of existing facts, and of the working of existing Governmental machinery, with a view

to arriving at trustworthy conclusions as to the subjects treated of in these pages. There has been no general inclination to impute blame. Principles have been stated which must in fairness be considered to be established by science and experience, but there has been no desire to urge the adoption of any specific measures as being indispensable, nor to speak of any particular measure as being a panacea for any particular evil, or set of evils. Some courses of proceeding have been dwelt on with more or less of detail, which appear to be commended by a preponderating weight of good sense, and of information, bearing on the topics in question.

1st. The development of India by the encouragement of private enterprise, so far as practicable.

2nd. The following out in all its fulness the Christian policy now established in India.

3rd. The entering into an understanding in favour of the neutralization and civilization of the regions situated between the Mediterranean and India, by diplomatic arrangements, so far as practicable, between Britain, France, and Russia.

4th. The acting on a Christian policy in the

East of Europe and the Levant, which in the main amounts to supporting the cause of civil and religious liberty. This is now professed to be done by British statesmen, but being a wide departure from the traditions handed down in the Foreign Office from former days, in so far as it gives up all notions of supporting the Turkish Power, except on condition of its pursuing a course conformable to the instincts of modern civilization, care and firmness are required for working out the details; there is a necessity likewise, that we should seek to bring about an alteration of many parts of the Turkish administration, which are totally incompatible with civil and religious liberty (though they may not involve the exercise of actual cruelty), such as the levying of a special tax on persons not being Mahometans, refusing to allow them to enter the military service, and declining to permit their evidence to be taken in courts of justice; all which things were promised by the Sultan to be altered, on peace being concluded with Russia, and it is our bounden duty to see that the promises then made by him are strictly carried out, since it is owing to the expenditure of British blood and treasure that he is able to maintain his

sway, and at the same time to withhold from his subjects rights accorded by the *common* sense of all civilized nations. The acting on a Christian policy in the East of Europe and the Levant must include the aiding and developing of its several nationalities, and the promotion of Christian civilization. It would also render feasible, if there were otherwise any doubt about the matter, and almost infer the entering into an understanding in favour of the neutralization and civilization generally, of the regions situated between the Mediterranean and India, by diplomatic arrangements (as has been said), so far as practicable, between Britain, France, and Russia.

5th. The invitation from the self-governing Dependencies of the Crown, of representatives, or quasi-ambassadors, to represent their views in London.

6th. The constitution of a Colonial Court of Privy Council.

7th. The arranging of means for making useful so far as possible, the capabilities of our dependencies for receiving British emigrants.

8th. The arranging, so far as practicable, of Free Trade between the different portions of the Empire, and the rendering available in a liberal

manner, the use of the Imperial credit for the promotion of public works in the Colonies and in Ireland.

Very varied and numerous as have been the topics treated of, they have not been more varied or more numerous than was requisite for a fair consideration of the subjects to which the reader's attention has been called, and for a consideration also of their bearings the one on the other. As in material nature mists and darkness prevent the connexion being apparent, which nevertheless subsists amongst all the parts of some vast panorama, and which gradually becomes visible when gloom is dispelled by sunlight, (the hill tops being the first illuminated), so the relationships between the different portions of a widely spreading and complex aggregate like the British Empire, to be estimated in the main by the light of moral and political science, are gradually made manifest by the progress of knowledge and of free discussion; the most striking and salient points being the first to arrest attention, and to be dealt with by the intelligence and the social forces of the community. Mistakes there will be, and rectifications, both in the formation of public opinion, and in acting on it when formed. But an advance is

ever to be observed, and an increased perception of truth, so long as the virtue and patriotism of a nation remain vigorous and undecayed, and its material prosperity is unchecked, while, at the same time, it participates in that general increase of knowledge and augmented power of discernment which are eminently the distinguishing features of the age in which we live. Most remarkable it is, that the conclusions arrived at by the public mind are apt to be at least as correct, as even those of the individuals who are endowed in the highest degree, with the great and rare ability to introduce into the investigations of politics and history, the accuracy of exact science; but the reason is a simple one, for scientific accuracy as distinguished from theory arises from full information; in other words, from a full acquaintance with the matters to which attention is turned; an acquaintance sufficiently full to confer the power of entering on that complete enumeration of facts, on which (using the expression with due qualifications), absolute knowledge in its widest range is almost invariably based. A theorist never knows all facts, or he would cease to be a theorist; the public at large does know them all for every practical purpose, with respect

to any particular question, whenever it arrives at a trustworthy and abiding conclusion.

Each citizen is affected by all that affects the welfare, material prosperity, character, and prospects of the realm at large; he is concerned in it to the extent of the stake possessed by him in these things; this stake is not to be measured by the amount of his fixed or floating capital, nor yet by riches joined with the associations of an historic name or of personal reputation, though it is often by such adventitious circumstances indefinitely enhanced. The stake possessed by each man consists in the *position he occupies, in the command he has of the enjoyments of life, and the means he possesses for doing his duty in his position.* Even the individual who spends his life in accumulating wealth, and who falls (as many such men do) into the mistake of looking on wealth not as a means but as an end, usually entertains some vague idea that he is doing his duty. The possession of unprecedented riches has very much made England what she is, and conspicuous instances are every day witnessed, of persons of gigantic fortune being absorbed by their devotion to public employments, and by the desire to serve their native land. A vast amount of wealth,

however, by no means proves that its owner has a greater interest than many others in *the position he occupies, in the command he has of the enjoyments of life, and in the means he possesses for doing his duty in his position;* in other words that he has a larger stake in the country. And this is to be observed, that whatever may be the absolute magnitude of the stake in his country belonging to anyone, the degree varies, in which he is liable to be affected by his country's prosperity or adversity. The productive classes are obviously the most immediately and intimately affected by the fortunes of the nation to which they belong, and the landed interest must in many respects be looked on as being included amongst the productive classes. Floating capital may float away, and as regards the rate of remuneration which it can command, things will always find their level, and individuals depending on it are never likely to be unable to take care of themselves. But those depending on fixed capital, and especially on fixed capital invested in land, and the productive classes generally, are the orders in society the most influenced by the well-being of the commonwealth, and there is one division of society which, more than any other, is

affected by the changing tides of affairs; to whom and to whose families the public weal or woe brings sufficiency and well-being, or pinching poverty and misery, sometimes hard to realize by those more happily circumstanced. The welfare of the British Empire is bound up, more than with the welfare of any other class, with the welfare of Working Men.

THE END.

APPENDIX A.

(p. 30).

Colonel Kennedy further makes some observations as regards the base of military operations in India, and some other allied topics, which well merit attention; even if they appear to be of a technical character, as being specially connected with military science; they are at all events far from uninteresting to anyone; and it can hardly be deemed an objection to them as forming part of a general statement relative to the defence of India, that they do partake of this technical character.

"By considering railways throughout India as an extended base of military operations, the perilous and difficult contingencies which have hitherto accompanied the assembly of large forces at particular points would be avoided. Those forces have necessarily been drawn, in the first instance, from the stations nearest to the point attacked, leaving the district of country which ought to have been kept strongest without troops.

"Such a course could never be required where the facility of railway intercourse existed. The force required could be withdrawn, in any fitting ratio, from all districts, however distant, or from those that could most easily spare them. Assume the army of India to consist of 80 brigades of 2500 men each, stationed at 80 distinct points 75 miles apart, and that 100,000 men were required for the field, in one or more places. Such a force could be assembled in a week, by withdrawing alternate brigades, and allowing their posts to be occupied by half brigades taken from the adjacent districts. Thus one half of the entire army might be in the field, and one half of the usual forces would remain for the occupation of every other district, without denuding any.

"It is objected by some that railways are not to be depended upon in military operations, because (like all our other appliances) they may be destroyed by an enemy. Experience thus far does not give weight to this objection, although it is natural to assume that this mode of cutting off lines of communication would be at once resorted to; still, the few instances in which it has occurred amongst the many occasions which have given an opportunity for its adoption, rather

prove that it is a frivolous criticism. Those instances have occurred in Continental disturbances, and have not in any case produced serious damage to a line: a few rails being lifted is supposed to intercept the communication, whereas such slight damage is so easily repaired, that it really is not worth consideration; and to remove any considerable length of way becomes an effort of much difficulty, involving the use of skilled labour.

"The facility which a railway affords for its own defence is so great, by enabling a rapid concentration of troops at any point, that if a Government cannot defend it, their functions may at once be assigned to those who can. Defeat can only occur where the inhabitants are in persevering, unanimous, and vigorous hostility with their rulers; and, even in that extreme case, the railway system gives the most effectual support to any Government, in developing its military power, and enabling it to maintain its position.

"The most vulnerable points of a line of railway may be considered its bridges. But these likewise should be constructed so as to admit of easy repair. And in important places they may

be defended by *têtes de ponts*, which would add little to the cost of constructing the line, and would afford beneficial service, both as regards a railway company and the public.

"The course I myself adopt is to use iron, both in the piers and superstructure of Indian bridges, cast iron piles for the piers, and uniform 60 feet spans of wrought iron for the superstructure. *Hence, to provide against damage in such cases, it is only necessary to have a few spare piles and spans at depôts along the line; and, the dimensions and parts being uniform, any evil is remedied at once. There can be no misfit or delay.*

"Another railway defence which answers a double purpose consists in a regular system of side cuttings for obtaining the requisite embankments of the line; and the use of those formidable growing fences peculiar to India, with short flanks at fixed intervals where sidings occur; by these means strong defences may be obtained without cost in the entire length of a line of railway. These arrangements, with the power of bringing up to any point of the line by train, in obedience to a telegraph order, the requisite number of troops to meet any danger, would furnish a well-defended continous line throughout the length of

every railway, and in a country like India, would give to the Government, without cost, the most formidable military strength.

"It is quite clear, from what is now going forward," (this was written during the Sepoy Mutiny,) "that we must for the present calculate on maintaining a largely increased European force in India, however improved the principle may be which shall regulate our future organization and enlistment of native corps; but the precise extent of that European force from year to year may be regulated in some inverse ratio to the amount of railway intercourse that shall be brought into operation from year to year.

"Our European troops can only be exposed to Indian field service, without great damage, during six months of every year. Our power of meeting contingencies will depend upon our power of concentrating our European troops; wherever we can assemble 10,000 or 12,000 Europeans, with the requisite cavalry and artillery, we shall probably be victors over any number of natives that may present themselves against us. But what must be our European strength in a territory about 2,000 miles long by 2,000 wide, to admit of concentrating 12,000 British troops

in as many points as may be requisite by ten-mile marches, limiting our period for concentrating such a force, and following the concentration up by a decisive campaign, to six months? I believe that 150,000 British soldiers would be barely sufficient, under such circumstances, for the military occupation of India; and its occupation by European troops must always be exposed to the disadvantages of which the natives thoroughly understand the value, namely, that we cannot operate during the long hot period of the year without most disastrous consequences to health. Their mutinies, insurrections, and disturbances are generally based upon the knowledge of this fact. They commenced the present mutiny at the setting in of the hot season; they commenced their mutiny in 1850 at the same season. They will always select this season for their tumults, as it must give them an enormous advantage to force Europeans to take the field against them during the summer and monsoon.

"The real question, then, of our military occupation of India, under the very peculiar circumstances of our physical constitution, the climate of that country, its vast extent and population, and its military tendencies, is, How can we best con-

centrate a reasonable force, *where required*, in the shortest time, at the smallest cost, and with the least possible exposure to heat? There can be but one answer; by the immediate and rapid extension of railways. There is no other process which can possibly give a modern European force the substantial control of our Indian empire; and until we shall have completed that process, our regiments must suffer much heavier mortality in marching to the scene of their operations, than the most hard-fought conflicts in the field can ever inflict."

APPENDIX B.

(p. 61).

Misgovernment in India means loss of life, and loss of life attended by such peculiar horrors as can hardly be imagined in England. A population ordinarily for the most part fed on rice and water, whose very excess and luxury in their most plenteous days was well said by Burke to have fallen far short of the allowance of our austerest fasts, perish during an Indian scarcity in resignation, utter helplessness, and almost without complaint. They trust in Government to take measures to protect them, and it is very certain that if Government does not protect them, nothing will be done on any adequate scale. Such is an Indian population, and it would be unreasonable, as well as futile, to expect them to exhibit the virtues and strength of self-reliance. The degree in which our Government has protected them, is best to be judged of by the history of events.

In 1852 the Madras Commissioners of Public Works calculated that the famine of 1834 cost

250,000 lives, and induced a pecuniary loss of £2,250,000. This famine arose from the absence of artificial irrigation and of facilities for transport. When another drought occurred in the same Presidency in 1854, it turned out that, notwithstanding the Report of the Commissioners, no steps had been taken in the interval to remedy these evils. Even up to the year 1861, little had been accomplished with this view; and accordingly, in that year, a plague of hunger visited districts in India, which there is reason to think was without parallel, in the extent of the districts affected. Much has been done since, particularly in opening lines of communication, which, if sufficient for the requirements of the locality, at the last moment will almost always enable Government to avert the pressure of extreme dearth of food, by sending supplies of provisions into any district which is threatened. But all that had been done was not enough to prevent the occurrence of the Orissa famine, in which above a million and a half of people died, nor of a famine which is at this moment raging in Rajpootana; in the small district of Ajmere the official estimate of deaths from famine is already 70,000.

An official account says:

"The numbers which perished from starvation and exhaustion cannot be computed; there are no statistics to give a clue to this. Dead bodies and human bones were found in all directions; parties were constantly moving up and down the road to bury and burn those who had died by the wayside. In many instances the corpses were left to jackals and vultures."

APPENDIX C.

(p. 125.)

On January 26th, 1870, the news was announced in London, that a lease of the Bay of Semana, in St. (or San) Domingo, had been obtained at a rent of about £30,000 yearly, and this was looked on as preliminary to the annexation of the whole republic of San Domingo, if not of the entire island eventually. It seems that a treaty had already been concluded; the sum of $1,500,000 was to be paid as compensation for public buildings and property, and San Domingo was intended to be added to the Union as a Territory, under the tutelage of Congress, and not as a State. The treaty could not take effect till ratified by a vote of two-thirds of the Senate; but the Administration was stated to have been for some time using its influence to secure a favourable reception for the proposal.

This intelligence was considered, on its arrival

here, in quarters well informed as to American topics, to mark the definitive adoption of a new territorial policy on the part of the United States. The steps taken (generally by private parties) in order to acquire Cuba, and the negotiations for buying the island of St. Thomas, as well as the measures adopted with a view to the purchase of the territory of Alaska from Russia, prove to demonstration the nature of the tendencies relative to their territorial policy, which now find favour amongst our kinsmen on the other side of the Atlantic, who are actuated by the vigour and ancient instincts of their race.

APPENDIX D.

(p. 131.)

An adequate representation in London of the opinions prevalent in the colonies has long been felt to be a want; and till it is supplied, no one can say that a fitting place is provided for the colonies in the imperial system. The late Earl of Elgin and Lord Bury, some years since, expressed themselves as being deeply conscious of the urgency of this want, and the former of these noblemen entertained a confident anticipation that a remedy would be found for the difficulties incident to supplying it; as remedies had been found for other difficulties. Being one of the most successful and practical men of his day, he was all the more ready to believe that systems and solutions in accordance with the dictates of good sense would, in the working of a popular constitution like our own, be suggested by experience, and he knew the value of the principle of growth.

The late Sir George C. Lewis, who is supposed to have been distinguished by his power of apply-

ing rare and accurate judicial qualities of mind to Politics and Political Science, more, perhaps, than any other contemporary Statesman, thus recorded the conclusion he arrived at (*Lewis's Government of Dependencies*, p. 308).

"It seems desirable that a dependency should have a representative agent in the dominant country to watch over the interests of his constituents, and serve as an organ of communication between them and the Supreme Government; and the mode of determining the functions of such an agent, so as to enable the dependency to exercise a useful influence over the Supreme Government is a question which deserves more attention than it has yet received."

Sir George C. Lewis would, therefore, we may feel well assured, have approved of inviting representatives or quasi-ambassadors from the self-governing Colonies.

Lord Grey says in his book on the Colonial Policy of Lord John Russell's Administration, that the Ministry "considered that upon certain colonial subjects, the ancient practice of calling upon the Committee of the Privy Council of Trade and Foreign Plantations to act as a deliberative body, might be usefully revived."

The Committee did give advice on establishing constitutions for the Cape and Australia.

It would be in accordance, therefore, with both ancient and modern practice to commit to a Colonial Court of Privy Council the duty of advising the Secretary for the Colonies, as to the proceedings to be adopted by him.

To commit this duty to such a Court of Privy Council, if to do so is looked on as a permanent arrangement, and if the Court were adequately constituted with regard both to the numbers and to the character and consideration enjoyed by its members, instead of merely consulting the Committee of the Privy Council of Trade and Foreign Plantations, would ensure stability of purpose on the part of the Home Government, and an administration of affairs according to fixed rules, which is impossible when views, and principles, and action are varied with each change of individuals holding the office of Secretary of State for the Colonies. The changes are supposed to be more frequent than in any other great post under the Crown. Of course a Colonial Court of Privy Council could not consist of representatives from the Colonies. Representatives ought to meet separately.

The establishment either of an assembly of Representatives or of a Colonial Court of Privy Council, or still more of both, would at once do away with the danger, as well as with all apprehensions of the danger of the British Empire falling to pieces, since a machinery would have been created capable of dealing with the questions to be considered, and certain to be viewed with friendly eyes by the parties concerned. It is the absence of such a machinery which has allowed things to drift into their present position, or rather has directly caused them to do so. Unwise measures could seldom be properly understood when first proposed, in the state of matters which has existed, and it is now generally admitted that nothing could have been much more unwise, than to adopt many of the measures which have been adopted within the last thirty years.

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